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This is the second part of  the study commissioned by  the European Parliament's 
Directorate-General  for  Research  on  the  GATT  Uruguay  Round  agriculture 
negotiations.  More  specifically, it represents an up-date of that study in the 
light  of  the  major  new  developments  which  occurred  in  the  GATT  negotiations 
between  the  completion  of  the  first  part  of  the  study  in  June  1993  and  the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round  in Marrakesh on 15  April 1994.  The  new  sectoral 
studies concerning the implications of the agreements for the various production 
sectors have also been incorporated and they clarify,  supplement or correct the 
information given  in the first part of  the study. 
In the intervening period the Uruguay Round negotiations continued apace and the 
bargaining finally reached a  conclusion beyond the hard-line positions which the 
various parties had maintained until then for strategic purposes. 
On  20  September  1993  a  joint Agriculture/General  Affairs  Council  enabled  the 
European Union,  against all expectation,  to re-establish a  strong,  united front 
in order to assert its position in the negotiations.  The  Union thus regained the 
upper  hand  and  was  able  to exert  a  much  stronger  influence  on  the  subsequent 
course of  the negotiations. 
On  7  December  1993,  i.e.  a  week  before  the cut-off date  for  the negotiations 
which had been set unilaterally by  the  USA  and accepted by  GATT,  the Union  and 
the  USA  reached  a  balanced  agreement  on  agriculture.  The  agreement  differs 
substantially  in certain  respects  from  the  draft  Blair  House  agreement:  for 
instance, it significantly reduces the detrimental effects of the latter on the 
Union  and the  USA. 
The  implications  of  the  new  agriculture  agreement,  which  the  114  other  GATT 
contracting parties adopted and ratified on  15  December  1993  as part of  a  final 
agreement  which  includes  14  other areas,  differ significantly,  therefore,  from 
the implications which  the draft Blair House  agreement would have had.  For this 
DOC_EN\DV\273\273540 reason  the  question  of  compatibility  between  the  GATT  commitments  and  the 
reformed  common  agricultural policy  (CAP)  should be reconsidered. 
Furthermore,  a very important conclusion of the Jumbo  Council was  the commitment 
by the Council that the Union's commitments vis-a-vis GATT  should not impose any 
further constraint on European farmers as regards the level of support provided 
by  the CAP.  This means  that any  incompatib~lity between GATT  and the CAP  (which 
has  not,  therefore,  been  excluded  by  the  Council,  contrary  to  what  the 
Commission maintains)  will not result in a  watering-down of  the  CAP. 
Between  15  December  1993  and  15  April  1994  (the  date  on  which  the  Marrakesh 
agreements were officially signed)  the various parties were required to finalize 
their lists of  commitments  vis-a-vis  GATT.  These  lists,  which  ran  to several 
hundreds of pages,  were submitted more  or less on  time  to the  GATT  secretariat 
by  the  various parties,  each  of  which  threatened  to cut  back its list if the 
concessions it expected from  the other parties did not materialize. 
Before  they  can  be  implemented  the  agreements  have  to  be  ratified  by  the 
legislative bodies of  the various parties.  In June  1994  there were still major 
problems standing in the way  of ratification by  the  US  Congress because of  the 
reduction  in  customs  resources  as  a  result  of  the  commitments  to  reduce 
protection measures,  whilst in the European Union,  final ratification was  held 
up by  the question of the division of responsibility between the Commission and 
the Member  States,  some  of whom  insisted on being involved in the ratification. 
In  the  autumn  of  1994  the  Commission  was  due  to  publish  the  regulations 
concerning the transposition of the GATT  commitments,  which will mean  thorough-
going changes to the principles of the CAP  and most of the regulations governing 
the Common  Organizations  of  the Market  (COMs).  It should be  recalled that the 
Council and the Commission have given an undertaking that these changes will not 
result in any decrease in the support provided to Union  farmers. 
***** 
The  study  begins  by  establishing the  precise  chronology  of  the  Uruguay  Round 
negotiations  between  June  1993  and  the  conclusion  thereof  in  April  1994  to 
enable readers to follow events on a  day-to-day basis and to see how  the various 
stages are linked. 
The  second part is concerned with the agriculture agreement of  7  December  1993 
between the European Union  and the  USA  and establishes a  comparison between it 
and the draft Blair House  agreement.  The  final agreement signed on  15  December 
1993  by  the  116  contracting  parties  is  then  considered,  with  its  various 
agricultural and non-agricultural sections. 
The  fourth  part  of  the  study sets out  to  consider,  in  the  light  of  the  most 
recent studies,  the implementation and the implications of the GATT  commitments 
as  regards  the major  production sectors.  Where  possible the possible risks of 
GATT-CAP  incompatibility  or  disadvantages  to  producers  are  indicated  in 
accordance with the international data on which the assumptions are based.  By 
its  very  nature,  such  an  assessment  cannot,  therefore,  claim  to  be  either 
exhaustive or infallible.  Its main objective is to set out,  in the clearest and 
simplest  way  possible,  the  implications of  the  GATT  commitments,  although  the 
lists of commitments are extremely complex,  even for specialists,  and it is very 
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parameters which will have a  decisive influence on the implications of  GATT  for 
European agriculture. 
A section of  the study is then devoted  to Parliament's activities relating to 
the GATT  negotiations  between June  1993  and  June  1994. 
Lastly,  in the light of  the analyses undertaken  in the preceding sections  the 
conclusion  to  the  study  tries  to  present  current  ideas  on  the  compatibility 
between  the  GATT  commitments  and  the  CAP  and  the  likely  implications  for 
European agriculture. 
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The  multilateral trade negotiations known  as the GATT  Uruguay  Round  began more 
than  seven  years  ago.  The  15  areas  covered  by  the  negotiations  include 
agriculture,  which  is a  new  departure,  since it was  more  or  less  explicitly 
excluded from all the previous GATT  rounds. 
It  was  quickly  realized  that  the  proposals  by  the  United  States  and  the 
countries within the Cairns Group would have had the effect of dismantling the 
common  agricultural policy,  a  pillar of Community  integration since 1962.  The 
countries  concerned  skilfully presented  their  arguments  to  the  GATT  and  the 
media  in  such  a  way  as  to  isolate  the  Community  from  international  public 
opinion  by  portraying  it  as  solely  responsible  for  the  deadlock  in  the 
agricultural negotiations  and the  Uruguay  Round  in general.  Community  export 
subsidies were the constant target of American attacks, which sought to distract 
attention  from  their  own  subsidies  (deficiency  payments).  Owing  to  the 
divergent interests of the 12  Member  States and the lack of political unity,  the 
Community  had great difficulty in defending its interests with a  single, strong 
voice and securing their recognition by the international community.  From  1986 
onwards it remained in a  defensive posture,  acting as  the accused.  The  draft 
EU/US  agricultural  agreement  of  November  1992,  known  as  the  Blair  House 
Agreement,  was  the  logical  outcome  of  the  Community's  lack  of  political 
consistency. 
In the middle of the battle of experts waged  between the Commission,  farm trade 
organizations and national governments, it was  very difficult to obtain a clear-
cut  idea  about  the practical effect  of  the  commitments  included  in the draft 
agreements and about the consequences of those commitments for the vital aspects 
of  Community  agriculture  (production  volumes,  percentage  of  land  set  aside, 
level  and  type  of  support  by  product,  farm  incomes).  An  assessment  of  the 
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generated divergent and opposing conclusions which were  frequently difficult to 
understand. 
The  European Parliament,  responsible to the 340  million Union citizens that it 
represents,  decided to commission a  study designed to place the GATT  events,  as 
conveyed  by  the media,  in context so as  to make  them  comprehensible  for  MEPs, 
and  to  provide  them  with  all  the  information  needed  to  reach  their  own 
conclusions:  in addition to setting out the progress of negotiations from  1986 
onwards,  the  study was  to present what  was  at stake  in the  Uruguay  Round,  in 
terms of agriculture,  for the various parties and the strategies that they had 
developed; it was  then to analyse as comprehensively and objectively as possible 
all the literature available on the subject.  In particular, it was  supposed to 
analyse the different assessments  of  the  consequences  of the draft agreements 
for European agriculture,  and above all enable a  comparison to be drawn between 
their  respective  conclusions,  by  setting  out  and  explaining  the  economic 
hypotheses  on  which  they were  based.  These hypotheses  were,  in fact,  the key 
to  understanding  the  assessments.  Readers  would  then  be  able  to  agree  or 
disagree  with  the  judgment  mad~ of  any  given  hypothesis  and  make  their  own 
judgments.  The  same  approach  was  to  apply  to  the  assessments  of  the 
compatibility of  the draft agreements  and  the reformed CAP. 
HOW? 
The  first  stage  of  the  study  comprised  gathering  together  the  abundant 
literature on  the subject,  attempting to be as comprehensive as possible. 
The  second stage,  which was  essential for an understanding of current or future 
events,  was  the chronological description of  the progress of the Uruguay  Round 
from  1986  onwards,  together  with its main  punctuating events:  the  Punta  del 
Este  Declaration  (September  1986),  the  mid-term  review  in  Montreal  and  the 
Geneva meeting (December  1988 and April 1989),  the proposals made  by the various 
parties  (autumn  1989  and  1990),  the  'final'  Brussels meeting  (December  1990), 
the Dunkel compromise  (December  1991)  and the draft EC/US bilateral agricultural 
agreement,  known  as  the  Blair  House  Agreement.  The  details  of  what  was  at 
stake,  economically  and  politically,  for  each  party  in  the  agricultural 
negotiations,  makes  it  easier  to  understand  the  different  positions,  by 
'standing  in  the  other  party's  shoes',  and  also  to  home  in  on  the  strategy 
followed  by  each  party,  with  varying  degrees  of  success,  to  achieve  its own 
objectives. 
Once  the events  of  the  Uruguay  Round  were  placed in context,  the study could 
attempt to pull together several aspects of the information found in the studies 
analysed,  as follows: 
detailed implications, sector by sector, of the commitments contained in the 
draft  agreements,  and  impact  on  (subsidized  and  total)  exports,  refund 
budgets,  import  volumes  and  internal  supports.  The  changes  could  be 
calculated on  two  bases: 
between  the period of reference to the  GATT  {1986-88  and  1986-90)  and 
1999,  or 
between  the  'current'  period  (1991)  and  1999; 
conseauences  of  the  commitments  contained  in the draft  agreements  for  the 
vital aspects of agriculture, either globally or sector by sector: production 
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prices. 
Fortified by  the information contained in the sections referred to above,  the 
study  was  then able  to embark  on its most difficult stage:  an  assessment  as 
such of the consequences of the draft agreements for agriculture and of GATT/CAP 
compatibility: 
to  do  this,  it was  first  necessary  to  list  all  the  economic  hypotheses 
underpinning  each study  and  compare  the various studies with each other so 
as to reach an initial judgment about those hypotheses which seemed the most 
realistic,  on  the basis of  individual criteria; 
finally,  it  was  possible  to  summarize  the  consequences  of  the  GATT 
commitments  for each sector  (indicating the hypotheses used and the changes 
envisaged  by  the  CAP,  as  reformed  in  May  1992),  and  thus  arrive  at  a 
conclusion about  GATT/CAP  compatibility. 
WHAT  CONCLUSIONS? 
The  consequences  of  the  commitments  contained  in  the  draft  GATT  agreements 
obviously  vary  from  one  sector  to  another,  and  may  diverge  considerably 
depending on  the hypothesis chosen. 
Since the consequences were projected forward to 1999  the study necessarily had 
to  take  into  account  the  outcome  of  the  various  hypotheses  for  changes  in 
macroeconomic  indicators for the next  few  years:  there is thus a  major degree 
of uncertainty, since no-one can predict whether these hypotheses will actually 
come  true.  We  simply selected the hypotheses which  seemed  the most realistic. 
Moreover,  given what  we  knew  as at  30  June  1993  it was  extremely difficult to 
separate the effects of the GATT  commitments themselves from those brought about 
by  the CAP  reform,  which will necessarily play some  part (it should be pointed 
out here that,  at present,  CAP  reform plans run only until  1996,  and  that the 
future  of  internal and external support thereafter is unknown:  the  CAP  rules 
therefore  had  to  be  extrapolated  for  1996  to  1999,  on  the  basis  of  a 
continuation of the current course). 
In June  1993  there was  little or nothing in the way  of studies giving detailed 
consideration to the consequences  (which  are only now  beginning to emerge)  of 
the  new  CAP  for  the  various  reformed  sectors;  to  some  extent  we  had  to 
'unbundle'  them  from  the  GATT  effects  themselves,  since the  CAP  reforms  were 
largely undertaken in  (risky)  anticipation of  the GATT  conclusions. 
Another  gap  is  that,  in  the  case  of  those  sectors  which  have  not  yet  been 
reformed,  it was  obviously impossible to examine the compatibility of the GATT 
commitments with the new  CAP.  These sectors are not insignificant,  since they 
include wine.  and  fruit and  vegetables.  It is to be feared that these sectors 
will  be  'sacrificed',  and  that  the  CAP  reform  will  have  to  be  limited  to 
ratifying the commitments  made  to GATT  without the possibility of changing the 
manner  or  level  of  support.  It should  be  recalled  that  these  sectors  are 
already characterized  by  a  weak  COM  (common  organization of  the market).  It 
will  therefore  only  be  possible  to  examine  GATT/CAP  compatibility  for  these 
major sectors once the draft reforms have been presented by  the Commission and 
accepted by  the Council.  Although the Commission's proposals for reform of the 
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debated,  those concerning fruit and vegetables have not yet been published. 
The  concluding table sets out,  sector by  sector,  the consequences  of  the  GATT 
commitments,  those of the reformed CAP,  the hypotheses used and the conclusions 
regarding compatibility.  This is only a  highly compressed summary,  which must 
be  read  in  coniunction  with  the  discussion  of  the  hYPotheses  cited.  which 
provide the key to the whole approach  (a  'literal' reading of the conclusions, 
stripped of context and details,  would  lead to major errors). 
If one  wished to sum  up the conclusions of this study in a  few  words,  it could 
be said that incompatibility between the commitments contained in the GATT  draft 
agreements and the CAP,  as reformed in May  1992,  is the dominant feature in many 
sectors.  The constraints imposed by GATT  would therefore unfortunately compound 
those already introduced by  the new  CAP. 
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What  issues were at stake in the GA  1T Uruguay Round negotiations? Why did the Uruguay Round last seven 
years? Why was agriculture the focus of the discussions? When did the 'round' start, and when and how did it 
finish? What is the difference between the Dunkel project, the Blair House draft agreement,  the agreement of 7 
December 1993, the agreement  of 15 December 1993 and  the Marrakech  agreements?  How is GATI going to 
affect European farmers and agricultural and agri-food imports and exports? Which sectors will be most affected, 
and how? Will the commitments made at GA  Tf  be compatible with the common agricultural policy of May 1992? 
Why? Under what conditions? What role has the European Parliament played in the negotiations and what impetus 
has  it given them? 
This is the kind of question which the study has tried to answer, provided that answers are available,  on the basis 
of what appeared to be the most appropriate economic assumptions. The aim was not to steer the reader's opinion 
in any particular direction but to inform Members and other interested parties as objectively as possible about the 
implications of the GA  Tf  agreements for each of  the major production sectors so that they could act, take decisions 
or adopt a position in full possession of the facts. 
The study  represents  the  second  part  of a  piece  of research  commissioned  by  the  European  Parliament's 
Directorate-General  for Research on the subject and  constitutes a more detailed, up-to-date version as regards the 
implications of GA Tf for each  individual sector. 
The document,  which  wa~ written in  French but will  be tnm.slated  mto the other languages of the Union, begins 
with a brief chronological overview of the progre1.s of the negotiations, summJI·inng the agreements  of 7 and  15 
December 1993 and comparing the substance and  implicauons thereof with those stemming from  the draft Blair 
house agreement.  Details are then given, for each of the Union's main <Jgricultunll  production sectors, ofthe likely 
implications of the agreement for the three area~ affected:  imp011  mnngcments, export arrangements and internal 
support.  New  information  on  compatibility  between  the  CAP  and  GA TI is  then  provided  to round  off the 
conclusions of the first part of the study. La->tly,  the work of the European  Parliament,  in particular the various 
resolutions and reports which it has  drawn  up on the  Umguuy  Round,  i'>  briefly  presented. 
There is  an  attached  bibliography ''  hich update-;  the  one  111  the  fit 't part  of the study. 
The  purpose  of the  two-p<Jrt  European  Parliament  study  cntllku  'The  GATT  Umguay  Round  <Jgriculture 
negotiations'  is  to  explain,  m everyday  langudge  ,,nd  u~ing sunumr\'  '>hCet<;  <1nd  tables,  the implications  of the 
agreements  for the various sectors of European  dgriculture. 
Or.  :FR 
For further information, please canmer 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR RESEARCH 
Agriculture,  Fisheries,  Forests and  Rural 
Development  Division 
Mrs SCHELLING- SCH.6107 
L-2':12':!  LUXEMBOURG 
Tel  :  (3:121  ~.)lJO --1104  01  2552 
Fa-.,  \.)52) 4300 7719 
traduit en  DA-DE-EL-EN-ES-Fl-IT-NL-PT-SV EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL  FOR  RESEARCH 
Division for Agriculture.  Fisheries. 
Forestry and Rural  Development 
Press release on the study 
"The agricultural negotiations within the GATT  Uruguay Round" 
STRASBOURG,  17  November  1993 
W6  - Part I 
FR-7-1993 
The  European  Parliament  closely  monitored  the  progress  of  the  Uruguay  Round 
trade negotiations  from  their inception in  1986,  particularly with  regard  to 
agriculture,  and  expressed  its  views  on  several  occasions  in  own-initiative 
resolutions. 
Parliament,  aware  of  what  was  at  stake  in  the  negotiations  for  the  common 
agricultural  policy,  the  future  of  the  Community's  1  0  million  farmers,  the 
Community's  economy  in  general  and  the daily  lives  of  the  340  million  Union 
citizens that it represents,  decided on practical involvement by  commissioning 
a  detailed study  on  the  implications of  the negotiations and  the consequences 
of  the  draft  agreements  (Dunkel  compromise  draft  Blair  House  Agreement)  for 
agriculture in the Community.  The  compatibility of the draft agreements and the 
new  CAP,  the  focus  of  discussions  within  the  Community  and  the  GATT  from 
November  1992  onwards,  was  a  major concern for the European Parliament,  and the 
study seeks to sum  up  this complex  problem for the main agricultural products 
concerned,  reach  conclusions  regarding  compatibility  and  set  out  the 
consequences  of  the  draft  agreements  for  the  vital  aspects  of  Community 
agriculture. 
For  further information,  please contact: 
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164 GENERAL  INTRODUCTION  AND  METHODOLOGY 
The  current cycle of  trade negotiations  under  the  GATT,  known  as  the  Uruguay 
Round,  began  in  September  1986.  The  European  Parliament's  Committee  on 
Agriculture  and  Committee  on  External  Economic  Relations  have  regularly 
requested  the  Commission  to  keep  them  informed  of  the  stage  reached  in  the 
negotiations. They have also tabled EP  resolutions on the Uruguay Round and the 
issues involved for agriculture and the EC  in general,  dating particularly from 
the  STAVROU  report,  submitted to the  Committee on External Economic  Relations 
in May  1990 and adopted in plenary in September 1990  (resolution A3-215/90).  The 
EP  is  seeking  to  use  those  reports  and  resolutions  to  demonstrate  its  keen 
interest in this subject, given that it bears responsibility here vis-a-vis the 
345  million citizens of  Europe.  It is also  seeking  to  remedy  in this  way  the 
democratic deficit from which it, among  the Institutions, suffers: there is in 
fact nothing in the treaties to indicate that Parliament has to be consulted or 
involved in international  negotiat~ons. 
In  early  1993,  observing  the  battle  of  experts  be~ng  waged  between  the 
Commission departments,  the trade organizations and the national delegations to 
the  Council,  and  also  noting  the  dearth  of  studies  providing  a  statistical 
analysis to back up  their evaluation of  the draft agreement,  the  Committee  on 
Agriculture  (via its chairman,  Mr  BORGO)  and the Committee on External Economic 
Relations  (via  its  vice-chairman  and  rapporteur  for  the  Uruguay  Round,  Mr 
STAVROU)  asked the Directorate General  for Research to include  in  ~ts 1993-94 
research programme a  study evaluating the chapter on agriculture of the Uruguay 
Round and its consequences for Community agriculture. 
The  Directorate  General  for  Research  asked  the  Division  for  Agriculture, 
Fisheries,  Forestry and Rural  Development  to undertake that  study. 
It is no  easy matter to evaluate agreements as complex as  the  GATT  agreements. 
It is no  coinc~dence that the specialist services of the Commission,  the Member 
States and the COPA  have been trying desperately to prepare such a  study for six 
months  now  but  have  as  yet  to  arrive  at  clear,  precise  and  unequivocal 
conclusions.  The  fact is that,  because of  large number  of  economic  mechanisms 
affected by the agreements,  a  proper evaluation has to involve simulating their 
effects,  on  the basis of extremely complicated and complex econometric models. 
If such models are to be  established, it is crucial to set in place in advance 
a  large  number  of  macroeconomic  hypotheses  which  w~ll  enable  the  economic 
equations  contained  in  the  model  to  function.  It  is  essential  that  such 
hypotheses be precisely defined and justified if the evaluations are to be able 
to  be 'assessed  and  compared.  This  is  therefore  a  very  technical  and  complex 
task,  involving a  variety of disciplines. 
Unfortunately, the European Parliament does not itself have the resources needed 
to carry out  such an evaluation,  although this is extremely important  from  the 
social,  economic and,  above all, political po~nt of view.  Consequently,  as our 
human and financial resources are very limited,  we  have opted to deal with  th~s 
vast  and  complex  subject  in  stages.  The  first  stage  involved  establishing a 
systematic approach,  providing a  global picture of the problem,  on the basis of 
all the available data which  had been collected,  listed and analysed. 
- 6  -In  this  first  stage  of  the  study,  we  were  unable  ourselves  to  establish  an 
econometric model,  for several obvious  reasons: 
the  fact  that  such  studles  exist  on  the  market  and  have,  in  the  first 
instance,  to be brought  together,  analysed,  understood,  compared and assessed, 
before we  ourselves embark  on so complicated,  difficult and  costly a  study; 
the  short  period of  the  contract  (5  months)  meant  that it was  in any  case 
impossible to establish such a  model; 
the  ne~d, first and foremost,  to collect and analyse the  general literature 
on the subject. 
The  first  phase  of  the  study,  which  we  carried out  from  1  January  to  31  May 
1993,  therefore comprised an,  of necessity, superficial and simplified approach, 
based on  gathering together  and analysing the abundant  literature exlsting on 
the  subject  (key  words:  "Uruguay  Round"  and  "agriculture").  As  a  result,  the 
analysis  drawn  up  cannot  exactly  tie  up  with  the  specific  request  of  the 
European Parliament and its own  focus  of interest.  We  had to a  large extent to 
rely  on  the  figures  of  the  Commisslon  and  the  COPA,  which  do  not  necessarlly 
have the same political objectives or centres of interest as the EP.  Therefore, 
a  critical discussion of their various hypotheses seemed to us crucial to enable 
us  to  arrive  at  a  conclusion  which  lS  our  own  and  takes  into  account 
Parliament's specific objectives. That discussion in fact allows us,  despite our 
very limited resources,  to employ the conclusions arrived at  by  the Commission 
and the COPA  as  required by the problems  of specific lnterest to us. 
Once  we  had entered into as  broad  as  possible  a  range  of  contacts with those 
bodies directly involved in the issue  (see  the list of contacts attached)  and 
collected as  much  written data as  possible,  we  had  to evaluate  the different 
sources  and  draw  up  a  summary  critical  analysis  to  enable  us  to  arrive  at 
conclusions in relation to the issues originally of concern to  us,  ie "is the 
Washinqton  draft  agreement  compatible  with  the  CAP  and  what  will  be  its 
consequences for European agriculture?" We  had to sort through the studies and 
retain the most  reliable of  them,  on  the basis of  two  main criteria: 
presentation of  a  precise  argument,  backed  by  statistics,  and  basing  its 
evaluation of  the  agreements  and  its conclusions  on  the  compatibility of  the 
Washington draft agreement  with  the  CAP  reform;  studies which did not  contain 
an argument  backed by statistlCS could not  be  analysed and were  therefore not 
rellable; 
a  specific,  exhaustive  and  precise  presentation  of  all  the  economic  and 
agronomic.hypotheses underlying the models;  few studies meet this criteria, and 
we  had to :rely on the two main studies which set out their hypotheses l.n detail: 
the  Commission  and  COPA  studies.  Some  assessments  in  fact  refer  to  the 
hypotheses and figures contained in one or the other of these studies ln drawing 
up their own  evaluation of what  is being proposed. 
The list of economic hypotheses was of course.vital to enable us to understand, 
place in pontext  and assess  the models  based on  them.  Without  the hypotheses, 
it  is  not  possible  to  compare  the  assessments.  Where  feasible,  however,  a 
comparison  is  extremely  interesting  and  makes  it  possible  to  explain  the, 
sometimes  huge,  differences  in  the  conclusions  arrived  at  in  the  different 
evaluations. More partl.cularly,  the on occasion radical differences between the 
conclusl.ons  arrived at  by  the  Commission  a~ the  COPA,  which  at  first  sight 
appear  surprising,  can  easily  be  explained  if  we  go  back  to  the  different 
hypotheses  and  compare  them.  In  fact,  decidl.ng  what  are  the  most  plausible 
- 7  -hypotheses, -according to our criteria and  ~nformation, will make it possible to 
single out  the most  reliable results  1.n  each study and  establish a  "personal" 
view as to the compatibility of the agreements with the CAP. 
Only  in a  second phase  (and after having fully assimilated the results of  the 
first)  will it be possible to effect a  more  independent analysis that is more 
thorough-going  and  more  specific  in  relation  to  our  centres  of  interest  and 
objectives. This also presupposes that adequate resources will be available to 
us. 
The  study is made  up as  follows:  after describing the special features of  the 
agricultural sector and  the  background to  the  trade d1.sputes  which  led to the 
Uruguay Round,  we  go on to detail the principles and objectives of the GATT  and 
the outcome of previous negotiating rounds,  to introduce the Uruguay Round - its 
initial objectives, the issues involved for the different parties, the principal 
stated negotiating positions and the main stages in the negotiations up to the 
Washington  agreement.  The  most  recent  events  in  the  negotiations,  which  are 
actively taking place as this is being written, will be covered,  as will be the 
discussions on  this issue in the  European Parliament. 
This will enable us  to evaluate the draft  agreement,  on  the basis of the ma1.n 
studies analysed:  the  results of  those studies will  be  presented and  compared 
in tables,  while  the  hypotheses  on which  they are  based will  form  the subject 
of  a  specific,  comparative analysis,  also in tabular form. 
We  shall then be in a  position,  following critical discussion of the results and 
hypotheses contained in the main studies,  to reach our own  conclusions as to the 
compatibility of  the  Washington  draft  agreement  with  the  CAP  reform  and  its 
consequences for agriculture in the Community.  We  shall then attempt to present 
very concisely and as clearly as  possible  (in tables)  the conclusions,  sector 
by sector, as to the compatibility and consequences of the commitments contained 
in the draft agreement.  Reading through the tables will provide a  general idea 
of  compatibility,  on  an  individual  sector  basis,  but  this  will  be  only  very 
incomplete  and  will  need  to  be  supplemented by  looking at  the  analyses  which 
have  led to this general conclusion and  the hypotheses applied. 
As  comprehensive as possible a  bibliography will be provided by  way  of  annex. 
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- 10  -1 •  PREFACE:  SPECIFIC  FEATURES  OF  THE  AGRICULTURAL  SECTOR  AND  AGRICULTURAL 
MARKETS 
1.1.  THE  INDIVIDUALITY  OF  THE  AGRICULTURAL  SECTOR 
The  expression  "European  agriculture"  is  commonly  used  for  convenience,  as 
though it were  a  single,  uniform  whole  which  could  be  defined  in  terms  of  a 
number of common values,  but the differences among the 8. 65 million farms in the 
European agricultural area are  so great  that it would  be  more  appropr~ate to 
refer  to European  farmers  and  systems  of  European agriculture in  the  plural. 
It is true that  some of  these farms  produce the same  products,  but  there is an 
enormous contrast between the large farms  of  the northern European plains,  run 
on  the most  up-to-date lines,  and  the  smallholdings of  a  few  hectares devoted 
to subsistence farming  in many  of the southern regions of  the Community and in 
mountainous  areas.  The  diversity  of  agricultural  structures  stems,  in 
particular, from the natural conditions (soil, climate) ,  the size of the farms, 
the production methods used, the age and technical expertise of the farmers, the 
economic  environment  and  the  degree  of  development  of  non-agricu1  tura1 
activities in the various regions of the Community, etc.  Over twenty-five years 
of the Common Agricultural Policy  (CAP)  have not eradicated these long-standing 
differ'ences,  which  in  some  cases  had  been  consolidated  by  nat~onal policies 
existing before the introduction of the common market in agriculture, and indeed 
they have been accentuated by  successive Community  enlargements. 
Whilst stark contrasts do  ex~st between agricultural structures in the European 
Economic Community  (EEC)  from one country to another,  and indeed from one region' 
to  another,  there  is,  however,  a  common  denominator  which  differentiates 
European  agriculture  as  a  whole  from  agricultural  systems  elsewhere  in  the 
world,  in  particular  the  United  States.  The  basic  model  for  European 
agriculture is a  small,  often  fragmented,  family business,  engaging in mixed 
farming using labour-intensive methods.  The following is a  telling comparison. 
In  1957,  when  the  Community  carne  into  being,  it  had  65  million  hectares  of 
farmland,  worked by  17.5 million farmers,  to feed the Community  population of 
150  million.  At  the  same  time,  the  United  States had  more  than  400  million 
hectares  for  a  population of  200  million,  whilst  the  former  Soviet  Union  had 
more  than  600  million hectares for  a  population of just under  250 million.  On 
average,  each American farmer  had  100  hectares of  land,  twenty  times  the area 
worked by his Eur-opean counterpart  (5 ha).  Each American farmer  fed an average 
of  50  people,  whereas  his  European  counterpart  fed  only  10  and the  Community 
produced only 85%  of its food  needs.  Thirty years  on,  although  employment  in 
the agricultural sector has  been halved,  the average area of  farms  in the  EEC 
is  13  ha,  compared  with  200  ha  in  the  United  States,  and  the  density  of 
agricultural assets is  8  annual  labour  units  per  100  ha,  against  less  than  1 
annual  labour  unit/100  ha  in  the  United  States.  Some  60%  of  farms  in  the 
Community have an area of less than  5  ha,  this figure rising to over  80%  in the 
case of Portugal. 
Given this structural shortcoming,  one of  the most  urgent  tasks of  the  Common 
Agricultural Policy  (CAP)  was  to increase agr~cultural incomes.  There were  two 
ways of achieving this; by paying direct income subsidies to farms,  or by fixing 
remunerative  market  prices.  The  founder  States  of  the  Community  chose  th~s 
second  option  for  most  products.  In  view  of  the  large  number  of  farmers 
involved and  the wide  variety of economic  and working conditions,  this method 
was  less  bureaucratic  and  cumbersome  than  direct  income  subsidies 
(interestingly,  in  1992,  in  the  third  phas~ of  CAP  reform,  this  approach  was 
reversed).  Moreover,  this  pol~cy fitted in well with the course taken by most 
- 11  -of  the  Member  States,  and  avoided abrupt  switches  in national policies.  The 
market  and  price  policy  was  later  supplemented  by  a  common  soclo-structural 
policy. 
The  EEC  is  not  alone  in  having  an  agricultural  pollcy:  indeed,  all  other 
industria~ized  countrles  have  some  means  or  other  of  protecting  their 
agricultural sector.  For  instance,  in  1987,  the United States accorded 11',250 
US  dollars  per farmer  in agricultural subsidies,  approximately five  times  the 
amount  of  the  average aid granted to  European  farmers  under  the  CAP  (EAGGF  -
Guarantee and Guidance sections) . 
1.2.  FEATURES  OF  INTERNATIONAL  AGRICULTURAL  MARKETS 
The  EEC  and  some  other  countries  (such  as  Japan)  uphold  the  very  important 
principle  that  agriculture  is  a  very  special  sector,  which  is  subject  to 
climatic, soil, biological, economic and social constraints.  Accordingly, trade 
in agricultural products can never be treated in the same way as other areas of 
trade,  nor can  the  rules  governing  those other areas  be  applied directly to 
agriculture.  Agricultural products are peculiar in that they are bulky and  (to 
a  greater or lesser extent)  perishable,  which determines the way in which they 
are  marketed,  and  they  have  the  important  strategic  role  of  feeding  the 
population.  Taken  together  with  their  sensitivity  to  natural  phenomena 
(droughts,  floods,  soil  erosion,  etc),  these  characteristics explain the  two 
principal  features  of  agricultural  trade:  the  low  relative  volume  of 
internatibnal markets and the small number of products involved.  Moreover,  in 
most  cases,  quanti  ties  sold  on  the  world  market  merely  reflect  short-term 
fluctuations  in production in the  large producer countries,  whereas  the  other 
component of the market,  demand,  is characterlzed by its very high stability and 
inelasticity in relation  to  supply.  This  means  that  world  market  prices  are 
subject  to major fluctuatlons:  this  lS  partlcularly true of sugar,  cereals and 
dairy products.  In the case of other products,  such as  bovine meat,  sheepmeat, 
tobacco and wine,  there is no real world market,  and prices vary according to 
the  destination  of  the  exports.  Hence  the  overriding  attachment  of  all 
countries - from the poorest to the most  highly "developed"  - to food security. 
This explains  the  basic mechanisms  of  the  CAP  and  the  American Farm Bill,  and 
why  it  is  difficult  to  liberalize  agricultural  markets  along  the  lines  of 
markets  in other sectors.  The  fact  that,  throughout  the various  GATT  rounds, 
agricultural  products  have  always  been  treated  separately,  is  directly 
attributable to these  two  characteristics, which still apply. 
1.3.  THE  ORIGIN  OF  AGRICULTURAL  TRADE  CONFLICTS 
As  stated above,  the  volume  of  international agricultural trade  lS  relatively 
low  and  restricted to  products  which  can  be  stored.  To  cite an  example,  in 
1990,  world  agricultural  trade  amounted  to  only  10%  of  total  trade  (US$  320 
billion and US$  2,655 billion respectively,  and falling; see Table 1  at the end 
of  this  chapter).  This  is,  for  instance,  true  of  feed-grain,  one  of  the 
principal products traded on world markets  (world production in 1989  was  802.4 
million tonnes,  and world trade 94.0 million tonnes,  or  11.7%  of  production), 
and oilseeds  (production in 1989 244.8 million tonnes,  world trade 31.3 million 
tonnes,  or  12.8%  of production).  Most of the world's agricultural production 
is,  therefore,  sold for  local consumption.  Given  limited agricultural market 
volumes,  there will inevitably be  a  trade war  to capture these markets once the 
volume of supply exceeds,  however slightly, the volume of demand  (meaning, here, 
only solvent  demand,  of  course).  Only  a  small  number  of countries,  headed by 
the  United States  (14%)  and  the  EC  (12%),  far  ahead of  canada  (5%),  Australia 
- 12  -(4%)  and New Zealand  (2%),  export agricultural food products worldwide.  Solvent 
demand for agricultural products is also highly concentrated: the EC  (23%),  the 
United States  (11%),  the  former  USSR  (9%)  and Japan  (8%)  together account  for 
more than half of all imports of agricultural food products  (1986 flgures).  As 
to  the  dependence  of  world  markets  on  the  EC  and  the  United States,  the  two 
leading international tradlng countries in agrlcul  tural food products, Communl ty 
agricultural trade accounts for 12.1% of total extra-Community imports  (US$  71.2 
billion)  and  8.5%  of total extra-Community exports  (US$  44  billion),  givlng a 
deficit of  US$  26.4  billion  (1990  figures).  The  corresponding flgures  (same 
year)  for  the  United States were  7.0%  (US$  36.2 billion)  and  14.0%  (US$  52.5 
billion)  respectively,  giving  a  surplus  of  US$  16 . 3  billlon  (source:  The 
Agricultural  Situation  in  the  Community,  CEC  Report,  1992).  These  figures 
confirm the position of the  US  as  "leader" in world trade in agricultural food 
products  (leading  exporter,  second  lmporter,  with  a  trade  balance  well  in 
surplus),  followed by  the  EC  (leading importer,  second exporter,  with a  trade 
balance well  in deficit).  Moreover,  the  EC  has  a  negative balance of  ECU  2.5 
billion in its agricultural trade with the  US  (1990). 
What  has  happened  is  that  since  the  beginning  of  the  'eightles,  the  main 
agricultural  exporting  powers  have  reached,  then  structurally exceeded,  the 
level  of  self-sufficiency,  while  world  solvent  demand  has  stagnated.  This 
situation derives  from  the  fact  that,  as  a  result  of  the  combined  effect  of 
population  stagnation  and  saturation  point  being  reached  in  the  foodstuffs 
market,  domestic demand in the industrialized countries is not  growing as  fast 
as supply,  and some  "southern" countries have achieved self-sufficiency, while 
most  of  the  developing  countries  are  not  solvent.  This  has  given  rise  to 
increasingly acute  problems  in  disposing  of  growing  surpluses  on  limited and 
saturated markets,  which explains the ruthless trade war being waged by the main 
exporting  countries.  This  situation  is  an  apparent  paradox  given  the  food 
shortages  suffered  by  most  of  the  developing  countries,  ranging  from 
undernourishment to famine.  The  FAO  produces regular reports on the frequently 
very serious agricultural and  foodstuff deficit affecting more  than  one  thlrd 
of  the  world's  population  (it  should  be  stressed  that  this  lS  non-solvent 
demand). 
1 . 4.  THE  PROBLEM  OF  STRUCTURAL  SURPLUSES 
The  root of  the  trade conflicts among  the  main  agricultural product  exporters 
lies,  therefore,  in  certain  surpluses  which  cannot  be  placed  on  the  market 
without  subsidies.  What  is the reason  for  the  appearance  of  these  so-called 
structural surpluses?  As  we  have  seen  above,  the peculiarity of agricultural 
products is their vital strategic nature in feeding  the populatlon.  Since it 
is  not  possible  to  forecast  agricultural  production,  governments  have  done 
everything within their power to ensure that their countrles are self-sufficient 
in foodstuffs, by supporting domestic production and protecting against imports. 
By  1960,  neither the United States nor the EC  had achieved self-sufficiency in 
many  products,  and  several countries in Europe  were still suffering seriously 
from the effects of the food shortages experienced during the Second World War. 
Protectionism was,  moreover,  encouraged by the marked contrasts in the degrees 
of competitiveness of agriculture from one country to another.  That is why  the 
European Community established the  CAP  ln  1962.  This guarantees a  fair  income 
for  farmers  by  means  of  relatively  high  internal  prices  protected  agalnst 
fluctuations in world prices,  controls imports  by varlable levies and promotes 
exports  by  refunds,  which  are also variable.  The  United States has  sought  to 
achieve identical objectives by  other means,  which are frequently far  from  as 
transparent  as  the  EEC  levies  and  refunds  (quantitative  import  restrictions, 
- 13  -direct compensatory payments to producers, export subsidies and bonuses in kind, 
etc).  Above  all,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  these  policies- which,  of 
course,  have  been  adapted  to  internal  socio-structural  conditions  - have 
indisputably  succeeded,  since  self-sufficiency  has  been  achieved  and  amply 
exceeded,  making  the  United  States  and  the  EEC  the  world's  two  leading 
agricultural exporters;  for  instance,  in  the  case of  staple  products  such  as 
cereals, oilseeds and dairy products, the EEC  and the United States between them 
account  for  approximately  two-thirds  of  world  exports.  As  a  result,  at  the 
beginning of the 'eighties, world agricultural markets rapidly became saturated. 
This gave  rise to an  increasingly bitter and costly trade war  between the  two 
giants  (in competition,  moreover,  with countries operating a  comparatively free 
trade policy,  such as Australia,  New  Zealand and Argentina,  which have enormous 
agricultural potential and grant only small subsidies, if any,  for agricultural 
exports) over the main products traded: cereals, oilseeds, sugar, dairy products 
and bovine meat.  Export subsidies have become a  heavy,  even intolerable burden 
on the respective budgets.  World  markets are also distorted by  these subsidy 
wars - the first countries to pay the price being the developing countries whlch 
are  traditional  exporters  of  agricultural  products  and  also  find  themselves 
squeezed  by  the  deterioration  in  the  terms  of  trade,  although  the  reverse 
applies  to net  food-importing  developing countries,  which are able  to  procure 
supplies at low prices. 
1.5.  LEVELS  OF  SUPPORT  FOR  AGRICULTURE  IN  DIFFERENT  COUNTRIES 
The OECD  produces regular calculations showlng the level of support given to the 
agricultural sector in different countries.  The figures are based on an overall 
appraisal  of  the  various  different  types  of State  support  - both  direct  and 
indirect  for  agriculture.  In  1990  these  were  estimated  to  be  worth 
approximately 300 billion US  dollars.  The calculations show that Japan provides 
the highest level of  protection,  and  that  the  EEC  has  not  increased the level 
of  protection which  it affords  since  the  start  of  negotiations  in  the  GATT 
Uruguay Rpund,  but  nor  has it reduced it to  any appreciable extent.  Over  the 
last three years,  on the other hand,  the figures show a  marked reduction in the 
United  States.  These  dlfferences  are  attributed  basically  to  fluctuating 
exchange rates and  world prices.  The  OECD  reaches  these concluslons  by  means 
of an internatlonal comparison of  the producer subsidy equivalent  (PSE).  This 
index does not represent  a  measurement of  trade distortion as  such.  It is the 
payment  that  would  be  required  to  compensate  farmers  for  the  loss  of  income 
resulting from  the removal  of  the measures applied,  all things  being equal  in 
other respects  (see Table  2  at the end of this chapter} . 
Various  contracting parties.and  some  economists  have  suggested other ways  of 
calculating the level of support for agriculture, giving dlfferent results from 
the  OECD  method.  The  EC,  for  instance,  has  proposed  the  SMU  (Support 
Measurement  Unit),  which  differs  appreciably  from  the  PSE  used  by  the  OECD. 
However,  'the  PSE  is,  to  date,  the  reference  measurement  used  in  most  cases, 
since  no  other  unit  has  been  universally accepted.  There  are,  on  the  other 
hand,  various different ways  of expressing the PSE,  which allow comparisons to 
be  made  and  lead to different  conclusions:  the  PSE  may  be  expressed as  a  net 
percentage of  the final  value  of  the  product,  as  a  value  per  hectare of  land 
worked,  as  a  value  per  producer,  or  as  a  value  per  tonne  of  product.  For 
instance: 
percentage  PSE  is  a  global  approach  allowing  comparison  of  the  level  of 
support  for  agriculture  in  each  country  (see  Table  2  at  the  end  of  this 
chapter}; 
- 14  -PSE by producer can be used in a  comparative study for "social" purposes  (see 
Table  3  at the end of this chapter) ; 
PSE  by  hectare  of  land  worked  can  be  used  to  measure  the  degree  of 
"intensiveness" of support  for  each country; 
PSE  by tonne of product can be used  ~n a  comparative study focused directly 
on the competitive position of the various products in international trade, 
highlighting the extent  to  wh~ch subs~dies contribute  art~fic~ally to that 
position. 
There are no  reliable data on  the calculation of  the  last  two indices. 
It  would  be  a  mistake,  however,  to  consider  that  agriculture  is  the  only 
exception to  the  economic  rules,  that  it benefits  from  an  excessive level  of 
assistance from public funds or that this support could be completely abolished 
in the name  of fair treatment for all sectors of the economy.  In actual fact, 
all  human  activites,  in  one  way  or  another,  are  the  subject  of  governmental 
action,  which  varies according  to  the  characterist~cs peculiar  to  the  sector 
concerned.  Table 4,  at the end of this chapter,  shows,  for instance,  that other 
sectors  of  the  economy  of  the  EEC,  such  as  transport,  also  enjoy  subsid~es, 
which may  be  far higher than  those granted to agriculture. 
1.6.  THE  PROCESS  OF  GLOBALIZATION  OF  ECONOMIC  ACTIVITY  AND  AGRICULTURE 
Foreign  trade  is  the  oldest  manifestation  of  international  economic 
interdependence  and  the  interaction  between  the  two  fundamental  factors  -
imports  and  exports  - to  achieve  a  balance  between  supply  and  demand  in  the 
context of open economic systems.  Agricultural trade obeys certain rules which 
follow  from  the  nature  and  characteristics  of  these  products  (bulky  and 
perishable) ,  on  the  one  hand,  and  from  the  strategic  importance  for  feeding 
(first and foremost)  local populations,  on  the other. 
Certain economists  who  champion  the cause of  free  trade have  argued at  length 
in  favour  of  the expected benefits of  globalization of  the  world's  economies 
(economies  of  scale,  technological breakthroughs,  economic  growth,  employment 
etc)  for partners in international trade.  It is true that  there is a  positive 
connection  between  trade  and  economic  growth,  JUSt  as  other  forms  of 
international cooperation have a  favourable impact on development,  although the 
distribution of  these  benefits  among  the  partners  involved is not  known  w~th 
sufficient precision.  The economic cost of insufficient liberalization of world 
trade is, naturally,  higher for  the beneficiary countries  (net exporters),  and 
is doubtless  aggravated  by  the  absence  of  a  clearly defined  and  universally 
respected multilateral regulatory  framework. 
It is,  moreover,  accepted that  the globalization of  economic  activ~ty and  the 
resulting system of  interdependence between  one  country  and another seriously 
reduce  the  room  for  manoeuvre  for  national  governments  to  apply  economic 
policies  of  their  own  and  to  implement  national  measures  suited  to  the 
conditions and requirements of  economic units in the country concerned. 
This  interdependence has  also made  it more  difficult to define and defend  the 
national interest, which  ~s no longer confined to the geographical frontiers of 
a  nation-State.  An  increasing proportion of  the activity which contributes to 
the wealth of  a  country is now  carried on abroad  (imports)  and,  even when  this 
wealth creation occurs  with~n its territory  (exports),  there is an  increasing 
probability that it derives  from  act~vities conducted by foreign nationals for 
whom  the goods  are  intended  (mult~nat~onals). 
- 1 5  -This  phenomenon  has  led  to  a  new  internat1onal division  of  labour,  with  the 
result that production has  been transferred to countries with  low  wage  costs. 
The  globalization of  economic  activ1ty inev1tably results in a  certain degree 
of  uniformity  among  economic  systems.  Nevertheless,  many  differences  remain 
from one country to another in lifestyles and working methods.  Trading partners 
have different traditions, aspirations, soc1al values and regulatory frameworks. 
The act of competing for markets can,  therefore, give rise to tensions resulting 
from the incompatibility of different socio-economic systems.  Interpenetration 
of  markets  can,  moreover,  give  rise  to  major  socio-economic  imbalances 
(introduction of new habits, cessation of traditional economic activities which 
cannot  stand  up  to  foreign  competition,  etc.),  not  forgetting  the  adverse 
environmental  impact  of,  for  instance,  increased use  of  non-renewable  energy 
resources in transporting goods,  etc. 
In the case of agriculture, globalizat1on 1s  (and will continue to be)  limited, 
because,  as we  have mentioned above,  agricultural products,  by virtue of their 
nature  and  character1stics,  cannot  be  treated  in  the  same  way  as  industr1al 
goods.  This  is evidenced by,  inter al1a,  the  low  proportion of  agricultural 
products in world trade  (only 10%  of total international trade), which actually 
fell  by  6.5  percentage  points  during  the  period  1970-1990,  giving  way 
principally to manufactured goods  (see Table  1  at the end of  this chapter) . 
International economic  interdependence does  indeed exist in agriculture as  in 
the  other sectors of  the  economy,  but it is severely limited,  depending as  1t 
does  on  aspects  of  agronomy,  such  as  climate,  soil  and  biolog~cal factors. 
Moreover,  advances  in  biotechnology,  climatic  change  and  new  production 
techniques  have  reduced this 1nterdependence to a  small  number  of products  (a 
few  tropical and other products),  since most  crops  can  now  be  grown virtually 
anywhere.  Given  the  inelasticity  of  demand  for  agricultural  food  products 
(which  leaves  room  for  manoeuvre  only  in  the  case  of  new  or  h1gh-qual1ty 
products) ,  world  trade  in  these  products  can  be  expanded only at  the cost  of 
market  share held by another partner. 
The  EC  is a  striking example if we  consider  the composition of its imports of 
agricultural  food  products,  the  overwhelming  majority  of  which  are  products 
which could be  grown within the Community. 
Witness that in 1989/90, the Community imported 53 million tonnes of soya beans, 
soya  meal,  corn  gluten  feed  and  other  cereal  substitutes  as  animal 
feedingstuffs;  6.4  million  tonnes  of cereals  and  0.6  million  tonnes  of  rice; 
2.05  million  tonnes  of  sugar  (including  sugar  in  processed  products);  2.65 
million hl of wine  (1ncluding vermouths and flavoured wines);  1.  7 mill1on tonnes 
of  fresh  fruits  (not  including  citrus  fruits),  1.5  million  tonnes  of  citrus 
fruits and  0.9 million tonnes  of  fresh vegetables;  1  million tonnes  of  cotton 
(fibres);  0.463  thousand  tonnes  of  tobacco  (raw);  0.438  thousand  tonnes  of 
potatoes;  295,000  tonnes  of  bovine meat,  251,000  tonnes of  sheepmeat,  112,000 
tonnes  of  poultrymeat  and  40,000  tonnes  of  pigmeat  (live  animals  and  meat 
expressed in terms of fresh carcase weight,  including meat preserves);  113,000 
tonnes  of  cheese,  89,000  tonnes  of butter and  63,000  tonnes  of casein;  78,000 
tonnes  of olive oil;  67,000  tonnes  of alfalfa  (flour);  25,000  tonnes of eggs; 
floricultural products of  a  value equ1valent to 495.4  MECU,  etc. 
- 16  -Most of these imports enjoy preferential access,  including,  in the majority of 
cases, total exemption from customs duties and substantial reductions in levies, 
which represents an apprec1able loss of own  resources for the Community budget, 
amounting to several billion ECU,  but which has never been calculated precisely. 
According  to  some  estimates,  these  imports  correspond  to  an  area  of  over  20 
million  ha,  which  is  thus  transferred  away  from  Community  agriculture  (now 
obliged to set  aside  part of its own  land,  following  the  CAP  reform)  to non-
member  countries.  Community  dependence  on  external  sources  has  become 
particularly serious  in certain areas,  such  as  the  oilseeds sector,  in which 
Community  imports  account  for  44%  of  world  trade  (48%  in  the  case  of  soya) . 
This  dependence  sterns  from  the  artif1cial limitation of  Cornrnun1ty  production 
(CAP  reform  +  Blair  house  draft  accord),  1t  being perfectly poss1ble  to  grow 
these same products within the  EC. 
It is because  of  the current  economic crisis and growing competition in world 
trade that there has recently been such a  strong tendency to relocate production 
in low-wage-cost countries, and in view of this there is cause for grave concern 
about  the  economy  of  the  Community  in  a  period of  deep  recess1on  and  rising 
unemployment.  The  debate  triggered off  in  France  by  the  publication of  the 
Arthuis report, and the renegotiation of the NAFTA  agreement,  show how  important 
it is to combat  the likely effects of relocation, particularly exploitation of 
child  labour  and  other  unfair  social  dumping  practices,  which  violate  human 
rights and  human  dignity. 
It is vital that certain minimum social conditions be respected in the interests 
of  equity,  wh1ch  is  a  question  of  human  dignity  and  should  prevail  in 
international trade.  However,  the theory of comparative advantages and concern 
to promote economic  development  through trade  (which  was  the histor1cal basis 
for  the development of cap1talism in Europe)  led the founders of GATT  to decide 
not  to concern themselves with equitable labour standards based,  for  example, 
on  the  ILO's  International Labour  Code. 
From the first,  the idea of introducing the principle of maintaining reasonable 
labour  standards  into international  trade negotiations  was  in  the air,  being 
mentioned in the Havana Charter of 1948.  However,  several attempts to initiate 
a  debate on establishing a  link between trade and human rights fa1led.  The  time 
has  therefore come  to reopen  the debate  on  the social clause and  to make  this 
one of  the key  issues in GATT  negotiations. 
- 17  -TABLE  1 
Breakdown of world exports  by product,  1970-1990 
(percentage based on value) 
1 970  1980 
Goods  81  83 
Market  services  1 9  17 
100  100 
Agricultural products  1 6  1/2  1 2  1/2 
Mining and quarrying  1 2  22  1/2 
Manufactured goods  50  45  1/2 
Transport  8  1/2  7  1/2 
Travel  5  1/2  4 
Other market services 
and  income  6  6 
Source:  GATT 
TABLE  2 
PSE*,  net  percentage 
1990 
81 
1 9 
100 
10 
11 
57 
6 
5 
7 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Canada  31  39 
Australia  10  14 
Austria  33  39 
EEC  (1)  32  43 
Finland  60  67 
Japan  67  69 
New  Zealand  18  23 
Sweden  38  40 
USA  28  32 
AVE.  OECD  34  41 
*PSE= 
( 1) : 
Producer Subsidy Equivalent 
EEC  of the  10,  up to  1985 
EEC  of the  12,  from  1981 
49  46 
16  1 1 
50  53 
51  51 
70  71 
76  77 
33  1 4 
54  61 
43  41 
51  50 
1990: 
1 991 : 
Former  GDR  included in EEC  since  1990 
estimates 
provisional data 
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43  36  45 
10  1 0  1 5 
48  41  50 
49  41  49 
70  69  72 
74  70  66 
8  5  5 
58  52  61 
34  28  29 
45  40  45 
1/2 
1/2 
1 991 
45 
15 
52 
49 
71 
66 
4 
59 
30 
45 TABLE  3 
PSE*,  US$/producer 
Ave.  1987 
79-86 
Australia  4000  4000 
Canada  10000  17000 
EEC  (1)  7000  10000 
Japan  9000  16000 
New  Zealand  7000  3000 
USA  15000  26000 
AVE.  OECD  9000  14000 
*PSE= 
( 1 ) : 
Producer  Subsidy Equivalent 
EEC  of the  10,  up  to 1985 
EEC  of the  12,  from  1986 
1988 
4000 
16000 
10000 
18000 
2000 
23000 
14000 
1990: 
1991 : 
Former  GDR  included in EEC  since  1990 
estimates 
provisional data 
1989 
4000 
15000 
9000 
17000 
2000 
19000 
13000 
1990 
6000 
20000 
13000 
16000 
2000 
22000 
16000 
Source:  OECD,  Agricultura1 policies,  markets and trade,  1992. 
TABLE  4 
EC:  SUBSIDIES  BY  SECTOR 
% of value added 
1991 
5000 
22000 
13000 
17000 
1000 
22000 
16000 
Agriculture  Manufac- Ship- Railways 
turing  building 
1981- 1986- 1981- 1986- 1981- 1986- 1981- 1986-
86  88  86  88  86  88  86  88 
Italy  na  na  9.5  6.7  45.9  28.2  49.0  8.0 
Belgium  7.3  6.2  6.4  4.4  27.7  12.3  70.0  63.0 
France  1 2. 1  7.6  4.9  3.7  56.6  68.0  38.0  29.0 
Netherlands  7.2  6.2  4. 1  3.3  10.7  3.8  22.0  6.0 
UK  1 4. 1  8.6  3.8  2.7  21  . 6  25.0  18.0  9.0 
FRG  9.8  13.5  3.0  2.7  1 2. 3  16.6  37.0  32.0 
Source: 
1.  OECD 
2.  The  Economist,  23.11.1991 
- 19  -2.  THE  GATT  URUGUAY  ROUND,  FROM  THE  PUNTA  DEL  ESTE  DECLARATION  TO  THE 
WASHINGTON  DRAFT  EC-US  AGREEMENT  ON  AGRICULTURE 
2.1.  PRINCIPLES AND  OBJECTIVES  OF  THE  GATT- THE  FIRST  SEVEN  ROUNDS  AND  THEIR 
RESULTS 
2.1.1.  WHAT  IS  THE  GATT? 
The  General Agreement  on  Tar1ffs  and  Trade  was  negotiated in  1947  and entered 
into force in January 1948.  It is the only international treaty which lays down 
concerted rules for world trade.  There are currently 116 "contracting parties". 
The  Community is not  a  contracting party as such,  but  the interests of members 
are defended jointly by  the  Commission. 
2.1.2.  PRINCIPLES  AND  OBJECTIVES  OF  THE  GATT 
The  GATT  is complex,  but is derived from  a  limited number of  simple objectives 
and principles: 
non-discrimination  in  trade.  The  best-known  clause,  namely  the  "most-
favoured nation" clause, provides that member countries, known as contracting 
parties,  are obliged to grant  to each other treatment as  favourable as  the 
treatment which  they give to any  other country.  There are  two  exceptions: 
regional trad1ng arrangements, such as the European Economic Community  (EEC), 
deriving  from  Article  XXIV  (see  below) ,  and  provisions  in  favour  of 
developing countries; 
customs duties as,  in principle,  the only means of external protection, and 
the  binding  of  these  duties.  The  customs  duties  negotiated  between  the 
contracting parties are listed, for each member country,  in tariff schedules 
(the Common  Customs Tariff, or CCT,  in the case of the EEC),  and included in 
the Agreement.  Increases in customs duties, in principle prohibited, trigger 
compulsory compensation to the GATT  partners - hence the term "bound" duties; 
consultation, conciliation and dispute settlement.  Most disputes are settled 
directly  between  the  member  countries  concerned,  but  in  recent  years 
increasing  use  has  had  to  be  made  of  special  working parties  ("panels"), 
consisting  of  independent  experts  chosen  in  their  personal  capacity  from 
among  the nationals of countries which  do  not have  a  d1rect interest in the 
dispute concerned; 
waivers  and  possible  emergency  action.  In  certain  cases,  Article  XIX 
authorizes member countries to introduce restrictions at their borders or to 
suspend tariff concessions when  imports cause or threaten serious injury to 
domestic producers; 
quantitative import restrictions.  These are theoretically banned,  but many 
nevertheless exist, particularly in agriculture.  In 1955,  moreover,  the US, 
under a  1951  nat1onal law  (the Agr1cul tural Adjustment Act), secured a  waiver 
for  them,  a  theoretically  temporary  derogation  (which  has  lasted  over  40 
years!)  w1 th  a  very  broad  scope,  which  has  enabled  it  to  l1m1t  its 
agricultural  imports in all sectors it considers sensitive; 
regional  trading  arrangements  and  provisions  in  favour  of  developing 
countries.  Article  XXIV  permits  groups  of  countries  which  have  concluded 
such arrangements  (elimination or reduction of barriers to rec1procal trade) 
- 20  -to  depart,  on  that  basis,  from  the  general  rule  of  most-favoured  nation 
treatment, without, however,  erecting barriers to trade with other countries. 
Furthermore,  since the Tokyo Round,  developing countries have been p·ermitted 
to conclude preferential regional or global trading arrangements which also 
depart  from  the most-favoured nation rule. 
2.  1 • 3.  THE  FIRST SEVEN  MULTILATERAL  TRADE  NEGOTIATION  ROUNDS  AND  THEIR RESULTS 
In  order  to  achieve  a  substantial  reduction  in  customs  tariffs  and  other 
barriers  to  trade,  seven  sets  of multilateral trade  negotiations  (MTNs)  have 
already been held under  the  GATT: 
1947,  in Geneva  (Switzerland) , 
1949,,  in Annecy  (France) , 
1951,  in Torquay  (United Kingdom) , 
1956,  in Geneva, 
1960-61,  in Geneva  (D~llon Round) , 
1964-67,  in Geneva  (Kennedy Round), 
1973-79,  in Geneva  (Tokyo  Round) . 
Ninety-nine countries participated in the latest cycle completed to date,  the 
Tokyo  Round.  This  was  concluded,  in  1979,  with  agreements  covering,  in 
particula,r,  an  improved legal framework for  the conduct of international trade 
( includin'g  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  legal basis  for  the  preferential 
tariff an:d non-tariff treatment  in favour  of and  among  developing countries), 
non-tariff measures  (subsidies  and countervailing duties) ,  improvement  of  the 
1967  GATT  anti-dumping code,  bovine meat  and dairy products,  tropical products 
and special treatment  for  developing countries.  Part~cipating countries also 
agreed to reduce customs duties on a  large number of  ~ndustrial and agricultural 
products,  for  the  most  part  to  be  implemented progressively over  a  period of 
seven years  from  1  January  1980. 
The  Tokyo  Round  made  maJor  advances  in  the  following areas: 
customs duties: reduction or binding of duties negotiated covers trade worth 
more  than  300 billion US  dollars; 
non-tariff measures: 
1)  subsidies and countervailing duties: these measures may be imposed only 
if evidence can be  provided that  the  subsid~zed imports  concerned are 
indeed adversely affecting the national industry making  the request; 
2)  import  licensing  procedures:  the  parties  committed  themselves  to 
s
1implifying  these  procedures  and  adm~nistering  them  in  a  fair  and 
e,qui table manner; 
3)  GATT  anti-dumping code  (Article VI):  this was  revised in such a  way  as 
to  bring  the  provisions  on  anti-dumping  duties  into  line  with  the 
corresponding  provisions  on  the  subsidies  code  and  countervailing 
duties; 
legal  framework  govern~ng international trade: 
1)  differential  and  more  favourable  treatment,  reciprocity  and  fuller 
participation  of  develop~ng  countr~es:  preferential  tariff  and  non-
t'ariff  treatment  ~n favour  of  and  among  developing countries was  made 
- 21  --
into  a  permanent  legal  feature  of  the  world  trading  system.  This 
"enabling clause"  provided,  inter alia,  a  legal  basis  for  generalized 
preferences systems  (GPSs)  ; 
2)  trade measures  taken for balance-of-payments purposes:  these practices 
are based on  certa~n principles and strictly codified; 
3)  safeguard action for development purposes.  Greater latitude granted to 
developing countries as regards the trade measures necessary for their 
fundamental  development  needs; 
4)  understanding regarding notification, consultation, dispute settlement 
and  surveillance  w~thin the  GATT  framework.  Existing  mechanisms  in 
these areas  improved; 
agriculture: in theory,  the agreements on tariff and non-tariff concessions 
and all the multilateral agreements  concluded in  the  Tokyo  Round  apply  to 
agricultural products just as  they do  to  ~ndustrial products.  In addition 
to this, a  purely administrative arrangement was  reached on bovine meat, with 
the  creation of  an  International Meat  Council,  and  an  internat~onal dairy 
arrangement  which,  inter alia,  under  the  aegis  of  an  International Dairy 
Products Council,  fixes  minimum prices applicable in international trade in 
certain milk powders,  milk fat,  including butter,  and cheeses,  with  a  view 
to balancing supply and  demand.  In practice,  the situation has  not  turned 
out quite like this.  The  effectiveness of the agreements has been impaired, 
because they have not  always  been applied as strictly as  had been intended; 
tropical products:  reductions,  by  the  industrialized  countr~es,  in  import 
duties  and  other barriers  to exports  of  tropical products  from  developing 
countries were implemented in 1976 and 1977; others, subsequently negotiated, 
took effect as from 1980.  These concessions mainly affect coffee, cocoa,  tea 
and spices. 
- 22  -2.2.  THE  URUGUAY  ROUND:  OBJECTIVES,  ISSUES  AND  POSITIONS,  PROGRESS  OF  THE 
NEGOTIATIONS  AND  MAIN  STAGES 
2.2.1.  INTRODUCTION 
Seven  years after the  end of  the  Tokyo  Round,  and  even  though  the  commitments 
entered into had not  been met  in full,  certain States  (~n particular the United 
States)  felt  the need for  further multilateral negotiations to curb  the  trend 
towards  concluding  bilateral  agreements  and  market  sharing  outs~de the  GATT 
framework,  and to restrict the subsidy race in which a  large number of countries 
were  involved. 
In  September  1986  a  new  round  of  GATT  negotiations  opened at  Punta  del Este 
(Uruguay); in view of the important issues it raises, international agricultural 
trade was to be one of the main subjects for negotiations,  the objective be~ng 
to  "reduce  the  uncertainty,  imbalances  and  instability in world  agricultural 
markets".  These  negotiations  were  expected  to  be  completed  at  a  GATT 
ministerial meeting  in Brussels in late 1990. 
In 1985, before the new round of negotiations was lauched,  the European Economic 
Community  (EEC)  had  ra~sed objections to an undertaking of this kind,  fearing -
rightly,  as it has  turned out  - that it would be obliged to make  concessions 
leading  inev~tably to a  fundamental challenge to the Common  Agricultural Policy 
(CAP).  The  EEC  therefore  asserted  from  the  outset  that  it  was  prepared  to 
discuss international agricultural trade, but only provided that the principles 
and instruments of the CAP  were not called into question. 
2. 2.  2 .  THE  PUNTA  DEL  ESTE  MINISTERIAL MEETING  (SEPTEMBER  1 986) 
At  the ministerial  meet~ng held at  Punta del Este  in September  1986,  the  GATT 
contracting  parties  set  the  following  objectives  for  the  agricultural 
negotiations: 
"AGRICULTURE 
CONTRACTING  PARTIES  agree  that  there  is  an  urgent  need  to  bring  more 
discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and 
preventing restrictions and distortions including those related to structural 
surpluses  so  as  to  reduce  the  uncertainty,  imbalances  and  instability  in 
world agricultural markets. 
Negotiations  shall  aim  to  achieve  greater  liberalization  of  trade  in 
agriculture  and  bring  all  measures  affecting  ~mport  access  and  export 
competition under  strengthened and more  operationally effective  GATT  rules 
and  disciplines,  taking  into  account  the  general  princ~ples governing  the 
negotiations,  by: 
~)  improving  market  access  through,  inter  alia,  the  reduction  of 
import  barriers; 
ii)  improving the competitive environment by  increasing discipline on 
the  use  of all direct  and  indirect  subsidies  and  other measures 
affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade,  including the 
phased reduction of their negative effects and dealing with their 
causes; 
- 23  -iii)  minirnz~ng  the  adverse  effects  that  sanitary  and  phytosanitary 
regulations and barriers can have  on  trade in agriculture,  taking 
into account  the relevant international agreements. 
In  order  to  achieve  the  above  objectives,  the  negotiating  group  having 
primary  responsibil~ty  for  all  aspects  of  agriculture  will  use  the 
Recommendations adopted by the Contracting Parties at their Fortieth Session, 
which were developed in accordance with the GATT  1982 Ministerial Programme, 
and take account of the approaches suggested in the work of the Committee on 
Trade  in  Agriculture  without  prejudice  to  other  alternatives  that  m~ght 
achieve the obJectives of  the Negotiations." 
The  Community  thus secured the inclusion in the negotiations of all provisions 
affecting agricultural trade,  whether imports or exports,  making allowance for 
the  individual  features  and  problems  peculiar  to  agriculture,  whereas  other 
contracting parties,  in particular  the  United States,  wanted  the  talks  to  be 
confined initially to measures governing exports and imports, disregarding those 
relating to domestic policies. 
All  the  contracting  parties  agreed  to  observe  a  standstill,  with  immediate 
effect and until negotiations were  concluded,  in measures which might  have  an 
adverse effect on  international trade.  Under  that standstill agreement,  each 
participant undertook not to adopt  any measure which would enable it to improve 
its negotiating position. 
In September 1986,,the European Parliament  (EP)  adopted a  long resolution  (OJEC 
255  of  13.10.1986,  p  69)  on  the  new  round of multilateral negotiations within 
the  GATT,  which  it  forwarded  to  the  Ministers  attending  the  Punta  del  Este 
meeting.  In the section of  th~s document  devoted to international agricultural 
trade,  the  EP  considered that  improvements  should be  made  as  soon as  possible 
to  the  rules  and  disciplines  governing  international agricultural  trade,  and 
that direct and indirect assistance to exports,  in so far as it affected world 
trade,  should  be  restricted,  wh~le  taking  account  of  the  interests  of  the 
developing  countries,  which  are  frequently  net  importers  of  agricultural 
products.  The  EEC  needed,  ~n any case,  to uphold the pr~orities of the CAP.  The 
EP  was  thus  largely endorsing  the  position adopted by  the  Commission  and  the 
Council. 
In  1988  the  EP  restated  its  pos~t~on  on  the  stage  reached  in  the  GATT 
negotiations, adoptingaresolution (OJECC  326of 19.12.1988, p315), whichwas 
forwarded to the ministerial meeting in Montreal,  and in 1990 it adopted another 
resolution  (minutes of proceedings of the sitting of 17.05.1990, part II, p  68), 
which  led  to  the  preparation of  a  draft  report  by  the  Committee  on  External 
Economic  Relations  (EP  143.122;  opinion  of  the  Committee  on  Agriculture;  EP 
140.436; see detailed chapter on the role of the EP  at the end of this Section) . 
- 24  -2. 2.  3 •  PROGRESS  OF  THE  NEGOTIATIONS,  FROM  PUNTA  DEL  ESTE  TO  MONTREAL 
Since  the  start  of  the  Uruguay  Round  at  Punta  del  Este  in  September  1986, 
progress in the negotJ.ations on agriculture has  been at the rate of "two steps 
forward,  one step back".  It might justifiably be said that negotiations proper 
did not  b~gin until the second half of 1990. 
Four groups of countries emerged as the main protagonists in these agricultural 
trade talks: the United States, the EC,  the Cairns Group  (Australia, Canada,  New 
zealand,  Hungary,  Fiji,  Brazil,  Uruguay,  Argentina,  Malaysia,  Indonesia,  the 
Philippines, Thailand,  Colombia and Chile) ,  and the diffuse group of developing 
countriesl  (some  of which also belong  to  the  Cairns Group) . 
From  the  outset  these  (groups  of)  countn.es  put  forward  totally  dJ.fferent 
approaches  to  bringJ.ng  the  negotiatJ.ons  to  a  conclusion.  The  most  radical 
initial proposals were put  forward by  the United States,  the cornerstone being 
a  proposal  on  the  total  liberalization  of  agricultural  trade,  under  a 
"tariffication" system based on an  agreement  providing,  on  the one  hand,  for 
common measurement of the various levels of overall support and,  on the other, 
a  timetable for phasing out such support over ten years  (the "zero option"). 
In its c~ncern to achieve total liberalization of world trade in agricultural 
products,  of  which its members  are  net  exporters,  the Cairns  Group  took  up  a 
position close in spirit to that of  the United States.  But,  unlike the United 
States,  the  Cairns  Group  also  advocates  the  rapid  application  of  corrective 
measures oblJ.ging exporters to reduce their stocks without d1sturb1ng trade,  the 
freezing of trade barriers and all subsidies affecting trade,  increased market 
access  in the  context  of  agreed  percentages  and  the  l.mplementation of  phased 
reductio~s in export  subsidies and producer subsidies. 
Faced  with  these  proposals,  the  EC  was  obliged  to  adopt  a  rather  defensive 
position,  leading it to  recommend  a  dual  pricing system,  so as  to  preserve  a 
style  of  agriculture  in  Europe  capable  of  ensuring  the  survival  of  a  rural 
economy  ~hich  the  Community  regards  as  vital.  The  Community  advocated  a 
significant reduction in all types of support,  and various different mechanJ.sms 
were  proposed to achieve this.  At  the  same  time,  the  Community stressed that 
it was  already firmly  committed to  the process of adapting the  CAP  along the 
lines sought by other contracting parties - it had been implementing reforms in 
certain sectors since 1983 and broadenJ.ng stabilization measures sJ.nce February 
1988. 
Up  to this point  the developing countries had not  played a  major  part  in the 
negotiations on agricultural trade,  except as regards tropical products.  Some 
of  the developing countries belong  to the Cairns  Group. 
On  the  basis of  the  positions  oriiginally adopted,  the  negotiations  revolved 
initially around  the  question  of  how  to  negotiate  and  how  to  seek  a  common 
approach.  From then onwards,  serious problems arose,  leading to the failure of 
the Montreal  "mid-term review" of December  1988. 
- 25  -2.2.4.  THE  MID-TERM  REVIEW  IN  MONTREAL  (DECEMBER  1988)  AND  GENEVA  MEETING 
(APRIL  1989) 
The  major  differences between the European  Community  and  the United States at 
the "mid-term review" meeting of the relevant m~nisters in Montreal in December 
1988 meant that universal agreement could not be reached on how  the negotiations 
should proceed.  Another meeting,  convened in Geneva in April  1989,  had  to be 
held before the  following agreement  on agriculture could be  reached: 
''AGRICULTURE 
1.  The  Negotiating  Group  on  Agriculture  has  made  substantial  progress  in 
elaborating the elements of the negotiating proposals and submissions under 
the subsequent negotiating process.  The  stage has  now  been reached in this 
process  where  the  general  direction  and  procedures  to  be  followed  in  the 
final phases of the negotiations need to be defined in operational terms  so 
as to provide a  framework for liberalizing trade in agriculture and bringing 
all  measures  affecting  import  access  and  export  competition  under 
strengthened and more  operationally effective GATT  rules and disciplines. 
2.  There  is a  broad measure of consensus  that agricultural policies should be 
more  responsive  to  international  market  signals  in  order  to  meet  the 
objective  of  liberalizat~on of  international  trade  and  that  support  and 
protection  should  be  progressively  reduced  and  provided  in  a  less  trade-
distorting manner. 
3.  The particular needs  and conditions of  developing countries should be fully 
taken into account  at all stages of the negotiation in conformity with the 
principle of  special and differential treatment  to developing countries as 
laid down  in the Punta del Este Declaration. 
4.  Ministers accordingly endorse a  framework approach  compris~ng the following 
interrelated long- and short-term elements and arrangements on sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations. 
A.  LONG-TERM  ELEMENTS  AND  GUIDELINES  FOR  REFORM 
5.  Ministers agree that the long-term ob]ect~ve of the agricultural negotiations 
is to establish a  fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system and 
that  a  reform  process  should  be  initiated  through  the  negotiation  of 
commitments  on  support  and  protection  and  through  the  establishment  of 
strengthened and more operationally effective GATT  rules and disciplines. 
6.  The  above-mentioned  long-term  objective  is  to  provide  for  substantial 
progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over 
an agreed period of time, resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions 
and distortions in world agricultural markets.  This  goal will be realized 
through  negotiations  on  specif~c  pol~c~es  and  measures,  through  the 
negotiation of commitments on an aggregate measurement of support,  the terms 
of  which will be negotiated,  or  through a  combination of these approaches. 
Credit  will  be  given  for  measures  implemented  since  the  Punta  del  Este 
Declaration which contribute positively to the reform programme. 
- 26  -7.  In realizing the long-term objective stated above,  the strengthened and more 
operationally effective GATT  rules  and disciplines,  which would be equally 
applicable to all contracting parties, and the commitments to be negotiated, 
should encompass all measures affecting directly or indirectly import access 
and export  competition,  in particular: 
Import access 
quantitative  and  other  non-tariff  access  restrictions,  whether 
maintained under waivers,  protocols of accession or  other derogations 
and  exceptions,  and  all  measures  not  explicitly provided  for  in  the 
General Agreement,  and the matter of conversion of the measures listed 
above  into tariffs; 
tariffs,  including bindings; 
Subsidies and export competition 
internal  support  measures  (including  income  and  price  support)  which 
directly or  indirectly affect  trade; 
direct  budgetary  assistance  to  exports,  other  payments  on  products 
exported and other  forms  of export assistance. 
Export prohibitions and restrictions 
export  proh~bitions and restrictions. 
8.  Ministers agree that: 
special  and  different~al  treatment  to  developing  countr~es  is  an 
integral element  of  the negotiations particularly on  the strengthened 
and more operationally effective GATT  rules and disciplines; 
government  measures  on  assistance,  whether  direct  or  indirect,  to 
encourage agricultural and rural development are an integral part of the 
development  programmes of developing countries; 
~ays  should  be  developed  to  take  into  account  the  possible  negative 
effects  of  the  reform  process  on  net  food-importing  developing 
<Z:ountries. 
9.  Non-trade concerns 
Participants recognize that  factors other  than  trade policy are  taken into 
account in the conduct  o~ their agricultural policies.  In the negotiations 
to achieve the long-term objective,  account will be taken of proposals aimed 
at addressing participants'  concerns such as  food  security. 
10.  Implementation 
Implementation of  the first  tranche of  agreed commitments  on  the  long-term 
reform  programme shall take place in 1991. 
- 27  -11.  Work  programme 
Participants are invited to advance by  December  1989  detailed proposals for 
the achievement of  the long-term objective,  including the  following: 
the  terms  and use of an aggregate measurement  of support; 
strengthened  and  more  operationally  effective  GATT  rules  and 
disciplines; 
the  modalities  of  special  and  differential  treatment  for  developlng 
countries; 
sanitary  and  phytosanitary  regulations  and  the  work  programme 
foreshadowed in  (C)  below; 
tariffication, decoupled income support, and other ways to adapt support 
and protection; 
ways  to  take  account  of  the  possible  negatlve  effects  of  the  reform 
process on  net  food-importing developing countries. 
12.  Not later than the end of 1990, particlpants will agree on the long-term 
reform  programme  and  the period of  time for  its implementation.  Soon 
thereafter,  taking into account  the  different national procedures  for 
implementation  of  international  agreements,  participants  will  notify 
their plans for meeting the obligations and commitments agreed upon. 
13.  Surveillance 
The  reform programme will be subject  to multllateral surveillance and other 
procedures necessary to ensure full compliance with commitments made  in the 
negotiations. 
B.  SHORT-TERM ELEMENTS 
14.  With effect from the adoption of this decision and continuing until the 
formal completion of these negotiations on agriculture by December 1990, 
participants, within the scope of their existing legislation and their 
existing GATT  rights and obligations,  undertake to ensure that current 
domestic and export  support  and  protection levels  in the agricultural 
sector are not  exceeded.  Participants undertake to ensure that tariff 
and  non-tariff  market  access  barriers  in  force  at  the  date  of  this 
decision  are  not  subsequently  intensified  in  relation  to  imports  of 
agricultural  products  nor  extended  to additional  products,  including 
processed agricultural products.  Participants shall be deemed to be in 
compliance  with  this undertaking  so  long  as  the  access  opportunities 
granted to indlvidual products in 1989 and 1990 are not less than those 
granted on  average  in  1987  and  1988.  Participants shall also ensure 
that support prices to producers, to be expressed in national currencies 
(ECU  in the  case of  the  EEC)  ,  that  are set  or  determined directly or 
indirectly by  governments  or  their  agencies  are  not  raised  above  the 
level prevailing at the date of this decision or otherwise take actions 
to ensure that the current levels of support for the comrnodi ty concerned 
are not  increased. 
15.  Participants  state  their  lntention  to  reduce  support  and  protection 
levels for  1990.  This could be done either by using an AMS  or by taking 
specific  policy  measures.  They  will  notify  the  undertakings  for 
fulfilling this commitment  by  Octobe~ 1989. 
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Participants  agree  to  report  on  their 
undertakings  at  six-month  intervals. 
submitted not later than  1  December  1989. 
compliance  with 
The  first  report 
the  above 
shall  be 
17.  Any  participant  may  raise  any  matter  relating  to  or  affecting  the 
observance of the commitments at a  meeting of the  Negotiat~ng Group  on 
Agriculture. 
18.  In exceptional circumstances  (for particular countries excessive rates 
of inflation will be taken into account)  a  participant can be relieved 
by the Negotiating Group on  Agr~culture of commitments  under  the above 
undertakings. 
19.  Developing countries 
Developing countries are not  expected to  subscr~be to  the  commitments 
under  B. 
C.  SANITARY AND  PHY'l'OSANITARY REGULATIONS 
20.  Ministers endorse harmonization of  nat~onal regulations as  a  long-term 
goal and  a  work  programme  embodying  the following  object~ves: 
( 1)  develop  harmonization  of  sanitary  and  phytosani  tary  regulations  and 
measures,  on the basis of appropriate standards established by relevant 
international organizations including the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
the  International  Office  of  Epizootics  and  the  International  Plant 
Protection Convention; 
(2)  strengthen Article  XX  so  that measures  taken to protect  human,  animal 
or plant life or health are consistent with  sound scientific evidence 
and  use suitable principles of equivalency; 
(3)  review  existing  notification  and  counter-notification  procedures  to 
ensure  transparency  and  the  existence  of  an  effective  not~fication 
process for  nat~onal regulations and bilateral agreements; 
(4)  develop  a  consultative  process  which  ensures  transparency  and  allows 
opportunity for  the  b~lateral resolution of  d~sputes; 
(5)  improve the effectiveness of the multilateral dispute settlement process 
within the  GATT  in order to provide the necessary input  of scientific 
expertise and judgment, relying on relevant international organizat~ons; 
(6)  assess  the possible effects on  developing countries  of  the  GATT  rules 
and disciplines for sanitary and  phytosanitary measures,  and evaluate 
the need for  technical assistance; 
(7)  examine  the possibilities for  ~mplementation of the above  programme  ~n 
the context of short-term elements." 
In practice,  the participants actually agreed on only two points: 
multilateral surveillance over safeguards should be reestablished, inter 
alia,  by abolishing measures not  covered by  this; 
it was  universally recognized that  safeguards,  by  definition,  have  a 
limited duration. 
At the meeting of the GATT  Trade Negotiat~ons Committee  (TNC)  in Geneva in April 
1989,  the·Arnericans  were  forced to consent to a  balanced compromise.  The  text 
of  the  agreement  did  not,  in  actual  fact,  advocate  the  total  elimination  of 
subsidies, but only "substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support 
- 29  -and protection".  The  Twelve were given confirmation that the negotiations did 
indeed  cover  all  direct  and  indirect  a~d directly  or  indirectly  affecting 
international agricultural trade  (internal support,  barriers to market access, 
export  subsidies).  Apparently,  therefore,  all support  ~nstruments were  to be 
negotiated  - on  an  equal  footing  - and  to  be  subject  to  commitments  of  a 
universal nature. 
Moreover,  the  agreement  stated  that  support  and  protection  would  be  reduced 
either  by  means  of  an  aggregate  measurement  of  support,  as  advocated  by  the 
Twelve, or through negotiations on policies, as the Americans demanded,  or again 
through a  combination of the two.  It may  be noted that no decision was adopted 
on this. 
The  Twelve  made  a  concession,  by  agreeing  to  consider  the  option  of 
"tariffication"  (which  consists  in  converting  ~mport  barriers  into  customs 
duties).  But,  in exchange,  they  secured  the  inclusion in  the negotiations of 
the  "rebalancing" of  external protection  (~mprovement of  the  EEC's  protect~on 
against cereal substitutes and vegetable fats,  which are currently allowed to 
enter without levies). 
Lastly, thanks to the EEC,  the agreement provided for "special and differential" 
treatment  of  agricultural  subsidies  for  developing  countries.  It  also 
recognized the need,  during a  transitional period, to ease the additional burden 
of increases in world prices on the economies of net  food-importing developing 
countries.  This  related  to  food  supplies  and  the  granting  of  financial 
assistance. 
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END  OF  1989 
During  the  negotiations  within  the  framework  of  the  Geneva  meeting  in  April 
1989,  all the contracting  part~es had undertaken to submit,  by  the end of  the 
year,  substantive proposals for  the final  negotiating phase,  and  subsequently 
did  so.  The  United  States  of  America  submitted its proposals  on  25  October 
1989,  the net  food-exporting countries,  grouped  together  in the Cairns  Group, 
on  27  November  1989,  and  the  Community  on  20  December  1989.  We  propose  to 
summarize  below  the  proposals  of  the  three  main  supplier  countries  and  the 
proposal of  a  major  food  importer,  Japan. 
None of the three proposals, including the one put forward by the United States, 
which,  in  the  meantime,  had  abandoned  the  "zero option",  advocated  the  total 
withdrawal of State aid.  However,  all of  them stressed the need to expose the 
agricultural sector more  extensively to market  forces. 
The United States document and the cairns Group proposal conclude that extens~ve 
l~beralization of external agricultural trade is  essent~al, which implies that 
all export subsidies should be abolished,  the conditions governing market access 
of  imported  agricultural  products  fundamentally  improved  and  all  support  to 
producers'eliminated or  limited to  a  level  wh~ch does  not  disturb  the  market 
equilibrium.  This  led  to  the  emergence  of  the notion of  decoupling,  whereby 
state aid~ to agriculture must,  as far as possible,  be  des~gned so that they do 
not  disrupt  the patterns of  international trade. 
The Community's proposal,  on the other hand,  argued that the total abolition of 
price support mechanisms would lead to unacceptable cyclical  fluctuat~ons, and 
that the level of support should be reduced only if necessary to restore market 
equilibrium.  Improvements  should  be  made  to  the  rules  on  import  and  export 
mechanisms to avoid distortions, but the essential functions of those mechanisms 
should  be, preserved.  Moreover,  the  principal  agricultural  product  supplier 
countries should come  to an  arrangement at  world level on  the distribution of 
production  and  trade,  in  the  form,  for  instance,  of  product-by-product 
agreements.  This  notion  was  fundamentally  in  line  with  the  quantitative 
approach  which  the  Community  adopted  in  reforming  its  Common  Agr~cul  tural 
Policy,  and also with the principle,  wh~ch has  h~therto applied within the GATT 
framework,  whereby a  contracting party must  limit its claims to a  fair share of 
international agricultural  trade.  One  of  the  objectives  of  the  negotiations 
would  be  to bring  these  two  concepts  closer  together  - on  the  one  hand,  the 
international management  of agricultural products according to the laws of  the 
market  and,  on  the  other,  the  sharing-out  of  agricultural  production  under 
multilateral agreements. 
THE  US  PROPOSAL 
There are four  main  aspects to the  US  proposal: 
a)  Market access 
Over  a  period  of  ten  years,  all  protect~on  against  imports  would  be 
progressively  reduced.  Bilateral  agreements  such  as  voluntary  restraint 
agreem~nts  and  arrangements  setting  mimimurn  ~mport  pr~ces  would  be 
prohibited,  as  would  variable  import  lev~es  such  as  those  applied  by  the 
Community.  Moreover,  current waivers  and'other non-tariff  import  barriers 
would  be  converted into tariff quotas  as  an  inter~m measure  to assist  the 
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tariffication would  be  the  only  lawful  means  of  controlling imports.  The 
implementation  of  tariff  quotas  would  imply  the  establishment  of  import 
quotas  (at  bound  rates  of  duty),  with  duties  set  at  higher  rates  for  any 
imports in excess of  these quotas. 
The ultimate objective,  to be fully achieved by  the end of the transitional 
period,  would be  the full  tariffication of all forms  of protection against 
imports.  However,  a  special  safeguard  mechan1sm  would  be  instituted  to 
protect countries against sudden increases in 1mports during the transitional 
period.  over  the ten years  of  transition,  there would be: 
a)  an annual progressive reductl.on,  at bound rates, of the duties applying 
to imports in excess  of  the  quotas;  and 
b)  an  increase in the initial quotas  by  agreed minimum  amounts. 
b)  Export competition 
Export subsidies for a  wide range of agricultural products would be abolished 
over five years.  The  only exceptions would  be in respect of  subsidies for 
genuine food aid,  and even so the United States hoped that there would be new 
GATT  rules to govern and define food aid deliveries.  Export restrictions for 
certain products in short supply,  currently authorized under the GATT,  would 
also be  phased out. 
c)  Internal support 
The  United  States  proposed  that  current  national  agricultural  support 
measures  should be split into three categories:  those which  were  seriously 
trade-distorting,  those  whose  adverse  effects  on  trade  were  limited  (and 
which therefore called for the application of  "GATT  discipline"), and those 
deemed not  to be  trade-distorting. 
Measures  falling within  the  first  category  would  be  completely eliminated 
within ten years.  The  following policies would  be affected: 
regulated price policies; 
income support pol1cies related to production or marketing; 
any subsidy for  farm inputs not  granted to producers and processors of 
agricultural products on  an equal  footing; 
certain marketing programmes  (such as  transportation subs1dies); 
any investment subs1dy not granted to all producers on an equal footing. 
The  following policies would,  on  the other hand,  be  authorized: 
income  support policies not  related to production or marketing; 
environmental protection and conservation programmes; 
disaster aid; 
genuine  internal food aid; 
certain marketing programmes  (such as business information,  promotion, 
inspection and class1fication programmes) ; 
general services  (such as research,  popularization and education); 
resource withdrawal programmes  (such as  set-aside); 
certain food stockpiling  programmes  (not  constituting direct price or 
income support). 
All other policies would be permitted, but subject to strict GATT  disciplines 
(for  instance,  guaranteeing  non-discrimination  in  investment  in  the  farm 
inputs sector) .  Reductions in systems of internal support measures would be 
negotiated on  the basis of an aggregate measurement  of support. 
- 32  -d)  Phytosanitary and veterinary measures 
The  United States wanted all phytosanitary and veterinary legislation to be 
brought under the aegis of the GATT.  such legislation should be consistent 
with  sound  scientif~c  evidence,  a  clear  reference  to  the  much-debated 
Community ban  on the use of  hormones  in meat  preparations.  The  GATT  would, 
moreover,  draw  up  deta~led  rules  on  an  effective  dispute  settlement 
procedure. 
THE  PROPOSAL  OF  THE  CAIRNS  GROUP  COUNTRIES 
The CAIRNS  Group suggested that an agricultural trade reform should extend over 
a  period 'of  ten years,  being  complete,  integrated and  fair,  and  offering  no 
possibility  of  reinforcing  protective  measures,  except  in  carefully  defined 
cases in which such provisions could be adopted for limited periods.  The level 
of support and protection should be reduced systematically, on the understanding 
that all producers  and all products  would  be  ~nvolved.  In  this  respect,  the 
reduction of barriers to  import  access  would  be  accompanied by  a  reduction in 
export  subs~dies and  ~nternal  support.  The  extent  of  the  support  given  to 
agriculture and  reduction of  that  support  should be  quantified and  monitored 
against  a•  general criterion. 
The  Cairns Group proposal comprised the  following points: 
a)  Market access 
Ban on introducing or continuing to apply measures which were not expressly 
authoiized under  the  GATT,  including non-tariff barriers and measures  such 
as variable levies and mininum  ~mport prices; termination of all exceptional 
forms of treatment,  whether maintained under waivers,  protocols of accession 
or other exceptions; binding of all customs  tar~ffs at a  low or,  ~f pos'sible, 
zero level. 
b)  Non-tariff measures 
Non-tariff barriers  should  be  converted into tariff equivalents,  which  in 
turn would  be  reduced  to  a  very  low  level over  a  period to  be  determined, 
with tariff quotas  being  raised in parallel.  No  increase  in  the  level  of 
protection afforded to the various agricultural products would be tolerated 
during the transitional period. 
c)  Internal support 
Internal support arrangements should be consistent with the strengthened GATT 
disciplines,  with  distinctions  being  drawn  between  the  various  types  of 
support:  prohibited measures,  authorized measures  subject  to  international 
monitoring and authorized measures.  The classification of internal support 
measures currently in use in these categories would be  one of  the points to 
be  included in the negotiations.  The  Cairns Group considered that producer 
support prices, budgetary expenditure allocated to particular or unspecified 
products and  tax relief should fall within the first  two categories. 
d)  Export subsidies 
Existing subsidies should be abolished and any new  subsidy  proh~bited. 
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For  the  Community,  the  aim  of  the  negot~ations was  to  reduce  support  for  the 
agricultural  sector  progressively  - an  essential  precondition  for  the  re-
establishment of balanced markets and the development of a  more market-oriented 
agricultural trading system.  The extent of such a  reduction could not be fixed 
in advance and in the abstract. 
All  agricultural  policy  instruments  had  to  be  taken  into  account  for  the 
necessary  reduction  in  support.  It  would  be  superficial  to  regard  it  as 
sufficient  to  act  exclusively  on  border  protection measures,  since  the  fact 
remained that internal support devices,  such as direct compensatory payments to 
producers,  had a  fundamental  effect on foreign  trade.  The  Commun~ty proposed 
that  reference should be  made  to  a  precisely defined and transparent  "Support 
Measurement  Unit"  (SMU),  which  would  encompass  all measures  having a  genuine 
influence  on  the  farmer's  production  decisions,  in  particular  market  price 
support measures,  direct support for  product~on, support designed to reduce  the 
cost  of  farm  inputs,  etc.  All  products  for  which  markets  were  exposed  to 
disruption at  internat~onal level would be  included.  A simpler approach could 
be adopted for other products.  The main characteristics of the SMU  recommended 
by the  Community  are outlined below. 
Reduction of  support  should  be  organized  around  the  prevailing  situation  on 
world  markets.  The  extent  of  the  reduction  must  bear  some  relation  to  the 
situation on the world market.  Indeed, it was  necessary to forge a  closer link 
between agricultural polic~es and market trends: it would be logical for support 
to be reduced more severely than the movement  ~n world prices when  these prices 
were dropping,  and,  conversely,  for  the reduction in support to be less severe 
when world prices were on the increase.  In this context,  a  mechanism needed to 
be  developed  to  establish  the  period during  which  world  prices  needed  to  be 
taken into consideration,  as well as  the extent of reduction in support,  which 
would be adjusted according to world price movements.  Provision should also be 
made  for  these  adjustments  to  be  comparable,  even  if movements  in  inflation 
rates varied from one  country to another.  The  reference period would start in 
1986,  when  the Uruguay Round had begun.  In supporting the agricultural sector, 
priority should be given to measures which did not have a  decisive influence on 
the quantity produced.  Commitments  to  reduc~ng support should be expressed in 
terms of a  proportional reduction in Support Measurement Units, calculated both 
on a  unit basis and on an aggregrate basis.  These  comm~tments would have to be 
entered into at  regular intervals.  They  could differ  from  product  to product 
or product  group to product group.  Priority should be given  to sectors which 
were  in structural surplus  and  sectors  where  there  was  a  high  probability of 
serious  disturbance.  The  Community  therefore proposed that  pigmeat,  eggs  and 
poultry should be added to the sectors already mentioned  (cereals, rice,  sugar, 
oilseeds, milk, beef/veal).  In the case of products for which it is impossible 
to calculate support measurement units,  equivalent commitments would have to be 
entered into.  Processed agricultural products  had also to be included. 
The  support  measurement  unit  should  be  calculated  by  reference  to  a  f~xed 
external price. That was the only way  of neutralizing,  in particular, the impact 
of fluctuations in the market and exchange rates,  which have nothing to do with 
support  for  agriculture.  Commitments  could  then  be  entered  into  on  a  stable 
basis  and in the full  knowledge  of  the~r implications.  Commitments  to  reduce 
support,  expressed  in  terms  of  a  percentage  reduct~on in  the  SMU,  could  be 
undertaken for  an  initial period of  five years.  In  the  course  of  the  fourth 
year,  the situation on  the agricultural markets would be  reviewed,  in order to 
- 34  -determine  the  extent  to  which  the  reduction  should  be  continued.  Under  the 
principle of special and differential treatment, developing countr~es could not 
be required to enter fully into these commitments  unless  capable of  doing  so. 
The  problems  of  net  food-importing  developing  countries  should,  moreover,  be 
taken into consideration. 
In addition to the reduction in external protection,  and in parallel to the cut 
in  internal  support,  there  was  another  aspect  to  the  Community's  proposal, 
namely the requirement for  a  rebalancing of  ex~sting customs structures in the 
cereals sector,  in the sense that substitute products hitherto imported into the 
Community  duty  free  would,  in  future,  be  subJect  to duty,  while  the  level  of 
protection for  cereals  should  be  reduced in compensation.  This  argument  was 
opposed,  in particular,  by  the United States.  However,  the nature and extent 
of  the cereal substitutes problem  const~tute sound arguments in favour  of  the 
Community's proposal.  Indeed,  the problems  of the agricultural sector are not 
attributable to excessively high  levels of  support  alone.  The  means  whereby 
external  protection  and  support  are  prov~ded are  also  a  source  of  serious 
difficulties.  A  large number  of  support  systems  use  a  variety of  instruments 
of protection  (quotas,  variable levies,  derogations  from GATT  rules, etc),  the 
effect of•which in practice is a  serious reduction in trade flows and,  in actual 
fact,  iso~ation of the internal market  from  the world market.  For  products in 
direct competition with one another,  there are import  regimes  wh~ch  guarantee 
a  high level of protection for  some  of these products but  provide little or no 
protection for  others.  In  the  case of  the Community,  this applies to cereals 
(heavily  protected)  and  their  substitutes,  and  oilseeds  (no  protection). 
Lastly,  in  some  sectors,  import  regimes  are  not  the  same  for  all  non-member 
supplier countries.  Some  countries  which  are  not  developing countries enjoy 
preferential access,  whilst others do not. 
These illogical imbalances have consequences for production and trade which  do 
not  stem from normal competition.  In the Community's view,  "tariffication" is 
not  a  reasonable or credible solution to this kind of problem.  If  protect~on 
were  to  ~  based  exclusively  on  customs  dutles  and  provision  made  for  these 
duties to be reduced to zero or a  very low rate after a  transit~onal period,  the 
basis for conducting agricultural trade would would,  in the end,  be completely 
unrestricted and  chaotic.  The  Community  remains  convinced  that  this  kind of 
regime is not viable.  It would entail a  cycle of crises  (with their inevitable 
social and political consequences),  wh~ch would be  the only means  of  adJust~ng 
agricultural activity.  Application of a  regime of this kind would be tantamount 
to  extending  to  all  internal  markets  the  chronic  instability  which  is  so 
prevalent' on  the world market.  Sooner or later,  there would be an abrupt,  ill-
considered and therefore dangerous resurgence of intervention by the authorities 
in the  working of  the agricultural markets,  which  would be  the exact  opposite 
of  what  everyone  is  hoping  to achieve.  Moreover,  the  proposed tariffication 
mechanism  is,  for  the  main  part,  based  on  the  same  principle as  the  Support 
Measurement Unit  (calculation of the  d~fference between the world price and the 
internal price),  but it does not  take account of instruments such as deficiency 
payments,.  which  can  have  as  much  of  an  impact  on  trade  as  border  protection 
measures.  That  impact  is proportional  to  the difference between the  internal 
price of  a  crop supported by  deficiency payments  and world prices,  and  to the 
level  of  self-sufficiency  of  countries  using  this  instrument.  For  these 
reasons,  an  approach  which  involves  a  substantial  reduction  in  support  and 
protection by means of an aggregate measurement of support will make it possible 
to  achieve  the  objectives  of  the  negotiations,  while  avoiding  the  pitfalls 
inherent in separate treatment of support,  on  the one  hand,  and protection,  on 
the other. 
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importance.  However,  the Community would be prepared to consider the inclusion 
of  certain  aspects  of  tariffication  in  the  rules  on  external  protection, 
provided  that  the  problem  of  rebalancing  can  be  resolved  within  the 
tariffication  framework.  An  agreement  on  the  following  basis  could  be 
considered: 
border protection measures for products in the Support Measurement Unit list 
and their derivatives and substitutes would be provided by a  fixed component. 
This component,  expressed as an absolute value,  would be reduced at the same 
rate as  the Support Measurement Unit.  It would be weighted to take account 
of  variations  in  exchange  rates  and  fluctuations  on  the  world  market  in 
excess of certain agreed limits.  Deficiency payments would be treated in the 
same  way  and converted into duties. 
the same arrangements would apply  to exports;  the total budget allocated to 
exports could not exceed the amounts  lev~ed on imports.  External protection 
regimes  based on  components  linked in  th~s way  to  the  reduction of support 
would  make  it  possible  to  eliminate  the  current  incons~stencies  and 
distortions and would  br~ng about an overall level of protection which would 
be lower,  but more balanced than at present.  This system would forge a  link 
between  the  world  market  and  the  internal  market,  whilst  ensuring  the 
necessary stability and security. 
to date,  no serious proposal has been made  on  the quantitative limitation of 
international agricultural  trade,  such as  the  fixing of  worldw~de ceilings 
for  quantities  produced,  marketable  quantities  and  market  shares  of  the 
various exporters competing on  world markets.  However,  the Community would 
stress  that  in  certain exceptional  circumstances,  the  contracting  part~es 
must  be  able  to  apply  quantitat~ve restrictions  in  relation  to  domestic 
agricultural  production  or  factors  of  agricultural  production.  An 
appropriate form  of words  for Article XI  needs,  therefore,  to be agreed. 
JAPAN'S  PROPOSAL 
Japan  presented its proposal  on  the  liberalization of  agricultural  trade  in 
December  1987,  and supplemented and refined it in September and  December  1989. 
It should first  be  recalled that,  after  the  EEC,  Japan  is one  of  the  leading 
world importers of  agr~cultural products,  and that it is highly dependent on  ~ts 
food imports.  The key ideas of  the Japanese proposal  ~nits "final" version of 
December  1989  may  be  summarized in a  number  of points: 
a)  Unlike its main  trading partners  (United States,  Cairns  Group),  Japan  does 
not propose that all aids and subsidies for agriculture should be abolished. 
It  regards  a  reduction  in  support  for  agriculture,  where  it  is  trade-
distorting, as constructive and realistic, but does not put forward specific 
measures  or  time  limits.  On  the  other  hand,  Japan  does  target  export 
subsidies  directly,  blaming  them  for  distortions  in  world  trade  and 
overproduction.  It  calls  for  the~r  progressive  reduction  and  poss~ble 
abolition.  In  its  December  1987  proposal,  Japan  recommended  that  export 
subsidies should be scaled down to their 1980 level within five years.  There 
is no  trace of  this  time  limit  in the  final  proposal.  It should be  noted 
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is directly  challenged  by  Japan,  wh1ch  exports  few,  1f  any,  agricultural 
products.  For  Japan,  it 1s  an  essential precondition for  any  agreement  on 
agriculture that  they be dismantled. 
b)  The second crucial point for  Japan 1s  the 1nclusion of non-trade objectives 
in  the  agreements:  soil  conservation  and  environmental  protection,  the 
maintenance of rural employment and communities,  and above all food security 
for  net  importers of agricultural products.  The  overriding  importance  of 
food  security  for  Japan  means  that  multilateral  agreements  must  permit 
support  for  domestic  production  (producer subsidies,  subsidies to increase 
productivity)  and  protection  of  that  production  against  imports  (customs 
duties  and  quantitative  import  restrictions).  The  products  concerned are 
foodsthffs  of  major  importance  (such  as  rice  in  the  case  of  Japan)  which 
account  for  a  large  proport1on  of  the  daily  calorie  intake  requirement. 
Details of  these,  specifying the level of  production required to guarantee 
food security,  are to be  listed for  the benefit of  the other countries. 
c)  In  more  general  terms,  with  a  v1ew  to  achiev1ng  all  these  non-trade 
objectives,  Japan  considers  that  the  future  agreement  should  grant 
derogations  to  individual  countries  permitting  them  to  support  certain 
agricultural activities within the framework of nat1onal agricultural support 
policies.  Japan  does  not  believe that internal support for agriculture in 
any  way  hampers  the  liberalization of  international agricultural trade  (it 
should'  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  country  is  a  net  importer  of  all 
foodstuffs)  and  considers  that  a  clear distinction should be  drawn  between 
these "inoffens1ve" domest1c forms of support and export subsidies which,  1n 
its view,  are at the root of  the market distort1ons.  Japan insists that for 
the  purposes  of  an  aggregate  measurement  of  support  (AMS)  a  distinction 
should be drawn between external support  (export subsidies), on the one hand, 
and  internal  support  (protection  of  the  producing  sector)  - involving 
specific instruments  and  measures  linked to  non-trade  ob]ect1ves  - on  the 
other,  and  that  the latter should not  be counted in the AMS. 
d)  As  regards import duties and restrictions, Japan first calls for waivers and 
other quantitative import restrict1ons enjoy1ng derogations should cease to 
be  singled out  within  the  GATT  and  be  brought  under  the  same  rules  as  all 
other  import  restrictions  affect1ng  trade  (in  other  words,  be  reduced  or 
abolished).  Japan  is  call1ng  for  quantitative  import  restrictions  be 
eliminated but,  owing  to  the  unpredictab1lity of  agricultural  production, 
also proposes  that derogations be maintained to limit  imports  in the event 
of surpluses at the domestic supply level. 
e)  Lastly,  Japan insists that,  in view of the diversified roles of agriculture 
(economic,  social, food security), it would be difficult to eliminate support 
and protection for agriculture entirely.  Behind this assertion lies Japan's 
political will to defend its traditional rice-growing industry. 
- 37  -2. 2. 6.  THE  COURSE  OF  THE  NEGOTIATIONS  IN  1 990  UP  TO  THE  "FINAL"  BRUSSELS 
MEETING 
At  the  end  of  1989,  the  United  States  returned  to  its  initial  objective, 
presenting a  new  "hard-line" plan  to  the  GATT  for  the liberalization of world 
agricultural trade.  It demanded the abolition of export subsidies within five 
years  and the removal of internal support within ten years  (with the exception 
of  "decoupled"  direct  income  subsidies).  It called  for  import  levies  to  be 
converted into fixed customs  duties,  which should subsequently be phased out. 
The  EEC  responded to this new  American offensive with an admirable display of 
unity in its counter-proposals  presented at  Geneva.  The  Twelve  came  out  in 
favour of a  comprehensive,  progressive and balanced  redu~tion in all forms  of 
support for  production over  five  years,  with a  review of  the situation in the 
fourth  year.  In  their  view,  the  commitment  to  reduce  support  should  be 
expressed  in  terms  of  the  "Support  Measurement  Unit"  (SMU)  which  they  had 
proposed back  in April.  They also asked that  the efforts already made  by  the 
EEC  since 1986 in lowering prices and reducing production should be  taken into 
account  as part of this  exerc~se. 
At  the  same  time,  the  Europeans  continued to defend the  "dual pricing" system 
(domestic  price  and  world  price),  but  declared  that  they  were  prepared  to 
consider the inclusion of certain tariffication elements in the rules governing 
external protection,  on the understanding that the problem of rebalanc~ng could 
be resolved in this context.  In their view,  the  tariff~cation elements could 
take the following form:  border protection for  products in the  SMU  list,  the~r 
derivatives and their substitutes, would be reduced at a  rate similar to the SMU 
rate;  this  would  be  supplemented  by  a  weighting  to  allow  for  exchange  rate 
variations and  world market  fluctuations  in excess  of  certain agreed  limits. 
It was  understood that deficiency payments and refunds would be  treated in the 
same way.  The  Twelve  restated their proposals on  the developing countries. 
The Americans,  for  their part,  pursued their hard line.  At  the start of  1990, 
they continued to call for separate·negotiations on  the three forms  of  support 
granted  to  farmers  (internal  support,  barriers  to  market  access,  export 
subsidies),  laying  stress  on  the  abolition  of  export  subsidies  within  five 
years.  This  approach was  unacceptable  to  the  Twelve.  In practice, it placed 
Community  refunds  and  American  export  subsidies on  the  same  level,  relegat~ng 
deficiency payments  (indirect export  subsidies),  which American  farmers  would 
continue to enjoy,  to second place.  If they had agreed to it, the Twelve would 
have jeopardized their position as  exporters of certain agricultural products, 
leaving the Americans  a  clear field. 
Meanwhile,  the  Americans  stepped  up  the  pressure,  thereby  enhancing  the~r 
position of strength in the negotiations,  through  certa~n proposals made  by the 
American Administration in  the context of  the  draft~ng of  the  1990  Farm Bill. 
In particular, these proposals included an intensified EEP  (Export Enhancement 
Program)  and  increased  flexibility  of  ~mplementation  of  American  farm 
programmes,  which in practice meant  increasing the support provided for certain 
crops. 
THE  OECD  MINISTERIAL  MEETING  IN  PARIS,  MAY  1  990 
The  OECD  Ministerial Meeting  ~n Paris in May  1990  revealed the full extent and 
depth of the differences between  the EC  and  the  United States on agricultural 
trade liberalization.  The  EC  refused to give in to the  USA's  demand that  the 
- 38  -negotiations  should deal  with  the  different areas  of  support  for  agriculture 
separately.  The Community insisted that these three sectors should be included 
in an overall  reform proposal.  Otherwise,  the  EC  would be  obliged to abolish 
its export  subsidies,  whereas  the  United  States  could  continue  to  guarantee 
compensatory  payments  to its farmers  through  its domestic  support  programme. 
The  Commission  estimated  that,  ~f  the  EC  accepted  the  American  proposal  to 
abolish all support for agriculture,  internal agricultural prices would fall by 
between 20  and  35%  and 2-3 million European farmers would lose their jobs.  The 
Community'' s  negotiat~ng posi  t~on centred on  the assessment of all the  elements 
which  go, to  make  up  support  for  agricultural  production,  and  the  phased 
reduction of this support.  The EC  stressed that,  since the start of the Uruguay 
Round in 1986,  it had dropped its support prices for plant products by  10%  (25% 
in the case of cereals)  and for animal products by  15%,  by means of milk quotas, 
production stabilizers and more restrictive price policies and other guarantees. 
THE  DE  ZEEUW  DRAFT  FRAMEWORK  GATT  AGREEMENT  (JULY  1990) 
At  the beginning of July 1990,  Mr  DEZEEUW,  the Chairman of the GATT  Negotiating 
Group  on  Agriculture,  endeavoured  to  reconcile  the  American  and  community 
positions in his draft framework agreement on agriculture.  His  text envisaged 
the  reduction  (and  not  elimination)  of  support,  but  adopted  the  American 
approach in distinguishing between the three different aspects of agricultural 
support  ('internal support,  barriers  to market  access,  export subsidies).  The 
most  he  would  accept  was  that  internal  support  should  be  reduced  using  an 
aggregate  measurement  of  support  such  as  the  SMU,  which  had  already  been 
proposed by  the Twelve. 
He  also made  provision for export subsidies to be reduced more than other forms 
of support,  but did not  tackle the subject of rebalancing.  Moreover,  there was 
much evidence in this text of the idea of decoupling,  favoured by the Americans. 
Mr  DE  ZEEUW  rejected  Community  preference,  opting wholesale  for  the  American 
idea of "tariffication".  Indeed,  he argued in favour of converting all barriers 
to  market  access  (quotas,  variable  levies)  ~nto customs  duties,  and  did  not 
adopt  any  of  the  European  suggestions  regarding  partial  "tariffication" 
corrected according to world market price movements.  Lastly,  this text did not 
take  any  account  of  the efforts  made  by  the  EEC  since  1986  to  move  closer  to 
world market  conditions.  The  Twelve  therefore refused to ratify the draft. 
THE G-7  COMPROMISE  IN HOUSTON  (JULY  1990) 
At  the  Surnrni t  Meeting  of  Heads  of  State  and  Government  of  the  seven  most 
industrialized countries  (United States, Canada,  Japan,  Germany,  France, United 
Kingdom  and  Italy,  plus  the  European  Commission)  from  9  to  11  July  1990  in 
Houston,  the United States attempted,  unsuccessfully,  to secure  recogn~tion of 
Mr  DE  ZEEUW' s  text  as  the  basis  for  d~scuss~on for  the  final  phase  in  the 
Uruguay  'Round  negotiations.  The  f~nal  declaration  simply  advised  the 
negotiators  to  bear  it  in  mind  as  one  means  of  carrying  the  negotiations 
forward. ,  The Americans,  unable to breach the united front of the Twelve,  were 
forced,  like them,  to back down and consent to a  final declaration which was far 
more  balanced than Mr  DE  ZEEUW's  text  had been. 
The  declaration  ("the  Houston  Comprom~se")  calls  for  substant~al  progress~ve 
reductions in  agr~cultural support  and  protection,  including internal support 
systems,  market access  and export subsidies.  It states that the framework  for 
the  discuss~ons  to  come  should  contain  specific  and  internally  consistent 
assurances  that,  by  using  a  common  measurement  and  other  means,  the 
- 39  -participating countries would reduce not only internal support,  but also export 
subsidies  and  import  protection.  Commitments  would  be  entered  into  in  an 
equitable way.  The declaration speaks of reductions rather than elimination of 
support and protection,  as  the Americans  had demanded.  It does  not,  moreover, 
establish a  timeframe for  the  implementation of  these  reductions,  nor  does it 
lay  down  a  scale  of  preference  among  them.  In other  words,  all  support  for 
agriculture  would  have  to  be  discontinued.  As  regards  the  negotiations  on 
reduction of  this  support,  the  declaration strikes  a  compromise  between  the 
positions adopted up to that time by the Americans and the Twelve.  It proposes 
special commitments for each type of support,  but  interlinked and organized  ~n 
a  consistent way around aggregate support  trends.  The  compromise in this area 
therefore appears  to  be  balanced between  the  two  part~es.  It means  that all 
existing agricultural policy instruments  have  to  be  taken  into  account,  thus 
allowing the  EC  to preserve  the consistency of  the CAP. 
In order to implement the  reduct~ons in support and protection,  the declaration 
refers to a  common  measurement instrument to enable the efforts of all parties 
to  be  gauged  in  an  equitable  way.  Moreover,  the  final  text  recognizes  the 
legitimacy of concerns for food security.  It also states that the diversity of 
agricultural  support  mechanisms  from  one  country  to  another  reflects  the 
differences  that exist in economic  and  social  conditions  in agriculture.  In 
other words,  it acknowledges  the existence of diverse forms  of agriculture and 
the need to treat  them differently. 
THE  NEW  PROPOSAL  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  AUTUMN  1 990 
This  offer was  presented on  13  october  1990  and  includes  the  following,  inter 
alia: 
Internal support:  75%  reduction over  ten years from  1991,  on  the basis 
of the aggregate measurement of support  (AMS)  calculated for the period 
1986-1988;  this reduction affects,  in particular, market price support 
and  direct  payments  (to  producers)  other  than  those  which  can  be 
exempted on  the  basis of criteria to be  agreed - including deficiency 
payments,  payments  by  unit  and  processing  subsidies  - taking  ~nto 
account  levies or  dut~es pa~d by  producers; 
Border protection:  conversion of all measures  into tariff equivalents 
on the basis of their average in 1986-1988;  reduction of these tariffs 
by 75%  over ten years from 1991,  the tariffs not,  in any circumstances, 
to  exceed  50%  ad  valorem at  the  end  of  that  period;  75%  increase  in 
import tariff quotas over ten years;  to protect against fluctuations in 
world  prices,  a  50%  corrective adjustment  when  import  prices fall  to 
less than 75%  of their average for the three preceding marketing years; 
temporary doubling of the tariff if the quantities imported exceed 120% 
of  the quantities  imported during  the  preceding marketing year,  these 
two  safeguard mechanisms not  be~ng cumulative for  the same  product; 
Export  subsidies:  90%  reduct~on over  ten years  from  1991  on  the basis 
of  the  level  of  these  subsidies  in  1986-1988,  abolition  of  export 
subsidies  for  processed products  by  the  end  of  the  1996/97  marketing 
year. 
- 40  -THE  NEW  EEC  PROPOSAL  (NOVEMBER  1990) 
The  Community  had  considerable  difficulty  in  formulating  a  new  offer  on 
agricultural trade liberalization for submission to the GATT ministerial meeting 
in Brussels.  It  took  the  Commiss~on two  attempts  to  agree  on  a  proposal  to 
submit  to  the Council.  After  seven  Agr~culture Councils,  including  two  jo~nt 
meetings with the Fore~gn Trade  Min~sters, the Twelve finally reached agreement 
on the agriculture proposal  on  6  November  1990. 
The  main  strands of  the  Commun~ty offer were as  follows: 
Internal support:  30%  reduction in support and protection for the main 
agricultural products, based on calculation of an aggregate measurement 
of support.  For other products,  for which calculations cannot be made 
in terms  of  an  aggregate measurement  of support,  specific commitments 
would be entered into.  The base year was  to be  1986,  when  the Uruguay 
Round started, so as to take account of the efforts made by the EEC  from 
that time onwards  to reduce production and freeze agricultural prices. 
Reductions were to be staggered over five years to 1995/96 and could be 
brought  about  by  any  means  which  reduced  support  as  a  whole,  ~n 
particular by production  limitat~on measures.  If 1986 is taken as  the 
base year,  th~s assumed  an  annual  reduction of  2.9%.  The  EEC  was  not 
prepared to enter into commitments  concerning specific instruments; 
Export refunds:  the reduction of support for agriculture could lead to 
a  considerable reduction in export refunds.  Moreover,  the EEC  undertook 
to ensure that export  refunds would  not  exceed the  difference between 
internal prices and world market prices or  import  taxes applied to the 
same  products,  and  to apply  the  concept of  "equitable share" of  trade 
in a  positive way,  in accordance with  Art~cle XVI  of the  GATT; 
Border  protection:  the  EEC  was  prepared  to convert  border  protect~on 
measures,  namely variable import levies,  into tariff equivalents  wh~ch 
would  be  reduced  by  30%  by  the  1995/96  marketing  year.  The  tariffs 
would be calculated to represent the difference between a  representat~ve 
wprld market  pr~ce or  import price and the EEC  intervention price plus 
10%.  A weight~ng would compensate for monetary fluctuations and certa~n 
fluctuations in the market price compared with  the reference price. 
Rebalancing: customs duties were to be  introduced on  imports of cereal 
substitutes  (basically gluten and  maize)  and  oilseeds,  which  had  not 
hitherto  been  subject  to  any  customs  duty.  Tariff quotas  should  be 
calculated  on  average  imports  over  the  period  1986/88,  with  tariffs 
falling within the 6-12% range.  Outs~de these quotas,  the normal tariff 
would be applied.  The  Council did not accept  the Commiss~on'  s  proposal 
that  the  tar~ff quota should be  raised by  8%. 
The  Community's  offer  was  linked  to  accompanying  internal  measures  to 
compensate  for  loss of  income of  EEC  farmers  following an  agreement within 
the  GATT.  These  measures  related  principally  to  structural  aids  not 
affecting production and conditional upon environmental protect~on measures, 
set-aside,  extensification and compliance with product quality standards. 
- 41  -THE  DECEMBER  1990 MINISTERIAL  MEETING  IN  BRUSSELS 
A successful outcome  to the Brussels meeting  was  precluded by  the differences 
between  the  two  offers set out  above,  since  the  parties were  not  prepared to 
make concessions.  After three days of negotia  tJ.ons and progress in other areas, 
the  meeting  finally  had  to  come  to  an  end  as  deadlock  had  been  reached  on 
agriculture.  A fJ.nal attempt was  made  by  Mr  HELLSTROM,  the Swedish Agriculture 
Minister,  but  this failed because of opposition  from  the  EEC,  Japan and  South 
Korea. 
These  two  Far  Eastern  countries  are  highly  sensitive  to  the  consequences  of 
liberalization for  rice,  a  traditional industry  to  which  both  producers  and 
consumers are strongly attached.  In South Korea,  some  85%  of farmers  (who,  in 
total,  account  for  17%  of all employment)  depend on  rice growing,  and enjoy a 
system  of  border  protection  and  direct  subsidies  which  absorb  1.  5%  of  the 
national budget.  The  South Koreans  would not  countenance even  a  very limited 
opening  (2-3%)  of  their market  to imports,  which  Japan could have accepted. 
At  the European CouncJ.l  of  14  and  15  December  in Rome,  the  Heads  of  State and 
Government  of  the  Twelve  deplored  the  stalemate  in  the  Uruguay  Round 
negotiations.  The  Council  stressed  that  only  a  global  approach  based  on 
balanced concessions on all sides would lead to results.  It recalled that  the 
objective of  the negotiations  was  to strengthen the open multilateral trading 
system which  had  made  an  unprecedented expansion  of  world  trade  possible,  to 
extend it to new  areas and  to achieve  the  settlement of all disputes within a 
multilateral framework,  while complying with the obligations of  the system. 
- 42  -2.2.  7.  THE- RESUMPTION  OF  NEGOTIATIONS  AFTER  THE  FAILURE  OF  THE  BRUSSELS 
MEETING;  THE  DUNKEL  COMPROMISE  (DECEMBER  1991) 
At  a  meeting convened in Geneva on  31  January 1991  by Mr  DUNKEL,  GATT  Director-
General,  the chief negotiators of the Uruguay Round decided that, in view of the 
impossibility of ironing out the main differences, particularly on agriculture, 
the only way  of continuing the multilateral discussions,  the decision on formal 
resumption of which was to be taken shortly by the Trade Negotiations Committee, 
was  over  a  relatively long period with no specific deadline. 
The  Uruguay  Round  negotiatJ.ons  were  resumed  on  26  February  1991,  when  the 
contracting  parties  adopted  a  negotiating  framework  for  the  reform  of 
agricultural  subsidJ.es:  internal  support,  export  subsidies,  import  barriers. 
The  EEC  declared  that  J.t  was  prepared  to  enter  into specific  commitments  in 
these three areas.  The  following list of technical questions was  adopted as an 
outline for  the consultations: 
Internal support: how  to determine policies to be excluded from the reduction 
commitment,  role and definition of  an  aggregate measurement  of  support  and 
equivalent  commitments,  how  to make  allowance  for  the high inflation rates 
in some  of  the participating countries,  and strengthening of GATT  rules and 
disciplines. 
Market access: tariffJ.catJ.on procedures and scope, possJ.ble special safeguard 
clause  for  agriculture,  commitment  regarding  minimum  access,  reduction  of 
existing tariffs and strengthening of  GATT  rules and disciplines. 
Export  competition:  definition  of  export  subsidies  to  be  subject  to  the 
conditions laid down  in the  final  agreement,  how  to avoid circumvention of 
commitments while maintaining adequate levels of food aJ.d,  strengthening of 
GATT  rules  and discipines. 
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures:  possibilJ.ty of further  J.mprovements to 
a  number  of technical provJ.sions  and procedures. 
In all the above areas,  account to be taken of the particular concerns of net 
food-importing developing countries,  and concerns relatJ.ng to food security. 
Mr  DUNKEL  declared  that  the  Brussels  meeting  had  helped  identify  the  main 
stumbling blocks for  the negotiations. 
United States involvement  in the  Gulf  War  in the first  few  months  of  1991  had 
the  result  of  strengthening  American  leadership  on  the  international  scene, 
whereas,  one  year  earlier,  the  EEC  had  succeeded  in  increasing  its  world 
influence by  means  of  the  role  falling  to it as  a  result  of  the  upheavals  in 
Eastern Europe.  It was  noted in Brussels that this meant that Washington might 
try even harder to impose its views  in the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
During this period,  the Commission maintained close contact with the Article 113 
Comrni ttee and the Council, keeping them abreast of developments in the situation 
at the meetings  of  4  February and  4  March  1991. 
After  the  concessions  made  by  the  Community  on  specifJ.c  commitments  at  the 
Geneva meeting in February  1991,  the GATT  spqtlight focused on Washington.  In 
early March,  the US  President asked Congress to grant an extension of the fast-
track  negotiating  authority  for  the  GATT  and  the  North  American  Free  Trade 
- 43  -Agreement  (NAFTA)  under  the  1988  Trade Act.  w~tnout tne  ~ast-tLd~K ~Lu~~uuL~ 
(which limits  the Congress  vote  to straightforward acceptance or rejection of 
the  final agreement,  without  any  opportunity to  amend  the text),  an  agreement 
under the GATT  would be strictly hypothet~cal, since any draft would inevitably 
be subjected to minute Congress scrutiny and would in all probability be pulled 
to pieces.  This vote gave rise to a  general feeling of uneasiness in Washington 
for several weeks,  not because of  the GATT  but  because of political concern in 
some  quarters  regarding  the  non-trade aspects  of  the  NAFTA.  Since  the rules 
laid down  by  Congress  in the  1988  Act  indissolubly linked the  two  extensions, 
there was  a  genuine risk that the  GATT  negot~ations would be  scuppered by  the 
NAFTA.  Finally,  in May  1991,  the  two  Houses  voted with comfortable majorities 
in  favour  of  the  extension  231  votes  against  192  in  the  House  of 
Representatives and  59  votes against  36  in the Senate. 
Having  resumed work  on  15  April  1991,  the  GATT  took advantage of  the enforced 
interruption caused by the need for the Americans to await renewal of the fast-
track  authority  to  set  the  rnaJ or  pol~  tical  issues  on  one  side  and  seek  a 
consensus  on  technical  matters.  This  included,  in  particular,  reaching 
agreement on customs duties and export subsidies, defining an aggregate support 
measurement  and tackling the problem of  inflation,  and calculating the various 
options implicit in an  agreement  marking  the  conclusion of  the  Uruguay Round. 
Other groups studied the problems peculiar to the developing countries,  such as 
food security and measures to prevent the  diversion of food aid. 
In November  1991,  however,  the  negotiat~ons were still deadlocked.  A meeting 
on  9  November  between Mr  Delors,  the President of the  EEC,  and Mr  Bush,  the  US 
President,  in  The  Hague  seemed  to  pave  the  way  to  resumption  of  the 
negotiations,  on the basis of a  30-35%  reduction in Community support over five 
or  six years.  Considerable differences  in  interpretation nevertheless still 
remained. 
- 44  -At  the end of  November  1991,  in a  last-ditch attempt  to break the deadlock in 
the negotiations,  Mr  Dunkel  presented a  document  in Geneva,  suggesting a  five-
point compromise.  It  compr~sed the following main points: 
internal 
support 
import access 
export 
subsidies 
"THE  DUNKEL  COMPROMISE" 
20%  reduction in the AMS; 
commitment  product  by product; 
base  per~od: 1986-88; 
trans~tional period:  1993-99; 
compensatory payments  (US  and EC)  in yellow 
box. 
*tariffication: 
conversion of all barriers into customs 
duties; 
36%  reduction in customs duties  (arithmetic 
mean),  with  min~mum 15%  per product; 
base period:  1986-88; 
transitional period:  1993-99; 
possibility of safeguard clause. 
*market access: 
minimum  access  3%  of domestic consumption in 
base period  (1986-88),  rising to  5%  in  1999; 
transitional period:  1993-99; 
customs duties:  low or nil; 
current access  ma~ntained or increased  (if > 
3%  (86-88)); 
commitment  by  product  ("tariff line")? 
36%  reduction in refund budgets  AND 
24%  reduction in volumes exported  (with 
subsidies) 
commitment product  by product; 
base period:  1986-90; 
transitional period:  1993-99. 
The  "Dunkel Compromise"  tackled the  quest~on of classify~ng support measures in 
the "green box"  (for those deemed not to affect production)  or the "yellow box" 
(for  those having  a  distorting effect on  trade,  which should be  reduced). 
- 45  -Commissioner  MacSharry's  proposals  in  February  1991  on  reforming  the  Common 
Agricultural  Policy  were  intended  as  a  firm  step  towards  closer  linkage  of 
agriculture with world markets  (COM(91)  100  final).  In several respects,  they 
reflected American wishes  and the Dunkel  compromise proposals: 
Internal  support  prices  for  cereals  were  to  be  reduced  by  29%  over  three 
years,  which would also make it possible to reduce support prices for bovine 
meat  by  15%,  pigrneat  by  15%  and butter by  5%. 
Sheepmeat  and  bovine  meat  production  would,  like  milk,  be  subject  to 
production quotas. 
Reductions  in internal support  should theoretically eliminate  the need  for 
refunds  for  most  products as  from  1996-97.  This  aspect  of  the  reform  was 
entirely in line with the American proposals.  One  problem still remained, 
however,  as the United States and the Cairns Group were  demand~ng limits on 
export  volumes  AND  reductions  in the  budgets allocated to subsidies,  which 
would have appreciably increased constraints on Community exports  (for wheat 
in particular) . 
There  was  also  a  difference  of  opinion  regarding  the  direct  compensatory 
payments granted to producers by the new  CAP.  The  Dunkel Compromise had placed 
this  form  of  support  in the  "yellow box",  as  trade-distorting measures  which 
should  be  phased  out  according  to  procedures  to  be  finalized as  part  of  the 
Uruguay  Round.  The  Comrnunlty  had  not,  of  course,  intended  to  abolish  these 
compensatory payments -at the very least not  before  1996. 
The  United States suggested  that  certain domestic  support  measures  should  be 
placed in a  new  '"blue box",  which would apply to domestic support which was  not 
production-related.  These  support  measures  should either be  phased  out  over 
longer periods than those in the yellow box,  or should be granted a  grace per~od 
before any reduction was  made. 
The EC's position was  considerably strengthened by the CAP  reform proposal,  and 
its  situation  was  reversed:  the  success  or  failure  of  the  negotiat~ons now 
depended on the United States, which bore this responsibility for the first time 
since the start of the negotlatlons; the USA  had in fact repeatedly claimed that 
the main obstacle to the success of the negotiations was  the "lnsubordination" 
of  the  EC  as  regards  the agricultural proposals.  In the  communique  issued by 
the  Council  after  the  Lisbon  European  Summit  in  June  1991,  the  Community 
stressed that  it had  proposed essential  contributions  and  made  offers  which 
directly affected the  key  sectors  of  the negotiations,  and called on  all the 
other parties to demonstrate the  same  flexibility. 
- 46  -2. 2.  8.  DECEMBER  1 991 -NOVEMBER  1992:  FROM  THE  DUNKEL  COMPROMISE  TO  THE  DRAFT 
WASHINGTON  AGREEMENT 
THE  RESUMPTION  OF  NEGOTIATIONS  IN  SPRING  1 992  ON  THE  BASIS  OF  THE 
''DUNKEL  COMPROMISE" 
Between December  1991  and November  1992 the negotiations passed through various 
stages.  The  Dunkel  Compromise  served  as  a  basis  for  the  resumption  of 
negotiations in the spring of 1992.  In May  1992,  in adopting a  radical reform 
of  the  CAP,  the  EC  showed  its  readiness  to  further  demonstrate  its goodwill 
towards  the  renewal  of  negotiations.  Moreover,  the  choice  of  the  type  of 
support under the new CAP  (direct income subsidies) was directly insp~red by the 
American model. 
From October 1992 the run-up to the presidential elections in the United States 
gave  the Americans  the  impetus  to start the negotiations again with  a  view to 
securing agreement  at all costs  on  the  basis  of  the  "Dunkel  Compromise".  In 
order to increase the pressure on the EC,  the American Government,  in breach of 
GATT  rules, wielded the threat of retal~atory trade measures following the Euro-
Arnerican dispute on Community support for  o~lseed  product~on.  These retaliatory 
measures  (approximately 100% increase ~n customs duties)  would have involved 300 
million  US  dollars'  worth  of  imports  from  the  EC  (ma~nly French  cheeses  and 
alcohols),  with  the  possibility that  the  lists might  be  extended  to  cover  a 
value of  1 billion dollars.  If the EC  did not give way to the American demands, 
they  were  to  take  effect  on  5  December  1992.  After  the  Euro-Arnerican 
discussions  on  3  November  1992  failed,  the  internal  cohesion  of  the  EC  was 
seriously  shaken  by  the  threats  of  American  retaliation,  and  serious  r~fts 
appeared  between  Member  States  within  the  Council  and  even  within  the 
Commission;  regrettably,  these d~visions weakened the EC's position in the GATT 
negotiations and further eroded its political credibility in the international 
arena.  However,  the  negotiations  continued  ~n  a  strained  atmosphere.  The 
American threats caused some  EC  member countries to panic and go all out to seek 
a  return  to  negot~ations  with  the  Americans,  even  if  it  meant  granting 
concessions which,  a  few weeks  earl~er, would have been unthinkable, wishing to 
be  spared  US  wrath  and  condemnat~on at  all  costs.  A  small  number  of  other 
countries proposed that  a  list of  countermeasures should be  drawn  up  to apply 
to  Community  imports  from  the  US  (the  EC  was  far  and  away  the  USA's  biggest 
customer,  and would have been in a  strong position to do this),  but the majority 
did not  go along with this suggestion. 
20  NOVEMBER  1992:  THE  WASHINGTON  DRAFT  EC-US  AGRICULTURAL  AGREEMENT 
Contrary· to all  expectation~  (particularly those of agricultural circles),  on 
20 November  1992,  after several days of frantic negotiations and numerous trips 
by European Commissioners  to  Wash~ngton, the European and American delegations 
presented  a  draft  agreement  which,  ~n  actual  fact,  was  a  slightly  amended 
version  of  the  Dunkel  Comprom~se.  It also dealt with  the  oilseeds question, 
which had been  the  source of  a  dispute  between the  EC  and  the  US  for  several 
years and the subject of the American threats of retaliation in November  1992. 
Two  successive  GATT  panels  (special  groups  of  experts)  had  ordered  the  EC  to 
amend its system of support for oilseed production,  which impaired the value of 
the concessions  (zero duty)  granted by the  EC  to oilseed imports in  1962.  The 
"oilseeds"  section  of  the  agreement  was  intended  to  meet  the  American 
requirement  for  the  EC  to  implement  the  panels'  conclus~ons.  The  draft 
agreement comprised the  following  main points: 
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intema  1 support 
import access 
export subsidies 
oil  seeds 
"Andri  essen 
Canpranise" 
"peace clause" 
20%  reduction in overall  AHS 
across-the-board comni tment for a 11  products  (average  20% 
reduction); 
base period:  1986-88; 
transit1onal  period:  1994-2000; 
direct income  subsid1es  (EEC)  and  compensatory  payments  (USA)  not 
affected,  ie placed  in "green box"  (conditionally). 
•  tariffication: 
conversion of variable levies 1nto fixed  customs duties; 
36%  reduction  1n  all customs duties (ar1thmet1c mean),  with minimum 
of 15%  for each product; 
base period:  1986-88; 
transitional  period:  1994-2000; 
possibility of applying safeguard clause 
(to be triggered  automatically~). 
•  minimum  market access: 
markets to be opened  up to as much  as 3%  of domestic consumption, 
rising to 5%  in 1999  (depending on  level of aggregation:  "tariff 
line" or group of products?); 
duty applied:  32%  below  base tariff; 
base  per1od:  1986-88; 
transitional  period:  1994-2000; 
maintenance of current access opportunities (if >  3%  (86-88)). 
•  reduction in volume of subsidized exports:  21%,  product by 
product; 
•  reduction in refund budget:  36%,  product by  product; 
base period:  1986-90; 
transitional  period:  1994-2000. 
•  ceiling for area planted within the EEC:  5.128 million hectares, 
less  10%  m1n1mum  annual  set-aside (cf F.T.  4.7.6,  Annex  1). 
•  non-fodder use of oilseeds grown  on  set-aside land  limited to 1 
Ht soya meal  equivalent. 
EC  to undertake  not to export any subsidized  bovine meat to Asian 
markets  1n future. 
USA  not to challenge internal  EC  support within the GATI  if the EC 
met its comn1tments  (text not very explicit,  open to 
interpretation). 
- 48  -The  Washington  draft  agreement  did not  make  any  provision  for  direct  income 
subsidies.granted under  the  new  CAP  after  1999.  Up  to  1999  they  would  be 
conditionally  excluded  from  the  obligations,  like  the  American  compensatory 
payments  (both  measures  would  be  placed  in  the  GATT  "green  box"  for  support 
which does  not affect trade but is intended to limit production);  it should be 
noted that the  CAP  reform does not  make  any  prov~sion for  them after 1996. 
Moreover,  in a  "peace clause" the United States would undertake not to challenge 
the  EC' s  internal  subsidies  wi  th~n  the  GATT,  provided  that  the  EC  met  the 
comrni tments  which  it  had  entered  into  under  the  agreement:  this  point  is 
somewhat  vague and is interpreted differently by  the  EC  and  the  USA,  as is the 
concept  of  globalization  for  market  access  (in  the  case  of  bovine  meat  in 
particular, where the extent of globalization would have dramatically different 
consequences  on  imports  into the  EC  and  on sector equilibrium) . 
As  agreement  was  reached on  the  draft  accord right  at  the  end  of  the  meeting 
between the American and European delegations in Washington, it was not possible 
to issue a  joint communique before the European Commissioners left for Brussels; 
~t  was  left  to  the  staff of  Mrs  Carla  Hills  to  draft  a  text,  and  the  draft 
agreement is  summar~zed in a  letter from  Mrs  Hills to Mr  Andr~essen. 
- 49  -2. 2.  9.  THE  POSITION  OF  THE  COPA-COGECA 
As  they  stand,  the  DUNKEL  document  and  the  Blair  House  compromise  are  not 
acceptable to the  COPA  and  the  COGECA,  since they do not offer the possibility 
of  attaining  the  object~ve  stated  in  the  Punta  del  Este  Declaration  which 
launched the  Uruguay  Round,  given,  in particular,  the  following: 
a)  the absence of a  "lasting" peace clause allowing the Community,  within the 
framework  of the  accepted AMS,  to administer the  CAP  support measures  and 
mechanisms in line with the special features of its agricultural situation. 
To  that end,  and in order  to guard against unilateral,  groundless attacks 
on justified instruments of agricultural policy,  the foundation of a  world 
trade organization should form  an  integral part of any final agreement. 
b)  the absence of  i)  an  automatic,  effective  safeguard  mechanism  for  all 
agricultural  products,  particularly  in  relation  to 
currency and world  pr~ce  fluctuat~ons; 
ii)  an effective rebalancing clause to enable the Community 
- at the very least - to stabilize its imports of cereal 
substitutes,  including CGF; 
iii)  a  formal  commitment  to the Community's offer regarding 
minimum  access  and aggregation. 
c)  the damage that the proposed commitments to cease all subsidized exports of 
bovine meat  to the Far East and to reduce the volume  of  subsid~zed exports 
of  all  products  would  cause  the  Community:  the  definition  of  export 
subsidies given in the Dunkel document,  the proposed rate of reduction,  the 
base period chosen and  the absence of aggregation would  lead to  a  drop  in 
Community exports averaging one third,  but which would be far greater than 
that in the case of certain products.  About  half of  that  reduction would 
apply to most products from  the first year of application of any  agreement 
concluded on that basis. 
The  COPA/COGECA  particularly stress that: 
the long-term effects of a  GATT  agreement on the current bases would be very 
substantial and damaging,  in particular due to the effects of tariffication 
and minimum access,  which would lead to a  weakening of external protection 
and the ultimate dismantling of  Commun~ty preference.  These effects would 
be  particularly serious  in  the  case  of  sectors  of  production as  yet  not 
reformed  (fruit and vegetables,  wine); 
these general effects would be magnified if the Community decided to set up 
preference  or  free-trade  arrangements  with  the  countries  of  Central  and 
Eastern Europe  and the Maghreb. 
Reference:  COPA/COGECA,  PR(93)19- P(93)24  of 76/07/93 
- 50  -2.2.10.  THE  GENESIS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  DRAFT  AGREEMENT  AND  PROSPECTS  FOR  THE 
URUGUAY  ROUND 
After  20  November  1992,  events started to  move  fast:  the  draft  agreement  was 
generally  favourably  rece~ved by  most  of  the  Governments  of  the  Twelve,  with 
France  alone  rejecting it  ou tr  igh  t  and  threatening  to  use  its  veto  in  the 
Council.  Farming communities throughout Europe,  on the other hand,  showed their 
utter  disapproval  in  the  form  of  violent  demonstrations  and  through  the 
representative trade organizations.  On  25  November  1992  the  Commission,  in a 
document quoting rather vague figures, stated that the draft was  compatible with 
the reformed CAP  (with certain reservations regarding beef/veal), and in January 
1993 submitted its lists of support reduction commitments to the GATT  in Geneva, 
without  Council approval.  The  draft  agreement  has still not  been endorsed by 
the Council,  which wishes  to state  ~ts position only on  the overall agreement 
concluding the Uruguay  Round,  and  meanwhile battle was  joined between experts 
in Brussels and Paris  as  to whether or  not  the draft  agreement  was  compatible 
with the CAP.  A joint analysis of the impact of the Washington draft,  proposed 
by  the  Commissioner  for  Agriculture  on  8  January  1993  and  carried  out  by 
Commission and  COPA  experts,  resulted in widely diverging assessments.  On  10 
March  1993,  the  Special  Committee  on  Agriculture  (SCA),  wh~ch  was  asked  to 
present conclusions,  could do no more  than note fundamental differences in the 
economic assumptions underlying the  two studies.  In actual fact,  it would not 
accept  the  Commission's  opt~m~stic conclusions as  plausible without  verify~ng 
a  long li'st of  key  assumptions on which  the  Comm~ssion'  s  assessment  was  based 
and which,,  on closer  scrut~ny, proved to be  h~ghly uncertain.  According to the 
professional organizations  (COPA-COGECA)  ,  the Washington draft would lead to a 
loss of  one third of full-time employment  in agriculture by  the year  2000,  the 
set-aside of  some  11.5 million hectares  (assuming  frozen cereal yields)  and  a 
considerable  reduct~on in exports  in all the major sectors;  which would mean  a 
further loss of jobs in the agri-food sector.  Moreover,  simply to maintain the 
current purchasing power of farmers,  the  EC  would have  to provide compensation 
amounting to some ECU  33 billion ECU,  which is twice the  amount  forecast  by  the 
Commission.  And  this would all  take  place  aga~nst a  background of  budgetary 
uncertainty,  given that,  according to the  EP  Committee  on Budgets,  by  1994  the 
budget heading provided by the CAP  reform would already be overspent to the tune 
of  1.4 billion ECU. 
On  13 May  the French Government published a  memorandum setting out  ~ts position 
on the GATT  Uruguay Round negotiations as a  whole.  In particular, it calls for 
the estahlishment of  a  lasting peace  in trade and  for  amendments  to the  pre-
agreement  of  the  previous  November  on  the  Uruguay  Round  agricultural 
negotiati'ons.  These relate to the peace clause,  the consequences of dollar/ECU 
parity fluctuations, the rebalancing of Community protection with regard to corn 
gluten  feed,  the  aggregation  of  quantitative  commitments  on  imports  and 
limitation of export volumes. 
On  8  June 1993 France finally  (condit~onally) accepted the settlement of the EC-
us  dispute  on  o~lseeds  on  the  basis  of  the  Blair  House  pre-agreement,  in 
exchange  for  an  arrangement  concerning  the  demands  for  adjustment  of  the  CAP 
reform,  obtained  on  27/05/1992.  Nevertheless,  France  has  declared  that  it 
remains opposed to the  rest of  the same  compromise. 
On  9  June  1993  P  Sutherland  was  appointed  by  consensus  as  the  next  GATT 
Director-General. 
- 51  -on 22  June 1993 the us  House of Representatives adopted the renewal of the fast-
track authority which  - follow~ng the opinion of the Senate, expected shortly -
gives  the  American  Government  until  16/04/1994  to  sign  any  agreement  on  the 
Uruguay Round.  Allowing time for internal administrative procedures, this means 
that the negotiations must  be completed by  15/12/1993 at  the latest.  Congress 
will then be able only to accept or reject the agreement,  if any is reached,  as 
a  whole.  The preceding fast-track authority had expired on 31/05/1993,  and the 
President  had  asked  Congress  to  renew  the  authority  with  a  view  to  the 
forthcoming  G-7  summit  in Tokyo  on  07/07/1993. 
On  27  June  1993  a  ministerial meeting of  the Cairns  Group was  held in Bangkok. 
The declaration presented to the Prime Minister of Japan,  with a  view to the G-7 
summit,  called for  improved access  to agricultural markets  and for  firm rules 
to be  laid down,  in order for  an  agricultural agreement  to be acceptable,  and 
said that, at the minimum,  the status quo must  be maintained with regard to the 
conditions governing access  to agricultural markets. 
On  28  June  1993  the bilateral negotiations between  the  USA  and Japan ended  ~n 
failure.  July  1993,  events  succeeded one another as  follows: 
4  July 1993:  after the Senate vote of 1 July,  Bill Clinton signed the extension 
of  the  'fast track'  authority. 
6  July  1993:  the  'Quadrilateral'  group  meeting  in  Tokyo  announced  a  general 
agreement  on market  access  which  endorsed the EEC's  approach: 
elimination of tariffs in certain sectors:  medical equipment,  construction 
materials,  steel,  pharmaceuticals,  beer  and spirits  (and chemicals?); 
a  cut of 50%  in tariffs on high-rated products  (subject to tariffs over  15% 
- it was  unclear  how  determined  the  USA  was  to  include  textiles  in  this 
package); 
a  cut of at least one third in low-rated products  (subject to tariffs below 
15%).  These cuts were  to be  applied by  group of products,  and trade-offs 
between them were possible. 
- 52  -2. 3.  NOTE:  CEREAL  SUBSTITUTES  AND  SOYA  MEAL 
Cereal  substitutes are  high-energy  foods  used  in  the  European  Community  (EC) 
exclusively as animal  feed.  They include  (Annex D of Basic Regulation  (EEC)  No 
2727/75 on cereals) :  manioc,  sweet potatoes, corn gluten feed  (CGF),  bran, maize 
germ  cake,  citrus pellets,  dried sugar-beet  pulp,  distiller~s wash  and other 
fruit was~e.  They have the following common  economic characteristics: they are 
mostly  imported  into  the  EEC,  at  very  low  or  zero  rates  of  duty,  and  in 
increasingly large  volumes.  They  are  a  highly  topical issue,  since European 
cereal  producers  are  challenging  the  conditions  in  which  they  are  produced 
outside the  Community,  in particular in the  US,  and imported into the EC.  In 
addition to cereal substitutes, soya meal  (protein-rich feed),  imported as such 
or made  in the  Community  from  imported beans,  is used as animal  feed. 
REGIME  FOR  IMPORTS  INTO  THE  EC 
During the 1961-62 Dillon Round,  after the Common  Agricultural Policy  (CAP)  was 
adopted,  the United States challenged the  EC  under  the  terms  of  the  GATT  over 
the principle of Community preference.  They secured a  so-called countervailing 
measure from the EC:  the Community undertook to import most cereal substitutes, 
and oilseeds and oilseed cake,  at zero or very low duty,  some subject to a  quota 
(manioc,  sweet  potato and  bran),  and  others  without  any  limit.  It  should  be 
noted  that  in  1962,  when  these  agreements  were  signed,  imports  of  cereal 
substitutes  ~nto the  EC  were virtually non-existent. 
The  agreements in question were  made  b~nd~ng during the Kennedy  Round  in 1964-
67,  by  which  time  imports  had started to grow.  Once  they had become  binding, 
it  was  imposs~ble  to  terminate  them  without  offering  some  other  form  of 
compensation in return under a  new  GATT  agreement.  What  this means  in practice 
is that since 1962,  all cereal  subst~tutes and other animal feedingstuffs. have 
been  imported  into the  EC  virtually without  any  protection,  which  makes  them 
very competitive compared with cereals produced in the Community,  with which  (as 
their name  suggests)  they are in direct competition on  the animal  feed market. 
This has ·resulted in a  decline in the use of cereals produced in the Community, 
replaced by  imported cereal substitutes and meal.  To  cite one example,  during 
the  ten-year  period  1975-1985,  the  share  of  cereals  in animal  consumption of 
marketable feed  (ie excluding  roughages,  grazing,  hay,  silage,  etc.),  dropped 
from  61%  to 51%;  over the same period,  the share of cereal substitutes and meal 
increased from  5  to 11%  and 13  to 17%  respectively.  Another example is the use 
of Community cereals by the compound feedingstuffs industry, which declined from 
36.2  to  31.2  million  tonnes  from  1985  to  1991  (-14%),  this  trend being  more 
pronounced in the  new  Member  States  such as  Spain  (-20%)  and  Portugal  (-31%), 
where stock-farming is a  traditional outlet for  secondary grain. 
What  makes  this decline more  disturbing is the fact  that animal  feed is by far 
the largest area of internal use of cereals within the Community.  In 1988/89, 
83  MT  of feed grain were used as  an~mal feed,  of which 77  MT  (93%  of the total) 
were produced in the  Cornrnun~ ty.  At  the same time,  84  MT  of energy- and protein-
rich foods,  more than the amount of Community cereals, were used as animal feed. 
More  than  60%  of  that  quant~ty  (50  MT)  was  imported.  Imports  of  cereal 
substitutes  (19  MT)  and soya meal  (19  MT)  account  for  more  than three-quarters 
of all imports  (source:  1990  CEC  Report  on  the  Agricultural Situation in  the 
Community,  table,  p  85).  In  1989/90,  the quantities  of  cereals  used  as  feed 
amounted to only  80.5  MT,  and  79.2  MT  in  1990/91. 
- 53  -In 1989/90,-bran topped the list of cereal substitutes used in the EC  (10.1  MT, 
or  28%  of  the  total) ;  almost  all of  this  is  produced  in  the  EC.  Next  came 
manioc  (6  MT,  19%)  and  corn  gluten  feed  (CGF)  (6. 4  MT,  16%),  both  almost 
exclusively  imported.  Then  came  dried sugar-beet  pulp  (5  MT,  15%),  which  ~s 
also mainly produced within the EC;  distiller's wash and  fru~t waste,  classified 
as "other",  1/3 of which is imported;  ma~ze germ cake,  exclusively imported from 
the USA  in spectacularly  increas~ng volumes  (+100%  in 5  years);  lastly, citrus 
pellets and sweet potatoes,  which are also exclusively imported. 
In  1989/90,  manioc  accounted  for  38%  of  the  volumes  of  imported  cereal 
substitutes,  with corn gluten feed  (CGF)  in second place with  26%,  maize  germ 
cake third  (13%)  and citrus pellets fourth  (9%).  With  the  exception of bran, 
cereal substitutes are increasingly imported.  Imports of manioc,  sweet potatoes 
and bran  (about half of  the total quantity of imported cereal substitutes)  are 
subject to a  quota with a  low or  zero duty/levy,  under  agreements  between  the 
Community and certain non-member supplier countries, some of them members of the 
GATT,  others not.  In the case of manioc,  the main substitute, the overall quota 
is  7  MT,  broken  down  as  follows  (in  descending  order  of quantity):  Thailand: 
5,650,000 T;  Indonesia:  825,000  T;  China:  350,000  T;  other countries:  175,000 
T.  An  import  levy,  with  a  ceiling  of  6%  ad  valorem,  is  charged  on  the 
quantities imported within  these quotas. 
In 1989/90,  soya meal was  the top protein-rich feed used in the EC  (20.6 MT,  46% 
of  the  total) ;  this  was  virtually all  (98%)  imported,  mainly  from  the  United 
States and South America.  This  was  followed at considerable distance  (4.7 MT, 
12%  of the total) ,  by protein plant feed  (peas /field beans/sweet fodder lupins); 
most  of these  (84%)  are  produced within the  Community. 
Overall, it may  be seen that between 1983/84 and 1988/89,  the quantity of cereal 
substitutes  used  in  animal  feedingstuffs  increased  by  18%,  and  the  quantity 
imported rose  by  a  massive  35%.  This  means  that  imported cereal substitutes 
have won  market share from Community products.  On  the other hand,  over the same 
period,  the  quantity of  soya  meal  used  as  animal  feed  seems  to  have  levelled 
out, as has the quant~ty of imports.  In 1991/92,  the quantity of soya meal used 
(20.9 MT)  remained virtually at the 1986/87 level:  21  MT,  of which  20.4 MT  were 
either imported or made  from  imported seeds  (EC  degree of self-supply:  6%). 
The  explanation for  this phenomenon lies in  the physical limits which  the  use 
of  meal  as  a  constituent  of  the  feed  ration  in  stock-farming  cannot  exceed, 
which have probably already been reached. 
- 54  -PROBLEMS  PRESENTED  BY  THE  INCREASED  USE  OF  CEREAL  SUBSTITUTES  AND  SOYA  MEAL  AS 
ANIMAL  FEEDINGSTUFFS 
By their very nature, and owing to developments in stock-farming techniques,  the 
use  of  cereal  substitutes  and  soya  meal  as  animal  feedingstuffs  can  only 
increase at the expense of Community cereals, for which animal feedings tuffs are 
also the main outlet.  Until the m~d-seventies, cereal substitutes accounted for 
only a  minor proportion of animal feedingstuffs in the EC,  but the situation has 
altered in their favour,  and,  particularly since the mid-eighties,  the pace of 
this change has gathered speed,  so that today their market share amounts to 70% 
of the market  share of cereals.  All  forecasts  predict an  increasingly bright 
future  in the  EC  for  these products,  particularly cereal substitutes. 
The  problems  and  conflicts  of  interests  derive  from  the  fact  that  cereal 
substitutes are imported into the  EC  at  a  very low or zero rate of duty,  which 
makes  them  highly  competitive.  Community  maize  producers,  for  instance,  are 
faced  with direct  competition  from  imports  of  corn  gluten  feed,  95%  of  which 
come  from  the USA,  and  they look very unfavourably on such rapid growth.  This 
is a  particularly sensitive sector,  as CGF  is virtually free as a  by-product of 
the  ethanol  and  fructose  corn  syrup  industry,  and  enjoys  subsidies and other 
governmental concessions.  Between 1983/84 and 1989/90,  the market for maize as 
animal  feed  in the  EC  suffered a  20%  drop,  this decline being directly linked 
with  the  increase  in  CGF  imports.  From  1989/90  to  1991/92,  the  quantity  of 
Community-produced maize used as  animal  feed fell below the  20  MT  threshold  (-
13%  in one year).  EC  ma~ze producers are asking the Commission to challenge the 
US  under  the  GATT  on  grounds  of  unfair  competition:  American  producers  have 
spectacularly increased their CGF  production because they can take advantage of 
the  subsidies,  protect~on  measures  and  sundry  concessions  granted  by  the 
American  Government,  and  the  particularly  lucrative  outlets  offered  by  the 
complete absence of protection at  EC  borders. 
This is a  serious matter,  with severe consequences for  the income of  Commun~ty 
cereal producers,  subject as  they are to a  restrictive price  pol~cy under  the 
CAP  reform,  and aware that,  despite the efforts demanded of them,  the Community 
~s blithely cont~nu~ng to  import  more  and more substitutes. 
There  is ' another,  even  more  serious  consequence  in  structural  terms:  the 
relocating of livestock farms,  in particular pig farms,  to areas near Community 
ports which have special facilities to receive manioc and other imported cereal 
substitutes.  This  results  in  an  expansion  of  industrial  facil~ties,  with 
unfortunate  environmental  repercuss~ons  for  the  Member  States  concerned 
(Netherlands,  Belg~um.  Germany). 
Another  consequence  is  the  impact  on  the  area  farmed  in  the  Community.  Two 
million  ha  under  cereals  had  already  been  lost  between  1980  and  1988,  and  a 
further million between  1988 and  1991  in the  EC  of the Twelve,  and the trend is 
continuing downwards,  in particular owing to the combined effect of the reforms 
(set-aside)  and imports of substitutes. 
Clearly,  therefore,  the Community should intervene to slow down  the increasing 
use of cereal  subst~tutes, since soon it will not just be  a  matter of the non-
use  of  several  million  tonnes  of  cereals,  but  of  a  threat  to  a  system  of 
production which is typical of European agriculture, based on mixed  "l~vestock­
feed grain" farming,  practised on a  large number of family farms.  This problem 
was  raised  at  the  European  Council  of  February  1 988,  wh~ch  instructed  the 
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proposal  submitted by  the  Commission  in  response  to this brief  (COM  (88)  164 
final of 01.12.1988): 
a)  the  granting of  a  premium  for  additional quantities of  Community  cereals 
used in the manufacture of compound feeds in excess of  20%  over a  reference 
period  (1986/87 and  1988/89  marketing years); 
b)  the granting of a  kind of loyalty bonus to producers using more than 45%  of 
Community-produced cereals, irrespective of the basic premium on additional 
quantities. 
When  the  Commission proposal was  submitted to  ~t for  an  opinion,  the European 
Parliament  (DOC  A2-49/89  - rapporteur  Mr  EYRAUD)  voiced  doubts  about  the 
effectiveness  of  the  approach  advocated  by  the  Commission  and  made  a 
counterproposal for a  support  mechanism which would not use reference periods, 
would  be  simple  to  administer  and  could  allow  Member  States  to  guarantee 
effective monitoring mechanisms  to  prevent  fraud.  Parliament considered that 
the  Commission  proposal  could  be  improved  if  the  idea  of  an  additional 
quantities premium were abandoned in favour of the idea of a  premium for the use 
of  Community-produced cereals  - a  kind  of  intra-Community  production refund. 
This would  be  a  single,  fixed premium,  which would facilitate monitoring.  It 
would  be  paid  both  to  livestock  farmers  making  their  own  feedingstuffs 
incorporating their own  cereals,  and to manufacturers of  compound  feeds  using 
at least  20%  of cereals bought  on  the Community market.  However,  nothing came 
of either the Commission proposal or of the Parliament's opinion when  they were 
submitted to the Council,  possibly because other courses,  such as  the third CAP 
reform  (lowering of institutional prices of cereals),  were already in view. 
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THE  APRIL  1989  AGREEMENT 
Although trade in tropical agricultural products accounts for  only  5%  of world 
trade in terms of value,  its liberalization is a  matter of vital importance to 
the  economies  of  the developing  countr~es.  Indeed,  trop~cal products account 
for  40%  ~f  the  value  of  exports  from  these  countries.  The  Uruguay  Round 
negotiations have approached the question of tropical products through a  special 
negotiating group.  The experts have worked on a  list of 500  tropical products, 
some of  them agricultural and  some  ~ndustr~al. 
The  EEC  was  the first  to submit  its proposal,  in  October  1987,  suggesting the 
reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tar~ff barriers for  these products. 
It  should  be  borne  in  mind  here  that  the  EEC  had  to  strike  a  difficult 
compromise between its desire to make  concessions  to the developing countries 
and the reluctance of the ACP  countr~es, with which the EEC  had signed the LOME 
Convention,  to  share  their  preferential  status with  regard to  access  to  the 
Community market.  The  United States then submitted a  proposal along the lines 
of its proposal for agriculture, consisting of an accelerated timescale for the 
elimination of all support  and protection measures  covering trade  in tropical 
agricultural products, subject to agreement on trade in agriculture.  According 
to the US  the reforms should be applied in full within less than 10 years.  The 
third main group concerned,  consisting of the developing countries,  called for 
the reduction of duties for  the entry of processed and semi-processed tropical 
products  into other  countries,  and  the elimination of  internal  taxes,  global 
quotas  and  the discretionary nature of  the  granting of  licences,  and  greater 
flexibility  in  health  and  technical  standards.  In  the  final  analysis,  the 
developing  countries  wanted  the  other  countries  to  make  allowance  for  their 
special situation.  More  than  20  different countries  (or  groups of  countr~es) 
submitted lists of  the  main  products  affecting  them  and  their  liberalization 
proposals for  these products. 
In May  and June  1988  there were  two series of multilateral negotiat~ons on the 
seven groups of tropical products adopted as bases for negotiation.  These seven 
groups  are:  tropical  beverages;  sp~ces  1  flowers  f  basketware  and  wickerwork 
items;  certain oilseeds,  vegetable  o~ls  and  oilseed  cake;  tobacco,  rice  and 
roots of tropical  orig~n,  tropical fruits  (including nuts);  natural rubber and 
tropical timber; jute and hard fibres.  It was understood that this list did not 
constitute a  definition of  tropical  products,  that it was  not  exhaustive  and 
that  other  products  could  be  included  as  the  negotiations  progressed.  A 
separate negotiating group worked  on non-tariff barriers. 
The  agreement  resulting  from  the  mid-term  review  in  Montreal  from  5  to  9 
December  1988,  then  in  Geneva  from  5  to  8  April  1989,  includes  a  chapter  on 
tropical  products.  The  results  ach~eved  thus  far  are  organized  around  the 
following three  comm~tments: 
1)  elimination of  customs duties on non-processed products; 
2)  elimination  of  or  substantial  reduction  in  duties  on  semi-processed 
products.  The  objective  of  this  measure  would,  in  particular,  be  to 
eliminate or reduce  the progressive nature of duties; 
3)  elimination or reduction of all non-tar~ff measures affecting trade in these 
products. 
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volume of  some  10  billion US  dollars'  worth of trade.  In Geneva,  the various 
signatory countries undertook to put their stated intentions to liberalize into 
practice at an early date,  in other words  by  the end of  1989.  However,  after 
the April  1989 declaration in Geneva, it became very  d~fficult to make  progress 
in the negotiations  ~n certain sectors,  part~cularly agriculture,  and certain 
countries  - in  particular  the  Un~ted States,  canada  and  Switzerland  - made 
fulfilment of the commitments entered into in Geneva subJect to movement  in the 
agricultural negotiations,  all accords  and  commitments  remaining  frozen until 
such  time as  this was  achieved.  Other  countries,  such as  the EEC,  decided to 
apply,  unilaterally, a  limited.number of the liberalization commitments entered 
into in Geneva.  Lastly,  Australia,  Austria,  Finland,  New  Zealand,  Norway  and 
Sweden  decided to act  on  their commitments  immediately. 
It should be noted that the United States and the EEC  are the two main importers 
of  tropical products.  As  in the negotiations on  agricultural products,  these 
two countries have different interests in tropical products to defend.  Each of 
the  two parties claims  to be  putting forward  the most  favourable  proposal for 
trade liberalization.  It is difficult to compare these two proposals, since the 
offers made  by  the  two  countries do  not  cover  the  same  products  and/or do not 
concern the same quantities of imported products.  A comparison for  some  of the 
main problems is,  however,  shown  in Table  3  at  the end of this chapter. 
THE  NEW  EC  OFFER  ON  TROPICAL  PRODUCTS  IN  DECEMBER  1990 
In December  1990,  the EC  presented a  new offer on tropical products which went 
considerably  further  than  the  previous  one,  adding  new  products  and  greater 
customs duty reductions to the list. 
The  proposed reductions went  as  far as: 
total elimination of  customs duties  on  raw  tropical products; 
a  35%  reduction on  semi-processed products; 
a  50%  reduction on  processed products. 
On  the other hand,  the December  1990  offer omitted 84  products which  had  been 
included in  the  previous  offer,  and added  seven  new  ones.  The  customs  duty 
reductions proposed were greater  (with the exception of  26  products in respect 
of which the reductions were  not  as  great). 
The  new  EC  offer covers  220  tariff lines and  imports  amounting  to a  value  of 
approximately  ECU  4  billion,  30%  lower  than  the  previous  offer  (ECU  5.  7 
billion),  and entails  a  loss  in duty of  ECU  190  million,  rather  than  ECU  243 
million  (-22%) .  The limitation of the value of trade is not fully reflected in 
the loss of duty  lev~ed,  ow~ng to the larger reductions in duties granted.  The 
developing  countries  which  stand  to  benef~t  most  from  this  offer  would  be 
certain South  American  countr~es,  the  ACP  countr~es and  the  ASEAN  countries. 
The  Canary  Islands  (arrangements  under  the  1985  Act  of  Accession)  would  also 
derive substantial benefits  (value of  trade  involved:  almost  ECU  250,000). 
However,  this  new  offer  does  not  have  the  same  impact  on all the  Community's 
trading  partners:  whilst  trade  in  tropical  products  with  Japan,  the  United 
States  and  the  other  developed  countries  is  significantly  affected,  the 
interests  of  the  developing  countries  are  protected or  even,  in  some  cases, 
enhanced. 
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EC  offer,  the  following points are worth  not~ng: 
a)  Tropical timber  plywood 
The  Community  industry is  experiencing serious  difficulties owing  to  the 
export  restrictions  appl~ed to  timber  by  certain countries supplying  the 
Community with  trop~cal timber  plywoods. 
b)  Stri~g and rope  for  hard fibres 
The  situation  with  regard  to  str~ng  is  very  delicate.  The  Commun~ty 
indus try has been seriously hit by a  tax on raw rna terials lev~ed on products 
from ;Brazil,  the main  supplier.  In  order  to restore normal  conditions of 
competition, the Community recently ra~sed customs duties for these products 
from  12  to  25%. 
c)  Cork  floor coverings 
This product is still covered under  the  new  Community offer. 
d)  Ramie  yarn  (Boehmeria nivea,  China  grass) 
A  concession on  this  product  could benefit subtropical countries  such  as 
China and Japan in the long  term  (also comes  under  the  textiles offer) . 
e)  Cane,  wicker and bamboo furniture,  etc. 
Indonesia applies restrict~ons on exports of the raw material (rattan).  The 
Community will not  put  forward any  offer for manufactured products unless 
these export  restrict~ons are  abol~shed. 
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COMPARISON  OF  TROPICAL  PRODUCTS  SUPPLY  IN  THE  EC  AND  US 
Tropical 
beverages 
Plants-
flowers 
Vegetable 
oils 
Fresh 
bananas 
Tropical 
timber 
Natural 
rubber 
EC 
Special arrangements 
for  the least developed 
countries:  zero customs 
duties 
quantitative 
restrictions 
45%  of  imports 
internal taxes:  5-55% 
coffee:  cd =  4-15% 
cocoa:  cd =  0-12% 
tea:  cd =  0% 
internal taxes 
cut  flowers:  cd 
cd  5-20% 
cd =  20%  + quotas 
for  some  countries 
cd  2-2.5% 
cd  0% 
8-20% 
(cd  = customs duties) 
Source:  Doc  PE  WIP/90/04/065  (DG  IV) 
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us 
Cond~tion sine qua 
non;  conclus~on of 
negot~ations on 
agriculture 
35%  of  imports 
internal taxes  0% 
coffee:  cd  =  0% 
cocoa:  cd  = 0-0.4% 
tea:  cd =  0% 
cut  flowers:  cd = 4-8 
cd at  25%  for  some 
products 
cd  0% 
cd  0% 
cd  0% 
cd  0% 2. 5.  NOTE:  FISHING  IN THE  CONTEXT  OF  THE  URUGUAY  ROUND 
(Reference  contained  in  the  Manual  on  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy,  External 
Study by the Directorate General  for  Research of  the European Parliament,  ISBN 
92-823-0367-5,  FR-4-1992) 
The  commercial issues bound  up  with  fish~ng are dealt with as part of  the  GATT 
Uruguay  Round  w~thin the  Negotiat~ng Group on natural resource-based products. 
A working group  on  trade  ~n some  of  those products  had  already been set up in 
May  1984  (Doc  C/M/176)  -well before the start of the Uruguay Round therefore-
and had been mandated to 
consider,  ~n line with  the  decision  on  problems  in  trade  involving  some 
products derived from natural resources, adopted at the ministerial meeting 
of the contracting part~es in 1982  (Doc  BIS0/295/20),  the problems falling 
within the  scope  of  the  General  Agreement  and  concerning customs  duties, 
non-tariff measures  and other factors  affect~ng trade in products derived 
from  the following natural resources: 
a)  non-ferrous metals and ore; 
b)  forestry products; 
c)  fish and fishery products 
including  in  processed  and  semi-processed  form,  with  a  view  to  recommending 
possible solutions. 
The  Working Party on Fisheries,  which  is independent  of  the  two  other groups, 
met  on  several  occasions  ~n  1984  and  1985  and  produced  an  initial report  in 
November  1984  (Doc  MDF/3).  Two  major  aspects  were  the  immediate  focus  of 
concern: 
the overfishing of  fish stocks which  was  assuming alarming proportions and 
expanding further with every year; 
the redistribution of the sea's resources  (in terms  of catch possibilities) 
which followed the  "revolut~on" in the rules of the sea decided upon by certain 
states  of  the  North  Atlantic  in  1977  (and  subsequently  generally  applied), 
consisting in  the  extension of  national  fishing  limits  to  200  nautical miles 
offshore.  That  new state of affairs enabled the coastal states  (and Canada  and 
the United States in particular) to obtain additional maritime assets to manage, 
while  other  countries  (and  the  Community  Member  States  in  particular)  were 
deprived of large sections of their traditional deep-sea fishing zones,  with the 
significant economic and social repercussions this implied for  them. 
Some  coastal  states  then  went  on  to  expand  their  fish~ng  fleet  and  their 
industrial processing sector  to enable  them  to obtain  maximum  advantage  from 
their new  fishing resources.  In every case,  it is  the coastal state which  has 
sole responsibility for fixing its "TACs"  (total allowable catches) representing 
the  annual  catch  tonnage  which  may  not  be  exceeded  ~n  "its"  waters  for  the 
different  species.  Should their fishing fleets  be  unable  to  cover all of  the 
TACs,  then - in line with the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
- the coastal states have  to  determ~ne the  surplus  volume  available  for  third 
countries:  allocat~on of that  surplus is,  of 
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market  of  the  countries  concerned etc.  Between  1977  and  1985,  more  than  300 
bilateral agreements were entered into,  some  of  them based on the principle of 
access to resources in exchange for market access. It is plain that the TACs  and 
the  dividing-up of  the surplus have  an effect  on patterns of trade.  A coastal 
state is  in fact  completely  free  to  fix  unilaterally and  subject  to its  own 
criteria the volume  and nature of its surpluses,  to determine their value and 
accord  them  to  some  countries  but  not  others,  depending  on  the  commercial 
advantages obtained and/or existing commercial or political disputes. 
Such policies and practices therefore produce a  fundamental imbalance.  The fact 
is that while trade is subject to  the rules of  the GATT,  the allocation of any 
surplus is not subject to any international regulation. 
Indeed,  transparency  in  the  allocation  of  surpluses  cannot  be  guaranteed 
precisely because the principle itself of that allocation and the discrimination 
encountered by some countries creates an atmosphere conducive to the development 
of  commercial  and  indeed  diplomatic  problems.  Incidents  have  therefore 
inevitably arisen between coastal states and states seeking access to resources. 
One  of the most significant and most  serious is the dispute between Canada and 
the European Economic Community  (EEC)  since 1985.  A fisheries agreement was  in 
fact signed in 1981,  for a  period of 6  years,  and was able to be tacitly renewed 
(unless denounced with  twelve  months'  notice).  Canada  accorded the EEC  annual 
access to its resources to the level of  16,000 tonnes of cod  (14,500  tonnes  in 
1982)  and  7, 000  tonnes  of  squid  in  return  for  preferential  access  to  the 
Community  market  for  certain of its fisheries products  (frozen cod,  whole  and 
in  fillets;  salted cod,  whole  and  in fillets;  and  certain  forms  of  prepared 
herring). 
In  1986  therefore,  the  Community  accounted  for  14%  of  Canadian  exports  of 
fishery products,  and this was  l~kely to  increase with the entry of Spain and 
Portugal into the Community.  From  the  time  the agreement first came  into force 
(1981),  however,  Canada  condemned  administrative obstacles,  set in place,  ~t 
alleged,  by  the  Community,  and  having  the  effect  of  blocking access  for  its 
products  to  the  Community  market,  in breach  of  the  agreement  s~gned.  But  the 
real start of the conflict between Canada and the Community can be traced to the 
spring of  1985 when  Canada claimed that cod-fishing by the Community  in a  zone 
of  the  North  Atlantic  administered under  the  NAFO  (North  Atlantic  Fisheries 
Organization)  Convention  and  outside  its  jurisdiction  was  illegal.  Canada 
declared  that  the  cod  quota  which  it accorded  the  Community  represented the 
total Community  quota within and outside Canadian waters.  Since  the  Community 
refused to  comply with  the  demands  of  a  country acting outside its exclusive 
economic area,  Canada ceased to apply the provisions of the agreements from the 
end of 1985. Moreover, at Canada's instigation, NAFO  set zero fishing quotas for 
certain  stocks  of  interest  to  the  Community.  Such  quotas  are  not,  however, 
binding unless a  unanimous decision is taken by  those party to the convention. 
Given that it could not endorse such proposals, the Community took the view that 
it was  not  obliged  to  respect  the  NAFO  decision  and  therefore  fixed  ~ts  own 
quotas independently.  (For more  information on this, see EP  Working Paper No  21 
in the Agriculture,  Fisheries and Forestry series on relations between the EEC 
and canada in the  fisheries sector) . 
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the Uruguay Round  began in September  1986. 
In  September  1985,  the  Negotiating  Group  on  natural  resource-based  products 
published a  major report  (Doc  L/5895)  devoted to the commercial issues posed by 
fishery  products  and  in  which  the  Community  view  was  clearly stated.  At  the 
conclusion of the GATT  ministerial meeting at Punta del Este,  in September 1986, 
Mr  Willy  de  Clercq,  the  then  Cornrn~ssioner for  External  Relat~ons, stated that 
the  Community  had  accepted  the  text  on  natural  resource-based products  as  a 
whole  and  was,  of  course,  prepared  to  work  towards  a  greater  degree  of 
liberalization  in  that  area.  However,  as  far  as  the  fisher~es  sector  was 
concerned,  the Community  regretted that  the options it had put  to the  Work~ng 
Group on  Fish and Fishery Products and  had referred to in that Group's  report 
did  not  figure  anywhere  in  the  text.  The  Community  therefore  felt  itself 
compelled to repeat what it had always stated :tn all fora in which the issue had 
been considered,  namely that it would agree to take part in discussions covering 
the fisheries sector only if all the special factors concerning that product and 
affecting trade in it were  taken into account  (Doc  MIN  (86)  SR.7). 
On  this subject,  the Punta del Este Declaration is worded as  follows: 
"Negotiations shall aim  to achieve the fullest liberalization of trade in 
natural  resource-based  products,  including  in  their  processed  and  semi 
processed-forms.  The  negotiations shall  a~m to  reduce or eliminate tariff 
and non-tariff·measures,  including tariff escalation." 
In July 1987,  the Commun~ty issued a  communication addressed to the Negotiating 
Group on Natural Resources  (Doc  MTN/GNG/NG3/W/4)  setting forth,  inter alia, its 
position on the  trade  ~n fisheries products and stating the  problems it wished 
to see specifically d~scussed by  that Negotiating Group,  namely: 
a)  the tariff and non-tariff measures applied to imports; 
b)  aid measures  for production and  trade; 
c)  the other factors  spec~f~c to those products and which affected trade. 
The  Community  issued  a  further  communication  ~n  February  1988  (Doc 
MTN/GNG/NG3/W/11)  to  explain  the  position  of  the  Community,  which  attached 
particular  importance  to  the  principle of  non-discrimination under  the  GATT. 
Finally,  in  July  1989,  the  Community  issued  a  communication  (Doc 
MTN/GNG/NG3/W/25)  concerning  the obstacles  to  the  trade  in  natural  resource-
based  products  and  stressing  the  need  for  the  Working  Group  on  Fisheries  to 
tackle  the  issue  of  discriminatory  access  for  third  country  fleets  to  the 
resources'  and  the  limiting  and  discrimination  of  access  to  ports  and  port 
facilities. At the time,  those two issues concerned more particularly the United 
States  arid  Canada.  The  latter had  in fact  unilaterally barred access  to their 
port  facilities  to  fleets  which  they  did  not  consider  sufficiently 
"cooperative", but had provided no more specific reason for this. The Community 
was  therefore determined that access  to fishing resources and related problems 
should be broadly discussed by  the Negotiating Group on 
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included fisheries in the agricultural sector,  while  Canada put  them under the 
heading of tariff and non-tariff measures.  Both  those countries declared that 
the issues to be negotiated in the fisheries sector were limited to the level 
of  customs duties  and non-tariff measures.  They  took  the view that access  to 
fishing  resources  was  a  subject  outside  the  field  of  negotiation  under  the 
Uruguay  Round  and  covered  by  the  UN  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  (Doc 
MTN/GNG/NG3/W/8/Rev 1) .  A kind of dialogue of the deaf seemed therefore to have 
set in between Canada,  the United States and Australia on the one hand,  and the 
EEC,  supported  to  some  extent  by  Japan,  on  the  other.  The  former  wished  to 
discuss only customs dut~es and non-tariff measures as such, while the Community 
was  prepared  to  negot~ate only if all factors  influencing  trade  - including 
access to resources  - were  taken  into account. 
At  its  Geneva  meeting,  on  8  June  1990,  the  Negotiating  Group  on  Natural 
Resource-based  Products  considered  a  new  proposal  from  the  Community 
(MTN/GNG/NG3/W/37). The document,  which focused in the main on access to f~shing 
resources and two-tier price fixing  (a practice which involves supporting local 
industries by permitting imports of raw materials duty-free or at a  reduced rate 
of  duty,  while  at  the  same  time  imposing  duties  on  ~mports  of  processed 
products)  provoked very mixed  reactions within the  Group) . 
The Community proposal on access to resources was badly received. Chile made an 
official  protest  and  claimed  that  this  fell  outside  the  Group's  terms  of 
reference.  Japan  also  expressed  concern  and  stressed  that  discussions  on 
fisheries ought  rather to be  a  matter for  the group dealing with agriculture. 
The  EEC  delegation stressed,  in its defence,  that the Community was  not seeking 
to erode the sovereignty of the coastal states but was concerned to ensure that 
all  the  countries  could  compete  on  an  equal  footing  for  access  to  fishing 
resources. 
In  contrast,  the  Community  proposal  on  two-t~er  pr~ce  fixing  proved  more 
persuasive.  The  Community was  looking to put  a  stop to the practice which was, 
in  fact,  a  method  of  accord~ng aid  for  continued  operation  to  the  national 
industry. Australia,  Canada  and  the United States were  in favour  of  the Group 
discussing the  issue  and  pointed out  that  commercial  problems  were  likely  to 
arise  in  that  area.  Brazil,  however,  stressed  that  there  were  many  factors 
influencing  trade,  including  environmental  considerations  and  the  need  to 
protect national security,  which  explained why  some countries had  problems  in 
eliminating import restrictions. 
When  the Community proposal  was  further discussed,  on  8  June  1990,  several of 
the participants, and in particular the developed and developing coastal states, 
rejected the Community proposal on the ground that the issue was  not covered by 
the  GATT. 
At  that  point,  several of  the participants  ~nformed the  Group  that  they  were 
engaged in far-reaching bilateral negotiations on market access. 
In  September,  the  first  joint  meeting  on  market  access  was  held  between  the 
Negotiating  Groups  on  Customs  Duties,  Non-tariff  Measures,  Natural  Resource-
based Products and Tropical Products. 
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That meeting simply provided many delegations with an opportunity for expressing 
their  concerns  at  general  progress  on  market  access  and  calling  for  the 
bilateral :negotiations on the substance to be speeded up.  The participants also 
agreed to 'a  proposal from Australia and the Community inviting the secretarlat 
to evaluate the proposals  on natural resource-based products. 
The second joint meeting,  in November  1990,  saw no progress in the negotiations 
on  market access  - dlfficult decisions were constantly postponed. 
It was  therefore not  possible to establish a  foundation enabling ministers·to 
take final decisions,  in Brussels,  ln December  1990. 
- 65  -2. 6.  NOTE:  UNITED  STATES  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY 
THE  1990  FARM  BILL 
The five-year "Food,  Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990"  (1990 Farm 
Bill)  was  signed  by  President  Bush  on  28  November  1990.  The  House  of 
Representatives and  the  Senate agreed  to  reduce agricultural spending between 
1991  and  1995  by  $  13.6  bn  in  contrast  with  the  preliminary draft  farm  bill 
which had estimated agricultural spending at some$  55  bn  for the period 1991-
1995.  There was  therefore to be  a  cut in spending in the region of  25%.  But  the 
agricultural budget  was  set at  $  41  bn  over  five years,  that is $  8.3  bn  per 
annum  (0.63% of  the federal  budget). 
Were  the American Farm Bill and the new  ~nternational trade negotiations within 
the GATT  complementary or were  they  mov~ng ~n d~fferent directions? The latter 
seems  the more likely answer,  bear~ng in mind that the option of  extend~ng for 
a  year the  1985 bill- which would have made it possible to take account of the 
outcome of the GATT  negotiations - was  firmly rejected. 
Both Congress and the Administration had in fact  to meet certain requirements. 
Most  urgent  for  the  immediate  future  was  to  reduce  the  United  States'  large 
budget deficit. Given that the costs of supporting agriculture had swling during 
the life of  the previous five-year bill from$  11  bn to$ 25.8 bn,  it too was 
a  candidate for the essent1al cuts. But it should also be borne in mind that a 
large number of American farms  were in a  shaky financial situation as  a  result 
of climatic  (drought etc)  or economic factors  (h~gh level of  ~ndebtedness etc}. 
In addition,  the agricultural trade balance  - in the  region of more  than  $  20 
bn in 1990- made  a  major contribution to the American balance of trade and the 
agri-food sector, together with the industries dependent on it both upstream and 
downstream was  the leading sector in the economy.  Those considerations need to 
be  taken  into  account  alongside  the  demands  of  the  trading  partners  who 
traditionally support  American  positions and  influence the negotiation of  the 
Uruguay Round  (the  CAIRNS  Group,  for  example) . 
Alongside the pressure from  the  CAIRNS  Group,  there was  a  constant  demand  for 
review of protectionist agricultural policy within the  United States. Although 
in  place  since  the  sixties  (negotiation  of  the  Kennedy  Round),  it  was  not 
without ambiguity. Although the United States criticize the openly protectionist 
nature of  the  CAP,  it too  resorts,  and  to  a  considerable degree,  to what  are 
unquestionably protectionist mechanisms. In addition to the imposition of quotas 
on certain foodstuffs,  such as meat,  sugar and milk products,  crops covered by 
"programs"  provide  farmers  who  take  part  ~n efforts  at  voluntarily limiting 
production with  an  income  guarantee.  Unlike  the  Community  import  levy,  which 
makes it possible to maintain high  internal prices,  the American compensatory 
payment is equal to  the difference between  the market price  (or  "loan rate") , 
closely  related  to  the  world  price,  and  a  statutorily  set  target  price, 
calculated to provide  the  farmer  with what  is deemed  an adequate  income.  That 
compensatory payment, which varies according to the difference between those two 
prices, therefore enables Arner~can farmers to cushion the impact of fluctuations 
in  rates  on  the  internat~onal markets.  The  fact  that  the  internal  prices  (or 
loan  rates)  are  akin  to  world  prices  is  achieved  artificially,  and  is  the 
product of a  deliberate policy. It benefits consumers as well as the  process~ng 
industry which is, as a  result,  more  competit~ve. Above all, it facilitates the 
disposal on world markets of production between 30%  and 50%  of which is intended 
for export. Combined with subsidies and various credits, the support mechanisms 
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other  exporters  of  agricultural  products  who  do  not  have  the  resources  to 
guarantee their producers an adequate  level of  income  supplement. 
In  order  to  encourage  a  reform  incorporating  these  various  factors,  the 
Administr~tion drew  up  a  draft  proposal  which it put  to  Congress  in  February 
last.  Two  :key-concepts emerged from  that draft:  "flexibility" and the breaking 
of  the  link  between  compensatory  payments  and  production.  The  1985  bill had 
taken up the basic system,  brought in fifty years earlier,  of price support in 
exchange  for  partial  withdrawal  of  the  land  under  cultivation,  making  it 
possible to control product~on all the more closely where allocation of land use 
for  different  crops  is  fixed  rigidly.  It  had  also  set  in  place  a  ten-year 
programme  for  the  protection  of  the  land  most  liable  to  erosion,  thereby 
reducing  by  that  area  the  land  cultivated.  The  Adm~nistration proposed  that 
farmers  should  be  completely  free  to  cul ti  va te  land  on  which  program  crops 
(wheat  and other cereal crops,  rice and cotton)  and oilseeds had  h~therto been 
grown,  under  the  princ~ple  of  flexibil~ty.  The  secretary  of  state  for 
agriculture could even authorize cultivation of  some  of  the  land forming  part 
of the compulsory land reserve.  The  support linked to program crops  - excluding 
oilseeds  :- remained  set  at  their  "historic"  level  and  no  longer  therefore 
depended on production  (decoupl~ng) . 
According to the Department of Agriculture,  adopt~on of that system would bring 
with  it  several  advantages.  It  was  intended,  among  other  things,  to  tailor 
supply  more  closely to  demand,  as  farmers  would  pay  greater attention to the 
market and take their decisions concerning production in the light of the market 
instead of the various  government  support  programmes.  It was  also intended to 
facilitate crop rotation and  thus  reduce  the  use  of  fertilizer while limiting 
the  threat of erosion. 
Congress largely remained deaf to this argument. Once the initial enthusiasm had 
passed,  the  concept  of  flexibility  was  seen  as  dangerous.  The  freedom  of 
cultivation accorded  to  farmers  would  have  benefited  some  at  the  expense  of 
others.  Those  who  cont~nued  to  obtain  "historic"  compensatory  payments  for 
having  taken  part  in  the  program  crops  arrangements  from  which  they 
traditionally benefited would have  enjoyed an  unfair advantage  over  the other 
producers.  Had  they  enjoyed  th~s  new  freedom of  cultivation to opt  for  crops 
which did'not attract  th~s type of support,  they would have been able to accept 
without  risk a  fall in the market  price,  resulting from  increased production. 
The potato-growers and,  above all,  the powerful soya lobby soon objected to the 
proposal.  Following their consideration of  the question,  the proposals of both 
Congress and the House of Representatives in fact limited flexibility to 25%  of 
the land historically used for program crops and oilseeds.  Farmers could claim 
loan rates in respect of that agricultural area but not  compensatory payments. 
Congress  proved  still  more  d~strustful  of  the  concept  of  decoupling.  The 
breaking of the link between production and government payments was bound in the 
short or medium  term to result in  a  sharp drop in those  payments,  which would 
be all the easier to put  into effect as  this would  be  a  fixed allowance which 
could, in:the long term cause many  farms simply to cease to exist. Democrats and 
Republicans  joined  forces  to  reject  it  .  What  Congress  in  fact  feared  was 
surreptitious retreat by a  government facing serious budgetary difficulties and 
seeking to carry through its  negot~ating position in the  GATT.  Many  interests 
opposed to it were involved. First and foremost,  there were the  ~nterests of the 
farmers.  Farms accounting,  in 1 990,  for three-quarters of the land area used for 
the production of cereals and cotton,  benef~ted from federal support. Farms with 
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compensatory payments.  Those payments were vital to their survival,  whereas the 
large  farms  could  take  the  risk of  not  taking  part  in  government  programmes 
while, at the other extreme,  small farmers carried on a  secondary activity which 
made  them less reliant on federal  aid. 
Also  at  stake  was  the  balance  in  the  distribution  of  those  subsid~es  and 
advantages  between  the  different  products  and  the  different  regions  of 
production.  The  sugar  lobby  was  particularly active  because  of  being  under 
threat  from  the attempt at liberalization. 
Congress,  with  a  Democrat  majority,  was  sensitive  to  the  arguments  of  the 
electorate but  was,  at  the  same  time,  aware  that  an  overall reduction  in  the 
budget deficit also involved reducing agricultural spending - if this were not 
done,  President  BUSH  would  veto  the  bill.  It  therefore  finally  gave  its 
approval,  but  the  agreement  could  be  no  more  than  a  compromise  solut~on,  the 
main elements of which are  summarized below. 
The main provision to emerge  from  the agreement between  the Administration and 
Congress  was  the  establishment of  a  "triple base"  reflecting the principle of 
flexibility.  Added  to  the  "normal  crop"  basis,  compulsorily  grown  by  farms 
taking part  in  the  government  programmes  for  wheat,  other  cereals,  rice  and 
cotton (traditionally sown crops),  was the land reserve,  the percentage of which 
was  determined annually  (15%  for  the  next  marketing  year).  Under  the  "triple 
base",  farmers would have to relinquish compensatory payments on  a  further  15% 
of  land traditionally cultivated.  In  return,  they  would  be  free  to  sow  that 
portion of their land and to benefit from loan rates where  statutor~ly provided 
for.  There were  also specific programmes  for  various  products  (wheat,  grains, 
cotton,  rice,  oilseed,  sugar,  honey,  wool,  tobacco and milk products). 
The  compromise  balanced  out  the  sacrifices  to  be  made  between  the  different 
products. The reduction in compensatory payments which largely affected cereals 
was counterbalanced by the introduction of a  co-responsibility levy on sugar and 
milk products and  a  premium  for  soya.  Soya  producers  likely to be affected by 
the reduction in the market price resulting from the introduction of flexibility 
were given twofold protection in the form of a  marketing loan which enabled the 
farmer,  where  the  world  price  was  lower  than  the  loan  rate,  to  recover  his 
production from the federal intervention board  (CCC)  for a  sum  lesser than the 
loan rate he had been accorded. Moreover,  where there was  a  significant fall in 
rates,  the  soya  triple 'base  would  be  reduced  from  15%  to  10%.  The  sugar 
producers  meantime  retained  a  high  level  of  support  price  but  saw  the~r 
product~on made  subject  to quota to prevent  ~mports being eliminated. 
The  changes  in  product~on levels brought  about  as  a  result of  the flexibility 
of the Farm Bill are unlikely to be noticed during the next few marketing years. 
The producers will need some  time to appreciate fully the options offered under 
the  new  Bill.  The  differences between  the regions  may  actually be  accentuated 
given that,  for agricultural reasons,  they are not suited to the same  types of 
production. 
The  bulk of  decisions concerning trade,  including the  EEP  (Export  Enhancement 
Program)  are  retained  in  accordance  with  the  1985  Bill.  Some  changes  have, 
however,  been  introduced  with  the  aim  of  increasing  American  "commercial 
aggressiveness",  laying down  new  rules  for  participation in  programmes  by  the 
new  democracies  and the manufacture of  products with maJor value added. 
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changes  which  have  taken place on  the international markets. 
New  amendments  have  been  introduced  ~nto the  Amer~can legislation as  far  as 
environmental protection pol~cy ~s concerned. The list of penal ties provided for 
where  there are breaches of  the "sodbuster"  (conservat~on of land at risk from 
erosion)  and  "swapbuster"  (conservat~on  of  marshland)  programmes  has  been 
extended and  the levels of  f~ne  ~ncreased.  The  programme  for  the reduction of 
utilized agricultural  area  (ARP)  is  st~ll  being  implemented  wh~le  the  area 
covered by the reserve conservation programme is to be  increased from  34  to 45 
million acres by  1995. 
THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  1990  AMERICAN  FARM  BILL  FOR  THE  URUGUAY  ROUND 
What  are the  implicat~ons of this  leg~slative compromise for  the negotiation of 
the  GATT?  The  flex~bility  means  that  some  producers  enjoy  a  new,  albeit 
limited,  freedom.  It  encourages  farmers  to  pay  greater  attention  to  both 
internal  and  international  market  signals  the  prime  objective  of  the 
Administration.  But  it is  ev~dent  that  that  freedom  will  be  of  benefit  only 
where crop replacement is  poss~ble. That would apply to the maize-soya  rotat~on 
where the decision on which to sow will depend on the rates of the two products. 
Wheat  producers,  in  contrast,  will  der~ve very  little benefit.  Growers  will 
therefore be tempted not to take part in the government programmes  (30%  of their 
basic surface  being  excluded  from  federal  aid)  and  to  sow all of  their  land, 
regardless of  the risk of  erosion.  They will  have  therefore  to offset  through 
increased production the failure to obtain the compensatory payments they have 
abandoned. 
The  introduction of  flexibility is  an  ambiguous  measure.  It does,  of course, 
enable  vital  accounting  savings  to  be  made  ~n  the  federal  budget,  but  the 
reduction in  supports  which it allows  seems  to  require retaining the  current 
level  and  role  of  compensatory  payments,  despite  the  reduction  provided  for 
under the legislation,  from  1994.  While  the very large farms will probably not 
hesitate to withdraw from government programmes if they are taking part  ~n them, 
the same is unlikely to apply to medium-sized undertakings. They w~ll be all the 
more dependent on compensatory payments calculated on the basis of sufficiently 
high target prices  to the extent  that  the  income  they  obtain from  the  market 
will  be  diminished  by  the  fall  in rates  which  will  be  bound  to  result  in  an 
increase  in production.  But  their contribution to total production  cannot  be 
sacrificed without jeopardizing this vital sector of the economy.  The opposition 
of the  farmers  and,  consequently,  of Congress  to reducing supports,  so long as 
the  intervention  of  the  different  countr~es  involved  in  world  trade  causes 
prices to fall  (so that they do not  provide adequate income)  is likely to wreck 
any major  international trade reform. 
Finally,  the Export  Enhancement  Program  (EEP)  would continue to apply since it 
benefits American agricultural exports by making the prices of American products 
artificia~ly competitive as  compared with  the exports of other countries.  The 
EEP  is  seen  as  an  important  means  of  exerting pressure  to  reach  a  solut~on 
within the GATT. 
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The deficiency payment  system  ~n the United States involves financing the bulk 
of  support  for  agriculture  through  the  budget  by  offsetting  the  difference 
between  a  "market price"  (the natural consequence of  the  relationship between 
supply  and  demand)  and  a  "target  price"  (reflecting  the  desirable  level  of 
producer  income) .  That  method  therefore differs  radically  from  that  applied 
until May  1992  by  the  EC  which  involved supporting  market  prices at  what  was 
deemed a  "satisfactory" level  (for producers),  the burden of which fell almost 
entirely on consumers. 
Although  selective  (as  it  benefits  only  certain  products  and  producers  who 
request  it),  the  American  deficiency  payment  system  proves  costly  where 
international competition  produces  market  prices  which  fall  below  production 
costs.  But  the  risk  of  an  unlimited  increase  in  the  cost  of  the  system  is 
averted  (~n  theory  at  least)  by  the  requirement  that  agricultural  budgetary 
discipline be  respected,  which also applies in the United States. 
The  United  States  has  therefore  endeavoured  to  guarantee  the  international 
competitiveness  of  its  agriculture  by  requiring  its  main  competitors  to 
undertake,  in the context of the Uruguay Round GATT  negotiations, reforms which 
diminish  the  impact  of  their  various  support  systems.  One  result  of  that 
pressure  is  to  be  found  in  the  Commission  proposal  (COM(91)  100  FINAL  of 
1 .2.1991)  that it too should adopt- as part of the  "CAP  reform" -a system of 
"direct aid"  in order  to  enjoy  the  same  conditions  of  competition  (perfectly 
acceptable under  the  GATT  principles)  as  the United States. 
However,  the system of direct aid for  major  crops which  the Community  has  set 
in place differs markedly in several respects  from  the American system. 
Definition 
The  amount  of  the compensatory payment  corresponds  to the  d~fference between: 
- the ••target price"  - which more  or less corresponds to the  EC  target price 
- and  which  is fixed  annually  by  the  United States Department  of  Agriculture 
(USDA) 
and 
- the  '"market  price••  which  is at  the  same  level  on  the  national  as  on  the 
international markets 
or 
- the amount  of the floor price  ("loan rate")  which is also set  ~n advance for 
every marketing year and deemed to reflect the market  price.  The  amount  of  the 
"loan rate" is taken into account when calculating the compensatory payment only 
where  the market price is below it. 
The deficiency payment system applies to only a  limited number of program crops: 
fodder grain,  wheat,  rice and cotton.  The  other crops  (soya,  sunflower,  colza 
etc)  are able to benefit from  a  "loan rate"  but  not  a  "deficiency payment". 
The  deficiency  payment  system  ~s  an  optional  system  which  does  not  apply 
automatically to all producers but only to those who apply for it. For  farmers, 
the  benefit  of  the  deficiency  payment  is  accompanied  by  a  land  set-aside 
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deficiency  payment  farmers  have  in  fact  to  sign  with  the  Administration  a 
specific contract  involving  the  obligation to set  aside  land.  Land  thus  made 
subject  to  the  programme  ~s  intended  for  the  production  of  a  specific  crop 
(fodder  grain,  wheat,  rice  and  cotton)  and  a  percentage of it set aside at  a 
level fixed annually by the USDA  (aerial photography is used to ensure that this 
commitment  is  be~ng met) .  The  land yield is also fixed on  the  bas~s of  a  past 
sample  (the  average yield of  the past  5  years). 
In return,  the farmer  enjoys  two  advantages: 
payment in advance of the "loan rate":  the  amount  of  the  estimated harvest 
is in fact  paid in the  form of  a  loan  (at  the level of  the "loan rate")  to the 
farmer  who  undertakes  to  deliver  ~t  to  the  national  intervention  agency 
(Commodity Credit Corporation - CCC).  At  harvest time,  the farmer can decide to 
repay  the  loan to the CCC  enabling  him  to sell his  produce  on  the market  from 
which he will derive  a  larger  income,  if the yield or rates are  favourable. 
the benefit of the "deficiency payments":  in addi  t~on to the income he earns 
from  his  crop,  the  farmer  rece~ves compensatory  payments  for  the  production 
volume covered in the contract to the  lim~t of US$  50,000 per farm  (US$  250,000 
if the loan rate in quest~on has  been  the subJect of "Finley" reductions which 
trigger entitlement  to  "emergency compensation").  That  limit may,  however,  be 
circumvented given that,  since the  1990  Farm Bill,  the farmer's  spouse may  be 
taken into account  separately for  the  payment  of  that aid. 
Advantages 
The deficiency payment is a  flexible measure,  given that,  every year,  the  USDA 
is able to modify in the  light of  the situation on  the markets: 
the  percentage  of  compulsory  set-aside,  thereby  checking  or  boosting 
production; 
the level of  the "target price" and of  the "loan rate",  thereby making  them 
more or less attractive depending on  the differential being covered. 
The  system  leaves  farmers  free  to  take part  or  not  and  - in the  light of  the 
comparative advantages of  the United States in agricultural production - that 
reduces the function of the deficiency payment to harvest insurance against low 
prices. 
Moreover,, a  farmer  taking  part  in  a  federal  programme  enjoys  some  leeway  in 
choosing what  to produce since the new  agricultural legislation has  introduced 
the  system of  the flexible triple base which can be  summarized as  follows: 
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fl. 
X  XXX  1990 
K 
5%  95% 
A  fl. 
X  I  XX  I  XXX  1 991 
K  K 
1 5%  15%(10%)  70% 
Set-aside 
u 
X  II 
Non-program crop without  deficiency payment 
XX 
Program crop with deficiency payment 
XXX 
- the program crop  (benefiting from the defic~ency payment)  now covers only 70% 
of  the  utilized land;  the  farmer  may,  however,  use  for  the  production of his 
choice 10%  of the land utilized included in that initial base.  In that case,  the 
farmer  receives only  92%  of the  compensatory payment. 
the compulsory set-aside applies to only part of the remaining  30%  of  land: 
for  1991,  that  percentage  amounts  to  15%  under  contract  for  wheat,  7.5%  for 
maize,  0%  for  oats;  generally  speaking,  the  percentage  has  to  depend  on  the 
stock/utilization ratio and  may  be  reduced in return for  a  lesser deficiency 
payment. 
it is entirely up  to the  farmer  to decide what  he  does  with  the  remain1ng 
land covered by  the  program  (that is some  15%). 
Disadvantages 
"Set-aside of unproductive land/intensification of productive land" 
The  1985  Farm  Bill  linked  the  deficiency  payment  system  to  an  Acreage 
Reservation Program the  purpose of which  is to protect  the  environment rather 
than to control production. Two  factors have in fact tempered the effectiveness 
of  land set-aside: 
farmers have set aside "peripheral" land producing a  lesser yield and sought 
to  offset  the  loss  of  volume  ~nherent  ~n  set-aside  by  1ntensify~ng  their 
production; 
in addition,  the  1988  drought  led the  USDA  to  reduce considerably the level 
of  compulsory  set-as~de  (reducing it,  for  instance,  from  15%  to  5%  for wheat) 
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Budgetary cost 
Unless budgetary discipline is applied,  the deficiency 
rise  to  excessive  budgetary  expendlture.  Its  cost  to 
become  dif~icult to manage,  even for  the United States, 
collapsed  (between  1983  and  1986)  in  the  wake  of 
competition. 
payment  system may  give 
the  budget  has  ln  fact 
where world prices have 
stronger  international 
To tackle the crisis and maintain the competitiveness of American products,  the 
USDA  in fact agreed to pay increasingly hlgh levels of deficiency payment to the 
ever-growing number  of  producers applylng for  them. 
At  the  time  therefore,  the  system  of  compensatory  payments  operated  as  a 
"buffer"  a,id.  That  was  particularly noticeable  ln  the  case  of  maize.  In  the 
past,  there had been practlcally no deficiency payments for  American maize:  in 
1983,  only  3.9%  of  American  maize  production  benefited  form  a  compensatory 
payment  o~  US$  6.60;  in  1986,  that  proportion  had  rlsen  to  59.5%  and  the 
deficiency payment  amounted to US$  34.91. 
The distortion of competition 
The American system of compensatory payments represents an indirect export aid. 
In point  o,f  fact,  to the extent that it makes  it possible to malntain rates at 
a  level  that  only  American  producers  are able  to  cope  with,  it protects  the 
internal market against  imports  AND  constltutes an export subsidy guaranteeing 
the competitlveness of  American products. 
Discrimination between beneficiaries 
The  deficiency  payment  system  is  an  optional  system  which  does  not  apply 
automatically  to all producers  but  only  to  those  applying  for  it.  In general 
terms,  the effect of  the system is to encourage the big specialized farms  with 
the  paradoxical  result  of  diverting  the  support  away  from  those  farms  in 
greatest need of it. Budgetary support  for  agriculture  therefore goes  only to 
part of  total production,  so  that  the  breakdown  of  levels  of  support differs 
fundamentally  from  that of  the  EC  in the context of the GATT  negotiations. 
A  COMPARISON OF THE AMERICAN DEFICIENCY PAYMENT  SYSTEM AND  THE DIRECT AID SYSTEM 
RESULTING ·FROM  THE  CAP  REFORM 
As  far as :the major crops  (cereals,  oilseeds and protein crops)  are concerned, 
the  reform of  the  CAP  basically involves bringing Community price levels  down 
to  the  level  of  world  prices  and  partially offsetting the  resultant  fall  in 
income  by  a  system  of  direct  compensatory  aids  per  hectare  (not  linked  to 
production therefore),  the amount  of which will depend on farm size and the set-
aside of  some  of the  land covered by  the  system. 
The  impact on prices therefore varies according to farm size, as the percentage 
of compulsory set-aside and the amount of direct aid vary dependlng on the land 
area covered by  the system. 
This  is a  ;new  form of support  (based on  aids,  that is principally through  the 
tax-payer)  which differs radically from support  for cereals in the past  (based 
on prices; that is principally through  the consumer),  and very different  form 
the  system  applied  in  the  past  to  protein-rich oil  plants  and  the  American 
deficiency payment  system. 
- 73  -The  comparison that  follows is very telling: 
Beneficiar1es 
Set-aside 
Flexibility 
Production covered 
Level of premium 
Products covered 
us 
Farm  Bill  1991-1995 
The  deficiency pay.ment  benefits 
only fanners  who  apply for it 
by signing up  to a  crop 
program.  These are generally a 
minority of producers  (some  15% 
on  average in normal  times) 
Yes 
The  percentage of set-aside 
linked to the grant of a1d  is 
the same  for any given 
production whatever the area 
covered 
The  percentage of compu 1  sory 
set-aside is rev1sed every year 
by  the USDA  in the light of 
market needs. 
Yes 
Application of the principle of 
"flexible triple base".  The 
fanner therefore regains the 
ab1lity to take the initiative 
over a  part of his  land covered 
by  the contract. 
Quantity established on the 
basis of the past reference 
yield of that particular farm. 
Compensation constant between 
"loan rate" (or market price, 
1f higher) and "target price" 
within the limit of the 
reference yield. 
wheat 
fodder gra1n 
rice 
cotton 
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EC 
Commission  proposal  (COM 
(91)100  FINAL  of 1.2.1991  and 
COM(91  258  FINAL of 22.7.1991 
The  Corrmunity  system,  although 
a 1  so contractua  1,  wou 1  d 
encompass  a lrnost a 11  producers 
in that aids would  be 
indispensable to offset (in 
part at least) inadequate 
market prices 
Yes 
The  percentage of set-aside 
linked to the grant of aid 
var1es depending  on  the area 
involved. 
The possibility of annual 
adjustment is not envisaged. 
No 
As  an  "aid paid  per hectare", 
the  EC  deficiency payment would 
take account of a  reference 
y1eld,  calculated on a 
"regiona  1  ized basis". 
Compensation very reliable and 
var1es accord1ng to: 
- the size of the farm 
- the situation of the farm,  in 
both economic and  regional 
terms,  in line with criteria 
still to be defined  (some  by 
the Member  States) 
- yields which will  be taken 
into account. 
There would  be  no  more 
guaranteed  producer prices. 
cereals 
oilseeds 
protein crops 2.7.  NOTE:  THE  CORN  GLUTEN FEED  SECTION OF THE WASHINGTON  DRAFT  AGREEMENT: 
A  SIGNIFICANT  THREAT  TO  THE  EQUILIBRIUM  OF  THE  COMMUNITY  CEREALS 
MARKET  AND  A  DEFINITE  OBSTACLE  TO  GATT/CAP  COMPATIBILITY 
Corn gluten feed - CGF  - is a  by-product derived from  the manufacture of starch 
from  maize-seed using  the  following  process: 
maize-seed  starch + gluten + seed  (subsequently split into oil and seed cake) 
+residual by-product  (corn gluten feed}. 
The  American starch industry is more  or  less  the world's only producer of  CGF 
(the  US  is  the  world's  largest  maize  producer)  and  holds  a  sort  of  de  facto 
monopoly  on the product. 
CGF  can  be  used  as  a  supplement  ~n animal  feed,  in place of  cereals,  but  has 
three shortcomings in terms  of nutrition: 
it is low in easily assimilable sugars  (starch); 
it is high in cellulose, which is unable to be digested and wh~ch affects the 
capacity of proteins to be digested; 
it presents a  protein imbalance. 
Mixed  with co-products,  such  as  broken  or  waste  products  resulting  from  the 
screening process,  seed cake  or steep water,  CGF  can  be  made  into a  complete 
feedingstuff and,  as  such,  a  strong compet1tor for cereals. 
Following the  Kennedy Round of  the GATT  (1967)  the Community gave a  concession 
for  CGF  imports,  exempting them  from all duty on entry 1nto the Community.  CGF 
is therefore classified under tariff heading 2303  of the Common  Customs Tariff, 
as  a  residue. 
While  that  gap  in  Community  protection  was  without  ~mpact in  1967,  when  the 
concession was  made,  we  should bear in mind that currently  (1992)  the Community 
imports 38.7 million tonnes of cereal substitutes, including 6.1  million tonnes 
of CGF,  at a  time when  the  quant~ties of cereals used 1n animal feed is no  more 
than  82 million tonnes,  and their market  share is being  slowly further  eroded 
every  year  by  the  cereal substitutes.  For  community  cereal producers,  the  40 
million  tonnes  of  substitutes products  imported mean  that  that  volume  is not 
available 'for cereals on  the  ~nternal market,  and the  EC  is thus deprived of a 
substantial acreage of crops.  In contrast, stock farmers  and the manufacturers 
of  animal :feed,  particularly those  located close to the large ports  (foremost 
among  them Rotterdam)  at which those imports enter the Community,  are in favour 
of imports of cereal substitutes,  simply because they are a  great deal cheaper 
than Community cereals  (because  they enter  the  Cornmun~ty duty free).  There is 
therefore an internal conflict of interests within the Community on this issue, 
which explains the difficulty the EC  has in calling for a  rebalancing of imports 
of cereal substitutes in the context of  the GATT  and in taking tough  decis~ons 
on controlling import  fraud. 
The  source  of  the  "CGF  affair",  which  is currently the  focus  of  attention 1n 
Community circles and the Uruguay Round negotiations, is,  in fact,  the mistake 
made  by the Community negotiators in 1967.  At  that time,  what  they actually did 
was  to  offer  a  concession  not  on  a  clearly  def1ned  product  but  on  a 
manufacturing process. That  lack of clarity opened the door to all the products 
more or less encompassed by that definition of the process,  as well CGF  per se. 
The  problems  emerged some  25  years after the concession was  granted. 
- 75  -In  point  of  fact,  using  an  effective  method  of  analysis,  based  on  optic 
microscopy,  the Netherlands  customs'  authorities  uncovered a  fraud concerning 
the  composition  of  CGF  imported  from  the  United  States:  this  contained  high 
levels of broken maize seed which was  not the product of the process~ng of which 
CGF  is  a  residue.  Consequently,  this false  CGF  can  no  longer  be  considered a 
residue falling under tariff heading 2303;  instead, as a  compound feedingstuff, 
it should be classified under  tar~ff heading 2309  and subject to an  import  tax 
(levy)  of  ECU  79.2  per  tonne.  Checks  revealed that  the quantities of  (genuine 
and  false)  CGF  exported from  the  US  to the  EC  clearly exceeded the  product~on 
capacity of the  Amer~can starch industry.  Between 1991  and 1992,  the quantities 
of  CGF  exported from  the  US  to  the  EC  increased sharply by  20%,  rising from  5 
to  6  million tonnes. 
At  the  same  time  as  this  fraud  was  being  uncovered,  the  Uruguay  negotiations 
were taking place,  and in those negotiations the US  was  arguing essentially for 
greater  transparency and  more  extensive  liberalization of  world  trade.  On  25 
November  1992,  the bilateral negotiations on agriculture between the EC  and the 
US  resulted in  the Washington  draft agreement  (or  Blair  House  draft  accord), 
negotiated between the Commission and the  US  Administration. 
In addition to the general chapter on agriculture,  that draft includes a  chapter 
on  "oilseeds" and a  chapter on  "corn gluten feed".  We  should bear in mind that 
currently  (27. 5. 93)  only  the  chapter  on  o~lseeds  has  been  approved  by  the 
Agriculture Council. 
The  CGF  chapter included recognition of the American position on the definition 
of  CGF  which  had been  being stated for  several years:  the  US  was  demanding  a 
clear definition of the product CGF  - the definition it was  proposing included 
broken grain and other waste from the sifting process and the water residue from 
grain washing,  all of  them  products not  included in the  original definition. 
The  draft  actually  fixes  a  maximum  rate  of  1  5%  for  the  residue  from  maize 
sifting and speciflcally  ~ncludes in the  def~n~tion ma~ze germ pellets,  which 
in fact mean  abandon~ng checks using  m~croscopy, the only type of check to have 
been  effect~ve hitherto.  The  Americans  had  made  agitated and  persistent calls 
for  the use of checks  involv~ng m~croscopy to be abandoned on the pretext that 
the  method  had  yet  to  be  perfected,  an  argument  rejected  by  the  customs 
authorities of the Netherlands and the other Member States. The initial position 
of the EC,  which continues to be  that of several Member  States,  was  based on  a 
decision of  the  Court  of Justice of  the  European  Communities,  in Luxembourg, 
categorically excluding from  the definition any kind of mix.  Were  the American 
position  adopted,  CGF  would  cease  to  be  a  by-product  of  the  process  of 
extracting starch from maize and  become  a  compound·animal feedingstuff,  better 
balanced  in  relat~on  to  the  earlier  definitions,  and  the  quantities  of  it 
imported would be bound to increase. 
The  Americans  stressed that  the  two  chapters  on  "oilseeds"  and  "corn  gluten 
feed"  were,  in  their  view,  inextricably  linked,  and  called  with  increasing 
vehemence for the immediate application by the EC  of the chapter on "corn gluten 
feed,  following the approval,  by  the Council,  of  the chapter on  "oilseeds" in 
May  1993. Retaliatory measures were even threatened against imports  from the EC 
if the chapter on  "corn gluten feed"  was  not  swiftly approved. 
- 76  -During May  1993,  the  Cornm~ssion was  unable  to gain immediate acceptance by the 
Member  States of this disastrous chapter of  the draft,  the result  - we  should 
bear  in mind  - of  the  feverish efforts  made  by  the  Commission  negotiators in 
November  1992  to obtain- whatever the cost -an agreement on agriculture with 
the Americans. 
In  defence  of  "its position",  the  Commiss~on claims  that  the  chapter  on  CGF 
would merely confirm a  situation that has already existed for several years and 
would not bring with it the risk of increased American imports of  ("genuine" and 
"false")  CGF  in the future.  Several delegations found  ~t scandalous and insane 
that  the commission should be  proposing to legalize a  fraud,  in breach of its 
own legislation, and to accord so naively to the Americans a  concession that was 
unlimited in quantity and for which nothing was  being given in return. 
In June 1993,  the Commiss~on tried to use a  legally vague aspect of the Treaties 
concerning the powers of the Commiss~on and Council respectively to class~fy for 
customs purposes the products at  ~ssue,  to have the chapter on CGF  in the draft 
endorsed  "on  the  quiet"  by  a  technical  committee  of  national  experts,  the 
Committee on Common  Customs TarJ.ff Nomenclature. However,  the proceedings of the 
latter did not  result in acceptance of the new definition, which was clearly in 
breach of  the  Common  Customs  Nomenclature  (compound  feedingstuffs  such  as  the 
"false CGF"  to which  broken  maize  grain  had  been added could not  be  accepted 
under tariff heading 2303  "residue")  and ran counter to the ruling of the Court 
of  Justice  in Luxembourg  (which  can  be  set  aside only  on  the  basis  of  fresh 
agreement within the Council) .  Marked opposition to the Commission proposal came 
to light in the Committee. 
Future developments may,  in  theory,  take  one of  the  following forms: 
either the Committee will end up  by  endorsing the  new definition,  and it is 
likely that  the Commission will be able to have it applied directly by its own 
services, without having to put its proposal to the Council. This seems less and 
less likely, in view of the categorical opposition to it expressed by the French 
Government in its memorandum and underlined by the French Prime  Min~ster before 
the  Commission,  the  President  of  the  United  States  and  his  fellow  heads  of 
government at  the Copenhagen meeting of  the  European Council in June  1993; 
or  the  Committee on  Common  Customs  Tariff Nomenclature remains  too divided 
and is uriable  to give an opinion.  The  Commission would then be  free to try to 
have  the chapter on  CGF  endorsed by its own  services,  without referring to the 
Council.  As  matters  stand,  th~s  is  quite  likely  to  be  the  outcome.  It 
presupposes,  however,  that  the  governments of  the Member  States,  the European 
Parliament  and  publJ.c  opinion  w~ll  not  take  too  great  an  interest  in  the 
question, which would then become too "hot" a  political issue for the Commission 
to treat .in such an  "anti-democratic" fashion; 
or  the  Committee  categorically  rejects  the  definition  the  Commission  is 
asking  i~  to  approve;  the  text  would  then  be  bound  to  be  referred  to  the 
Council,  and it is far  from certain that the latter would accept it, given  the 
political issues and the firm opposition of  some  of its members.  This scenario 
presupposes  that  the  Committee  manages  to  agree  a  clear-cut  joint  position, 
which appears relatively unl~kely at  the moment. 
We  should bear in mind that, as  the assessment studies progress,  the  Washington 
draft agreement  seems  less and  less  l~kely to  be  compatible with  the  reformed 
CAP,  and  that  acceptance  of  the  CGF  chapter  of  the  draft  would  lead  to  a 
- 77  -significant-increase in  imports  of  the  "false  CGF"  from  the  us,  put  at  1.16 
million tonnes  by the services of the Commission itself  (DG  VI)  and,  according 
to the  AGPB  at  2.9 million tonnes  ln  the short  term and  7.6 milllon tonnes  ln 
1997-98. 
The opportunity for Community cereals to recover shares of the Community market 
in animal  feed,  estimated by  the  Commission  at  12  million  tonnes  and  even at 
this stage very unlikely  (see  above)  would then be permanently undermined. 
It is hard to see  how  Community  producers could  be  asked  to cut  their cereal 
exports and production,  how  the development of their industrial crops could be 
restricted and  the  fraudulent  entry  on  to  the  Community  market  of  unlimited 
quantities of cereal substitutes could be legalized, in direct competition with 
cereals on the animal  feed markets.  Assurances as to the nature of the product 
would  depend  solely  on  pseudo-certificates of  origin,  not  guaranteed  by  the 
American  Government.  The  logic  of  that  argument  seems,  to  say  the  least, 
difficult  to  grasp  and  will  be  difficult  to  defend  vis-a-vis  Communlty 
producers. 
Until such time as a  decision is taken on the issue,  we  should remember that at 
present,  in the wake  of the conflict between the  Europeans  and  the Americans, 
transitional measures  (opposed  by  several  Member  States)  have  applied  to  CGF 
since  the  end  of  1991 .  When  they  expire  at_  the  end  of  May  1993,  they  will 
certainly  be  extended  further  by  the  Twelve,  on  20  July,  for  2  months 
(Commission  proposal)  or  6  months  (French  proposal).  They  exempt  from  lmport 
duty mixes  containing more  than  50%  of malze  seed cake. 
- 78  -2.8.  NOTE:  THE  CHAPTER  ON  "OILSEEDS"  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  DRAFT  AGREEMENT: 
SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  DISPUTE  BETWEEN  THE  US  AND  THE  EC  ON  COMMUNITY  AID 
FOR  OILSEED  PRODUCTION 
Oilseeds, 'in  the  form  of  seed  cake  and  seeds,  account  for  a  substantial and 
rapidly growing proportion of animal  feed in  the  Community.  While  the bulk of 
the colza and rape consumed is produced in the EC  (5,710,000 tonnes of seed and 
3,200,000  tonnes  of  cake  produced  compared  with  510,000  tonnes  and  480,000 
imported,  that  is  self-supply  rates  of  92%  and  82%  ~n  1990/91) ,  a  greater 
quantity of sunflower is imported  (4, 200,000 tonnes of seed and 2, 300,000 tonnes 
of cake  produced as  compared with  300,000  and  1,330,000 tonnes  imported,  that 
is  self-supply rates  of  93%  and  61%  respectively).  In  the  case  of  soya,  the 
quantities involved are far greater,  and it is largely imported: in 1990/91,  the 
EC  produced  2, 130,000  tonnes  of  seed  and  1, 700,000  tonnes  of  meal  (from 
Community seed)  and imported 13,190,000 tonnes of seed and 10,140,000 tonnes of 
meal  from:the  us  and  Lat~n America,  resulting in self-supply rates of  14%  for 
the  seed and  8%  for  the meal.  In  1991/92,  Community  acreage  sown  to  oilseed 
amounted to 5, 500, 000 hectares, and seed production amounted to 7, 400,000 tonnes 
for colza and rape and 4,200,000 tonnes for soya.  The  substant~al quantities of 
seed and cake imported duty free,  together with the cereal substitutes which are 
also imported duty free,  are in direct competition with Community product,ion on 
the internal markets in animal feed,  and mean that the relevant crop acreage is 
lost to the Community.  We  should bear in mind that the Community is the world's 
largest importer of oilseed,  accounting for  44%  of world imports in  1988,  even 
though  oilseeds  can  be  produced  ~n the  proper  agricultural  condit~ons in  the 
Community~  We  should  also  bear  in  mind  the  scale  of  potential  outlets  for 
oilseed crops represented by  non-food uses  (digester processing,  for  example). 
The  Washi~gton draft Agreement  between the  US  and the EC  includes a  chapter on 
the  settlement of the dispute between  the  two  parties on  the aids accorded by 
the  EC  fot  oilseed production.  The  dispute has  been  in  existence for  several 
years  and resulted in  the setting-up of  two  successive panels  - in early  1990 
and in early 1992- by  the GATT  special  work~ng parties.  The  US  accused the  EC 
of seeking to use the aids to null~fy the effect of the concessions on oilseed 
imports which it had accorded its suppliers in 1967  (duty free entry of oilseed 
into the Community).  As  the arrangement  reached in October  1991,  following the 
first panel  (Council Regulation  (EEC)  No  3766/91,  OJ L356  of 24.12.91,  p17)  did 
not  satisfy the United States,  the latter caused a  second panel,  which  called 
for  the EC  to make  further changes,  to be set up.  In early November  1992,  when 
the bilateral negotiations on agriculture between the EC  and the  US  were again 
blocked,  the  US  cited  section  "super  301"  of  its  trade  law,  in  complete 
violation of the rules of the GATT,  and used the unresolved dispute on oilseeds 
as a  pretext for  threatening to take retaliatory measures against agricultural 
imports  from  the  EC,  with  a  commercial  value  of  US$  300  million,  with  the 
possibility of  increasing that  to  US$  1  bn.  The  retaliatory measures  were  to 
take effect as of  5  December  1992. 
- 79  -On  25  November  1992,  in the Washington draft  agreement  between  the  EC  and the 
US,  the Commission had proposed the following measures to meet  the demands  made 
in the conclusions of  the  GATT  panels on oilseeds: 
the  introduction  of  a  separate  base  area  (SBA)  for  the  cultivation  of 
oilseeds,  as of  1994  (except for  Spa~n and Portugal for which this is postponed 
to 1995-96):  the area would  be  equivalent  to 5.128 hectares.  The  SBA  would  be 
accompanied by  a  land set-aside requirement,  the  rate of  which would be  fixed 
annually  by  the  European  Council  but  could  not  in  any  case  be  less  than  10% 
(rate for  the  1993-94 marketing year:  15%); 
reduction of the compensatory payments in cases where  the  SBA  was  exceeded; 
imposition of  a  ceiling on  production not  primarily intended for  human  or 
animal  consumption  on  the  area set-aside of  1  million  tonnes  of  by-products, 
expressed in "soybean meal  equivalents"; 
- exclusion from these arrangements,  as of 1994,  of sunflower seed intended for 
confectionery products; 
no  additional  aid  would  be  accorded  by  the  EC  to  support  the  markets  ~n 
rapeseed,  colza,  sunflower  or  soybean,  except  for  those  set  in  place  by  the 
Regulation on the reform of the CAP  relating to major crops  (COM(91)  379  final; 
Council Regulation  (EEC)  No  1765/92,  OJ  L  181  of  1.7.92,  p12); 
a  quota  at  a  reduced  rate  of  duty  would  be  opened  for  the  US  to  import 
annually into Portugal  500,000  tonnes  of oilseeds. 
Those measures are in several respects restrictive: they would involve reducing 
the area  sown  to oilseed in the  EC  (5.62 million hectares in  1992-93,  hence  a 
reduction of nearly 500,000 hectares would be needed to reach the targets),  and 
be compounded by set-aside, the minimum rate of 10%  of which makes it still more 
restrictive and inconsistent with the objectives sought by the new  CAP  reform; 
they  straightaway  prevent  any  significant  increase  in  non-food  outlets  for 
oilseed,  although these are attractive markets. 
3  December  1992  saw  the publication of  a  memorandum  of understanding based on 
an  exchange of letters and  formalizing  those proposals.  In late January  1993, 
the Commission issued a  recommendation for a  Council decision on the conclusion 
of an  agreement  between  the  European  Economic  Community  and  the United States 
of America concerning certain oilseeds in the context of  GATT  (SEC(93)  53  final 
of  26.1.93)  seeking to obtain the approval of  the council as soon as possible, 
and  without  taking  into  account  the  remaining  aspects  of  the  agricultural 
chapter of  the  Uruguay  Round,  for  the  changes  to  the  Community  support  system 
for  oilseed production  and  the  concessions  those  changes  represent.  In  late 
February  1993,  the  French  Government  indicated that it would veto any  vote  ~n 
the  Council,  although  the  governments  of  the  other  Member  States  agreed  in 
principle with the Commission proposal. 
- 80  -On  18.5.1993,  however,  the French foreign  m~nister said that the French Chamber 
of Deputies could taken an  "open-m~nded" approach to the chapter on oilseeds of 
the  proposed  Washington  accord,  but  only  subject  to  certain  conditions.  The 
French  foreign  minister  demanded,  ~nter alia,  that  it should  be  possible  to 
review every  5  years  the clause  limiting the acreage  sown  to  oilseeds  on  the 
area of industrial fallow.  The acreage sown  to oilseeds for industrial purposes 
is limited to some  800,000 hectares and that limiting clause is contained in the 
chapter  on  oilseeds.  French  agreement  is  subject  to  a  further  condit~on:  an 
increase in the rate of compensation for land set-aside deemed "necessary". The 
minister finally demanded that  the compensation offered to the other countries 
participating in the soya panel  (Argentina,  Brazil,  Canada etc) ,  in return for 
retaining. the  European  system  of  support  for  o~lseeds,  should  be  "limited". 
Those reciprocal concessions concerned purchases of durum wheat,  beef/veal and 
poultrymeat etc. 
Following the meeting of the Councils of ministers of agriculture  (27.5.93)  and 
of  foreign  ministers  (8.6.93)  and  the  visit  to  the  Commission  by  the  French 
prime minister  (10.6.93),  France  finally accepted  (subject  to  cond~t~ons)  the 
"o~lseeds" chapter of  the Washington draft agreement. 
On  9  June  1993,  the French minister for agriculture gave an assurance that  the 
compromise on oilseeds was  in line with the conditions set by France and that, 
in particular,  there  would  be  area  management  on  an  individual  country basis 
such  that  any  penalties for  exceeding  the  limit  would  in fact  apply  to  those 
countries wh~ch had actually exceeded the limit. In his view,  the French acreage 
sown  to  oilseeds  this  year  ( 1 . 380  hectares)  is  less  than  the  area  ceiling 
accorded  'to  France.  As  far  as  limiting  oilseed  production  for  industrial 
purposes  to  1  million  tonnes  of  meal  equivalents  was  concerned,  the  minister 
noted that that figure was  the equivalent of some 800,000 hectares and that,  in 
the current year,  that  type of production accounted for  only 100,000 hectares 
in the  EC,  37,000  of  them  in  France,  so  that  the ceiling of  800,000 hectares 
meant  that there could be  a  significant increase in that crop. 
In  a  communication  also  made  public  on  9  June  1993,  the  Commission  services 
emphasize,  inter alia,  that: 
the  base  area of  5.128 million hectares  provided for  under  the  compromise 
will  make  it possible  to  mainta~n the  current  area  distribution between  the 
three major crops in the EC  (oil seeds,  protein-rich crops and cereals)  and thus 
meet  the final objective of the  reform in those sectors; 
- 81  -the reference to a  maximum  area will make  it possible,  in the  longer 
term,  once  the  Community  market  has  made  the  necessary  adjustment,  to 
seek productivity increases without the resultant increase in production 
being called into question; 
the  provisions  laid  down  for  industrial  production  (particularly 
biofuels)  mean  that it will be possible to use  800,000 hectares  sown  to 
colza all of  which would  otherwise  have  been set aside  (1  .6  million in 
the  case  of  sunflower)  and  that,  ~f  we  consult  the  list  of  all  the 
digester units that exist, are being built or planned in Europe,  then the 
level of  production needed  for  those  installations is not  in excess  of 
the limit laid down; 
the income support mechanism for Community oilseed producers will not 
be  included  in  the  commitments  to  reduce  aids  contained  in  the  draft 
final act of the Uruguay Round; 
- American exports of oils produced from oilseed, currently of the order 
of  740,000  tonnes  will decrease  to  140,000  tonnes  because  those sales, 
which  are  supported  by  the  Export  Enhancement  Program  (the  Community 
scheme  for  oilseeds does  not  provide  for  export  refunds)  have  increase 
substantially in  recent  years  and  will  have  immmediately  to be  reduced 
in volume,  during the first year of application of  the final act of  the 
Uruguay Round  (~f adopted),  to  the average  of the period 1986-1990; 
the  European  industry presses  every  year  some  25  million  tonnes  of 
seed,  including  13  million  tonnes  of  soya  largely exported from  the  US 
(6.2  million),  Brazil  and  Argentina  (5.5  million).  The  EC  is  a  net 
importer of all vegetable oils. More  specifically, it is a  net  importer 
of  soya oil  (1  .6  mill~on tonnes),  self-sufficient in sunflower oil and 
a  net  exporter  of  colza  oil  (700, 000  tonnes) .  75%  of  the  Community 
requirement for meal is covered by  (net)  imports, particularly of soybean 
meal  (9.1  million tonnes  of which  come  from Brazil and Argentina); 
the Commission is continuing its discussions with nine other parties: 
Argentina,  Brazil,  Canada,  Uruguay,  Poland,  Sweden,  India,  Pakistan and 
Hungary. 
- 82  -CONCLUSION:  As  is plain from  the arguments of  the Commission itself and 
despite :the clarlfication obtalned by  France,  the separate agreement  on 
oilseeds  between  the  US  and  the  EC  savagely  curbs  on  Community 
production,  which  is  already  largely  inadequate  to  meet  internal 
requirements,  even  though  the  Community  will  become  increasingly 
dependent on  imports as consumption grows.  The  agreement will reinforce 
the  developments  produced by  the  new  arrangements  for  oilseeds  adopted 
as part of the recent CAP  reform,  whlch are based solely on compensatory 
aid calculated as  a  flat rate,  although guaranteed prices are a  thing of 
the past.  Quite obviously,  the combined CAP-GATT  system penalizes above 
all  the  most  dynamic  farms  with  the  best  yields,  so  that  a  further 
reduction in Community production is to be  feared in the medium  term. 
- 83  -3.  THE  DEBATE  ON  THE  URUGUAY  ROUND  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
THE  RESOLUTION  OF  SEPTEMBER  1990 
On  22  September 1989,  the Committee on External Economic Relations asked for 
authority  to  submit  a  report  on  the  stage  reached  ~n  the  multilateral 
negotiations  in  the  context  of  the  GATT  Uruguay  Round.  The  President  of 
Parliament announced that that authority had been forthcoming,  in plenary, on 
23  October  1989. 
The  Committee on  Agriculture,  Fisheries and Rural  Development was  asked for 
an  opinion and  appointed as its rapporteur Mr  WOLTJER.  The  latter submitted 
his draft opinion  (PE  140.436)  on  10  April  1990.  Opinions were  also sought 
from the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, 
the Legal Affairs Committee and the Committee on Development and cooperation. 
At  its  meeting  of  17  October  1989,  the  Committee  on  External  Econom1.c 
Relations  appointed Mr  STAVROU  as  its rapporteur,  and  discussed  the  draft 
report at its meetings of  21  December  1989,  22  January  1990,  20/21  February 
1990,  2  March  1990,  26  April  1990,  31  May  1990,  16/17  July  1990  and  17/18 
September  1990. 
The  motion  for  a  resolution  was  unanimously  adopted  at  the  last  of  those 
meetings  (Doc  PE  144.724}.  It was  adopted by  the European Parliament sitting 
in plenary on  11  October  1990  (Session document  A3-215/90  and OJ  C284  of  11 
November 1990}.  This is a  lengthy documents which tackles all chapters of the 
Uruguay Round. 
In relation more specifically to the agricultural sector, Parliament stresses 
the importance of those negotiations for the success of the Uruguay Round and 
that,  because of its particular production conditions,  special arrangements 
are required for  the agricultural sector. It calls upon all the participants 
1.n  the negotiations to embark upon a  constructive dialogue for the purpose of 
reaching  agreement  on  the  definition of  a  unit  of  measurement  f  aid which 
takes into account,  on  the one  hand,  all the internal support measures which 
affect  external  trade  in  agricultural  products  and  external  protection 
measures.  The  Commission  proposal,  intended  to  provide  for  a  gradual  and 
reasonable  reduction  in agricultural  subsidies,  was  approved  by  Parliament 
which  took  the  view,  however,  that it was  also necessary  to  look  into the 
possibility striking a  new  balance  (by  increasing customs  duties  or  import 
duties in one sector,  for  example,  to offset a  reduction in another sector). 
Exports of agricultural products by the developing countries are deemed very 
important  for  those  countries  and  the  Parliament  highlighted  the  need  to 
continue to allow the developing countries to fix their domestic agricultural 
prices above  the world market  level. 
The  European Parliament expressed its concern over  the new  Farm Bill tabled 
in Congress and which clearly conflicted with the United States negotiating 
position,  taking  the  view  that  the  Bill  was  in  breach  of  the  agreement  on 
freezing support measures  concluded in Geneva  in April  1989. 
The  European Parliament also considered trade in tropical products  and  took 
the  line  that  the  tariff  concessions  accqrded  were  an  important  factor 
enabling a  balanced outcome  to be  achieved.  -
- 84  -There  follows  an  extract  from  the  above-mentioned  resolution  covering  the 
sections on  "Agricultural external trade"  and  "Tropical products": 
"The  individual negotiat~ng groups 
(d)  Agricultural external trade 
54.  Holds the view that the  ~ncrease in trade in agricultural products should 
comply with  the  pr~nciple of  sustainable development  formulated  in  the 
Brundtland report; 
55.  Maintains its point of  view  that in  the  framework  of  the  Uruguay  Round 
of  G~TT negotiations on international agreement should be established to 
restore  the  equilibrium  on  the  world  markets  for  major  agricultural 
products; 
56.  Is of the opinion that a  complete liberalization of trade in agricultural 
commodities,  as  proposed  for  the  medium  term  by  the  United States,  is 
unacceptable; the European community must retain the right to protect its 
own  agricultural  structure,  characterized  by  many  small-sized  family 
farms,  by  agricultural  production  which protects  less-favoured regions 
and  marginal  regions  and  by  a  large  deficit  in  certain  agricultural 
products,  but  also  notes  that  the  subsidy  race,  which  has  had  a 
significant impact especially s~nce the early 1980s,  has left too little 
scope  for  market  forces  in  some  producer  countries,  leading  to 
disturbances in world agricultural trade; 
57.  Takes  the  view  that  the  dumping  of  agricultural  products  on  the  world 
markets must  be prohibited forthwith as such activities destabilize  the 
world markets  for  such products and harm  the developing  countr~es; 
58.  Therefore  calls  for  the  gradual  reform  of  those  elements  in  the 
agricultural policy of all the signatories that badly distort trade; 
59.  Considers  that  the  measures  to  reduce  market  supports  should  be 
accompanied  by  further  measures  provid~ng  direct  income  support  for 
farmers  to  reassure  them  of  the  continued  commi  trnent  to  the  rural 
economy; 
' 
60.  Is of the opinion that the efforts made  to date by  the European Community 
to  limit  and  control  its  agricultural  production,  by  establishing  a 
system of quotas and stabilizers for the main sectors of its agricultural 
production, must be recognized as a  substantial contribution to restoring 
the equilibrium on  the world market  for agricultural products; 
61.  Takes  the  view  that  account  must  be  taken  of  the  differences  in  the 
structure of agricultural holdings  in the various countries; 
62.  Calls upon the United States and  the Cairns  Group  to drop their demands 
for the elimination of all subsidies distorting agricultural trade by the 
end of  the  1990s; 
- 85  -63.  Calls instead for a  constructive dialogue involving all the participants 
in the negotiat1ons,  so that the s1gnatories can agree on the definition 
of  a  yardstick  for  assessing  support,  including  all  internal  support 
affecting  agricultural  external  trade  and  all  external  protection 
measures  so  that  comparability  of  support  measures  is  attained  and  a 
balanced adjustment  can be undertaken at  international level; 
64.  Is,  therefore,  of  the  opinion  that  all  systems  of  support  for 
agriculture, including the system of deficiency payments,  should be taken 
into consideration for  the  establishment  of  the  agreement  that will  be 
concluded at the end of  the  GATT  negotiations; 
65.  Believes that this step will serve as  the basis for any  global,  gradual 
and  controlled  reductions  in  national  agricultural  support  measures, 
including in particular specific treatment for the developing countries, 
to which the signatories may  commit  themselves at the conclusion of  the 
Uruguay  Round; 
66.  Supports the Commission in its proposals for a  planned gradual reduction 
in subsidies and support measures in so far  as this will contribute,  on 
the one hand,  to environmentally acceptable production and the avoidance 
of  surplus  production  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  maintain  family-run 
farms,  and agrees with the Commission that agricultural subsidies are not 
a  taboo subject; 
67.  Considers that,  in the agreement  to be concluded at  the end of the  GATT 
negotiations,  account  should  be  taken  of  all  agricultural  support 
systems,  including the  deficiency payments  system; 
68.  Supports  the  recent  proposals  by  the  Commission  as  a  positive 
contribution to arrive at a  final agreement;  urges strongly all trading 
partners  now  to  overcome  their  differences  in  order  to  arrive  at  an 
agreement  which  substantially improves  the  world  trade  in agricultural 
products  without  exclud1ng  future  negot1ations;  emphasizes  in  this 
framework  once  more  that  an  adaptation  of  the  1nternal  agricultural 
policy should take place in a  socially acceptable way  and by introducing 
instruments that can achieve a  sufficient control of production in order 
to avoid the export of excessive production and any negative effects for 
the developing countries; 
69.  Believes that there is a  need for clear agreements on the time-scale and 
extent of  reductions in subsidies which distort competition; 
70.  Supports the position of the Commission for a  global rebalancing in order 
to achieve a  more balanced and fairer trade in agricultural products; 1s, 
however,  of the opinion that such a  rebalancing should not  have negative 
consequences  for  the developing countr1es; 
71.  Is  disturbed  by  the  damage  caused  to  national  economies  and  the 
environment  in developing countries  by  the  durnp1ng  on  the  world market 
of  surpluses  from  subs1d1zed  agr1cul  tural  systems  in  the  northern 
hemisphere; 
- 86  -72.  Points out  that  when  customs  dut~es are  imposed  on  cereal  substitutes 
transitional  and  restructur~ng  measures  must  be  adopted  for  the 
developing  countries  which  currently  export  such  cereal  substitutes; 
considers that  the  Community  must  be  involved in the financing of these 
measures; 
73.  Seeks  the early  establishment  of  a  GATT  Work~ng Group  on  Agricultural 
Trade  and Sustainable land use; 
74.  Therefore supports  the Commission's proposals for  the gradual reduction 
of all support prov~ded by agricultural producer countries; also demands, 
however,  that the interests of the  develop~ng countries  should be taken 
into  account,  particularly  with  regard  to  market  access  for  their 
products,  market  prices  and  their  processing  facilities  for  their 
products; 
75.  Demands  that  additional  accompanying  measures  be  taken  to  increase the 
local  and  regional  use  of  products  from  developing  countries  and  to 
develop local processing facilities; 
76.  Stresses  that  the  instability  of  both  volume  and  price  are  of  great 
importance  for  exports of  developing countries'  agricultural products, 
and  that  safeguards  aga~nst  such  instability  must  be  permitted  in 
addition  to  any  that  are  retained against  import  surges  and  excess~ve 
price movement  of imports; 
77.  Insists that  for  both  development  and  food security reasons  developing 
countries  should continue to  be  permitted to set  domestic  agricultural 
prices above world market  levels,  at least as  a  specific exemption from 
GATT  rules; 
78.  Considers  that  developing  countries  must  be  permitted  domestic 
agricultural marketing boards  and  price  stabilizat~on schemes,  in  view 
of the special character of agricultural  product~on in these countries; 
79.  Urges  the  Commun~ty  to  stand  firm  in  these  talks  on  ~ts  demand  for 
minimum  qual~  ty  standards  for  agricultural  products;  believes  that 
consumer  protection  cons~derations  must  be  taken  into  account  when 
establishing minimum standards for the quality of agricultural products, 
while trading partners should be allowed to take measures to re-establish 
fair trading conditions; 
80.  Regrets  that  the  negotiations  have  so  far  skated  over  the  essential 
subject  of  the  protection  of  the  environment  and  nature  in  connection 
with world trade rules and calls for exceptional provisions in  th~s field 
as in the field of health and plant protection,  so that  h~gher standards 
may  operate reliably and  restr~ct market  access; 
81  .  Takes the view that an agreement  on plant protection should be based not 
purely on scientific arguments but  that account  should also be  taken of 
consumer protection when laying down minimum requirements for the quality 
of agricultural products; considers,  however,  that these measures should 
never  be  adopted  on  the  basis  of  resident  treatment  but  always  on  the 
principle  of  reciprocity  and  thus  that  a  special  clause  should  be 
included  in  the  agreement  enabling  the  partners  to  undertake  such 
negotiations; 
- 87  -82.  Notes  that  the  tabling of  the  new  agriculture bill in  the  US  Congress 
clearly conflicts with the United States'  negotiating position and is in 
breach of the Geneva Agreements of April 1989 on the freezing of support; 
83.  Notes  that  there is no  longer  any  justification for  the external  trade 
waiver  granted  to  the  United  States  many  years  ago  and  advocates  the 
abolition  of  waivers  and  other  exceptional  provisions  which  benefit 
industrialized countries; 
84.  Urges  Japan to submit constructive proposals for  opening its markets  to 
agricultural products and food,  and condemns it for simply stressing the 
importance of its own  supplies; 
85.  Takes  the  view  that  the  Commission  should  refrain  from  concessions, 
particularly  over  export  refunds,  so  long  as  the  other  negotiating 
parties, especially the United States, fail to offer anything in return; 
86.  Is dismayed that the burdens imposed on European farmers between 1983 and 
1986  consequent  upon  the  reform  of  the  common  agr~cultural policy  (a 
freeze on officially fixed prices and a  reduction in guarantees)  have not 
been credited to  the  Commun~ty; 
87.  Points out that for this reason every effort must  be made to utilize this 
credit item in an appropriate manner and considers that the best strategy 
is  certainly  not  for  the  Community  to  proceed  unilaterally  with  its 
efforts  to  dismantle  support  to  agriculture,  while  other  signatories, 
especially the  United States,  pursue  and  aggressive policy  and deprive 
the Community of  traditional markets; 
88.  Is of the opinion that any agreement to be concluded for the agricultural 
sector  should  have  broad  support  and  insists  therefore  that  the 
conclusions of the coordinating committee cannot  on  their own establish 
an  agreement,  but  that  the  agreement  should  be  established  following 
negotiations  by  the  Comm~ssion in  direct  contact  with  the  Council  and 
Parliament; 
89.  Believes that laying down rules on applied biogenetics and biotechnology 
is  a  matter  for  the  FAO  and  not  GATT  and  that  steps  must  be  taken  to 
ensure that farmers and stockbreeders in developing countries have access 
to  local  genetic  material  and  to  scientific  and  technological 
information; 
(e)  Tropical products 
90.  Welcomes  the  tariff  concess~ons on  tropical  products  agreed  to  by  the 
industrialized countries during  the mid-term review; 
91.  Sees  this  as  a  major  step  towards  balanced  results  for  all  those 
concerned; 
92.  Deplores  the  fact  that  the  maJority of  signatories,  with  the exception 
of  the  EEC,  have  so  far  made  no  progress  in  relation  to  what  was 
initially agreed at Montreal; 
- 88  -93.  Points out  that as far as tropical products in particular are concerned, 
lowering  the  tariffs  for  manufactures  from  the  poorest  countr~es will 
have  a  positive effect  on  the  econorn~es of  those countries; 
94.  Notes,  however,  that  the  agreed  tariff  reductions  are  threatening  to 
undermine the preferences granted to the ACP  States and other developing 
countries, and calls on the European Community to devise,  for the benefit 
of  the  developing  countries,  systems  to  compensate  for  the  losses 
incurred in this field; 
95.  Demands  that trade in tropical timber should be strictly limited, if not 
prohibited,  for ecological,  economic and cultural reasons; 
96.  Supports  the  request  for  the  abolition  of  taxes  on  the  consumption  of 
tropical products;" 
- 89  -THE  RESOLUTION  OF  DECEMBER  1990 
On  13  December  1990,  the European Parliament again expressed its view when it 
adopted a  resolution  (Doc  pe  147.264,  OJ  C19  of  18  January  1991)  regrett~ng 
that  final  ministerial  conference  of  the  Uruguay  Round  had  been  unable  to 
produce an agreement because of the  ~ntransigence of the United States and the 
countries  of  the  Cairns  Group  as  well  as  the  limited negotiating  mandate 
accorded by the Twelve  ~o the Commission. 
The  text of the resolution is as  follows: 
RESOLUTION 
on  the Uruguay  Round of  GATT 
"The European Parliament, 
-having regard to  ~ts resolution of  11  October  1990  on the Uruguay  Round  of 
GATT, 
A.  whereas  these negotiations were  due  to end on  7  December  1990, 
B.  whereas the strengthening of an international system of free trade should 
of necessity respect  the eco-balance of  the planet, 
C.  regretting also the fact  that,  because this  confl~ct has come  to a  head, 
there  has  been  next  to  no  role  for  the  developing  nations  in  the 
negotiations themselves, 
1.  Notes with regret and  concern that  the negotiating partners were  unable 
to  reach  an  agreement  during  the  ministerial  meeting  in  Brussels, 
although further progress has  been achieved in the working groups; 
2.  Regrets  that  because  of  the  inflexible  attitude  of  the  USA  and  the 
countries of the Cairns Group and the fact that the Commission's mandate, 
which  should  have  included  sone  freedom  of  movement  was  unnecessarily 
limited,  no  progress  could  be  achieved  in  any  of  the  other  fourteen 
negotiating panels; 
3.  Insists that  a  failure to conclude the  Uruguay Round negotiations would 
have  a  devastating effect  on  the world economy; 
4.  Calls therefore on the Heads of State and Government,  who  will gather for 
a  European Summit  meeting in Rome  this week,  to discuss this urgent and 
important  topic  in order to contribute to a  polit~cal breakthrough; 
5.  Calls on  the President of  the Commission to assume his  responsibilities 
and proposes to  the European  Council in Rome  that it take  the necessary 
political steps to commit  the contracting parties of  GATT  to find a  fair 
and equitable overall agreement,  particularly in the agricultural sector 
which  - in this respect - must guarantee a  dignified and decent standard 
of living for  farmers  and reduce,  by  way  of  new  proposals,  the pressure 
on world agricultural markets including the  EEC; 
- 90  -6.  Continues  to believe  in  the  importance  of  a  comprehensive  world  trade 
agreement,  and  therefore  advocates  comprehensive  and  s~multaneous 
negotiat~ons in all the  GATT  panels; 
7.  Ma~nta1.ns  ~ts  bel~ef  that  in  the  framework  of  the  Uruguay  Round  an 
international agreement  should be established to restore equilibrium on 
the  world markets  for  maJor  agr~cultural products; 
8.  Demands that our GATT  partners accept that the common agricultural policy 
also contributes to sustainable land-use and  to the  preservat~on of the 
environment,  and that it also comprises  important social and structural 
aspects;  believes nonetheless that additional weight should gradually be 
given to market  forces; 
9.  Takes  the view that  the Uruguay  Round  must  restore balance on  the world 
markets  for  the  most  important agricultural products  and  that all GATT 
partners  must  put  an  end  to  the  practice  of  disposing  of  agricultural 
products  on world markets at  dump~ng prices; 
10.  Takes  the view that the European Community,  without destroying the world 
agricultural market  through  dumping,  must  stand by  its right to protect 
its agricultural structures,  which  are  typified  by  the  existence  of  a 
large  number  of  small  family  farms,  farming  as  a  means  of  protecting 
disadvantaged and peripheral areas,  and a  substantial deficit in certain 
agricultural products; 
11.  Considers,  as  far  as  agriculture  is  concerned,  that  the  Community  is 
right to insist that it  ~s not  the only problem area,  but also considers 
that a  balanced and reasonable package can be agreed containing specific 
commitments  that  will  not  lead to  an unacceptable  loss  in farm  incomes 
so  long as it is accompanied by  appropriate  income  support measures and 
sufficient safeguards against import  surges; 
12.  Points  out  that  monetary  stab~lity  is  essential  for  more  balanced 
development  of  world  trade  and,  in  this  regard,  recalls  the  crucial 
importance of consolidation of  the  EMU; 
13.  Points  to  the  need  to  achieve  an  overall  balanced  agreement  and 
underlines the importance to the European Community of common positions, 
notably  on  agricultural  policy,  anti-dumping,  textiles,  subsidies, 
protection  of  intellectual  property  and  trade-related  investment 
measures,  the international trade in services,  an arbitration procedure 
and the creation of a  multilateral trading body; 
14.  Regrets that  the confrontation between the  USA  and  the countries of the 
Cairns Group,  on the one  hand,  and the  EC  took too little account of the 
interests of  the developing countries; 
15.  Calls on  the European Council to  take initiatives towards  a  world  trade 
summit with leading Heads of State and Government,  including those of the 
developing countries,  with  the aim  of achieving agreement  on  the future 
shape of free  and  fa~r world  trade; 
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measures  which  could  undermine  the multilateral  agreements  and  to make 
every possible effort  to  contr~bute to a  successful outcome  of  the  GATT 
negotiations; 
17.  Instructs  ~ts President  to  forward  this  resolution  to  the  Council  and 
Commission and  the  GATT  Secretariat." 
Since 1990, the European Parliament has adopted two further resolutions on the 
stage  reached in negotiations in  the  Uruguay  Round  of  GATT,  on  22  February 
1991  (OJ C72 of 18 March 1991)  and 13 February 1992  (OJ  C67 of 16 March 1992). 
- 92  -THE  RESOLUTION  OF  FEBRUARY  1991 
The  text of the resolution is as  follows: 
RESOLUTION 
on  the stage reached in the multilateral trade negotiations within the 
Uruguay Round of  GATT 
"The European Parliament, 
-having regard to its resolution of  11  October  1990 on the stage reached in 
the multilateral trade negotiat1ons within the  Uruguay  Round of  GATT  and of 
13  December  1990  on  the Uruguay Round of  GATT, 
having regard to  the statement by  the  Commission on  the stage reached in 
the  GATT  negotiations, 
A.  concerned  that  the  participants  in  the  Ministerial  Conference  held  in 
Brussels on  3-7 December  1990 did not  manage to bring the Uruguay  Round 
to a  successful conclusion, 
B.  whereas  the differences over agricultural trade between the Community's 
position on the one hand,  and that of the United States and the countries 
of  the  Cairns  Group  on  the other,  have  proved  to be  unsurmountable and 
are blocking the entire negot1ating process, 
c.  whereas  events  in  the  Gulf  are  preoccupying  the  governments  of  the 
Western countries,  overshadowing the need to bring the Uruguay Round  to 
a  successful conclusion, 
1 •  Stresses the  importance of  a  successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
to  the  successful  development  of  an  open,  multilateral  world  trade 
system; 
2.  Appeals  to all the  GATT  s1gnatories,  desp1te the m1litary confrontation 
in the Gulf,  not to let up in their efforts to give new political impetus 
to talks within the  Uruguay  Round,  with  a  view  to  bringing  these  to  a 
successful conclusion as  soon as possible; 
3.  Stresses the global nature of  the talks,  while pointing out  that unless 
both sides review their negotiating positions on agricultural trade and 
show a  maximum of flexibility in the talks,  the entire Uruguay Round is 
threatened with failure; 
4.  Expressly supports the efforts of the Director-General of GATT,  Mr Arthur 
Dunkel,  to enable  the  deadlock to  be  broken;  welcomes  his latest moves 
to restart in the next  few  days the talks on the Uruguay Round which were 
suspended  two  months  ago,  and  hopes  that,  on  this  occasion,  political 
progress will be possible in the most  complex areas such as agriculture; 
5.  Recognizes  that  more  time  1s  necessary  to  solve  the  problem  of  the 
Uruguay  Round  and  therefore favours  extending it until the end of  1991; 
- 93  -6.  Considers  a  corresponding extension of  the  US  Government's  negotiating 
brief  and  the  'fast  track'  procedure  for  ratifying the  outcome  of  the 
talks  by  the  us  Congress  to  be  crucial  to  the  success  of  the  Uruguay 
Round; 
7.  Calls on all countries involved in the  talks to refrain from calling in 
question  the  progress  and  interim  results  achieved  by  the  other 
negotiating groups at  the Ministerial Conference in Brussels; 
8.  Notes with interest the Commission 
1 s  gu~delines for the structural reform 
of the CAP; 
9.  Urges the Commission to put  forward without delay specific and realistic 
proposals for  the reform of the CAP; 
10.  Stresses the need ultimately to create an institutionalized world trade 
organization and to improve arbitration procedures; 
11.  Realizes that the reasons behind such reform are not directly lined with 
the GATT  talks,  but points out that binding commitments by the Community 
to embark on  reforms of this kind are an essential precondition for  the 
continued progress and successful conclusion of  the talks; 
12.  Calls,  therefore,  on  the  Council  to  consider  the  Commission  proposals 
immediately and in a  constructive spirit and to take Parliament 
1 s  opinion 
into account before reaching its final decision; 
13.  Notes with satisfaction that the European Parliament  was  represented at 
the Ministerial Conference  ~n Brussels by  a  delegat~on and calls on  the 
Commission and Council  to make  the necessary preparations for  a  similar 
delegation  to  attend  the  Ministerial  Conference  to  be  convened,  where 
appropriate,  to wind up  the Uruguay  Round; 
14.  Reiterates its demand that  ~t be consulted on  the overall outcome of the 
talks on  conclus~on of the  Uruguay Round; 
15.  Instructs its President to forward  th~s resolution to the Commission,  the 
Council,  the governments of the Member States and the General secretariat 
of GATT." 
- 94  -THE  RESOLUTION  OF  FEBRUARY  1992 
The  text of  the resolution is as  follows: 
RESOLUTION 
on  the  GATT  Uruguay Round 
"The  European Parliament, 
having  regard  to  the  Comm~ssion's statement  of  17  January  1992  on  the 
progress of the GATT  Uruguay  Round, 
having regard to  the Council's statement of  11  January 1992, 
having regard to its resolution of  11  December  1991  on  the reform of  the 
CAP. 
A.  whereas  on  13  January  1992,  the  108  countries  participating  in  the 
Uruguay Round negotiations accepted the draft drawn up  by  the  D~rector­
General of GATT,  Mr  Dunkel,  as  a  working basis  on  which  to conclude the 
negotiations,  if possible by  April  1992, 
B.  whereas  the negotiations  of  the  GATT  Uruguay  Round  embrace  all aspects 
of international trade relations,  not  just the agricultural sphere, 
c.  whereas  enormous  economic  interests are at  stake;  whereas,  especially, 
the  Community  would  derive  substantial  benefits  in  terms  of  trade, 
economic activity and jobs from  a  positive outcome to the Uruguay Round. 
1.  Considers  it  a  matter  of  urgency  to  conclude  the  Uruguay  Round 
negot~ations as  soon as possible; 
2.  Stresses that the Council must  adopt  a  position on the reform of  the CAP 
if the  Uruguay  Round  is to succeed; 
3.  Stresses that  the  inadequacy of  the  Dunkel  document  in certain areas of 
the negotiations  (primarily agriculture)  may  jeopardize the  conclusion 
of a  global agreement  and  a  positive outcome  to the Round; 
4.  Stresses that such a  positive outcome would bring substantial advantages, 
particularly in terms  of  a  world economic  recovery  which  would benefit 
the developing countries above all; 
5.  Emphasizes  that it is  a  matter  of  urgency  to  reach  an  agreement  which 
resolves these differences, given the short  t~me available to ensure that 
the  decisions  ar~sing  from  the  negotiations  can  be  implemented  on  1 
January  1993,  and  in  view  of  the  constraints  ~mposed  on  certain 
contracting parties by their  polit~cal schedules; 
- 95  -6.  Calls on all the contracting partners in GATT,  and the Commission and the 
Council,  to do  their utmost  to secure  a  pos~tive outcome  to the  Uruguay 
Round as  soon as possible; 
7.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission,  the 
Council and  the governments of the  Member  States. 
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4. ,_ 
CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  DRAFT  AGREEMENT  FOR  AGRICULTURE  IN THE 
COMMUNITY 
THE  CAP  REFORM  OF  MAY  1992,  A  FUNDAMENTAL  CHANGE  AND  THE  RISK  OF 
ANTICIPATING  A  SUCCESSFUL  OUTCOME  TO  THE  URUGUAY  ROUND  NEGOTIATIONS 
Main measures  adopted in May  1992  (according to the publication "Economie et 
statistiques",  No  254-255  p72;  for  further  details  see  the  Manual  on  the 
Reform  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  produced  by  the  Agriculture, 
F~sheries,  Forestry  and  Rural  Development  Division  of  the  European 
Parliament's Directorate-General for  Research): 
A)  Cereals 
i)  Maintaining  the  common  organization  of  the  market  in  cereals  and,  in 
particular,  the  three  inst~tutional prices.  Reducing  those  prices  in  three 
stages from  the  1993-94 marketing year.  Those  pr~ces are fixed for  the three 
marketing  years  to  wh~ch  the  reform  applies  and  for  all  cereals,  on  the 
following scale  (institutional prices in green ECU  per  tonne) : 
marketing year:  target price  intervention  threshold price 
price 
1993-1994  130  117  175 
1994-1995  120  108  165 
1995-1996  11 0  100  155 
ii)  Introduction of  a  system of direct  payments  intended to offset loss in 
income linked to reductions  ~n the  institut~onal prices. The payments are not 
linked to the volume of production, are made  per hectare and based on average 
regional yield calculated on a  sample period from the past  (1986/87- 1990/91 
marketing years) multiplied by the programmed price reduction: 4. 6 T/ha*  (155-
110)  ECU/T  = 207  ECU/ha on average for the Community in 1995-96.  To establish 
the  area  eligible for  the  premium,  the  Member  States  determine  base  areas 
equal to the average areas on which cereals and protein-rich oil plants were 
cultivated during  1989,  1990  and  1991  (including  areas  left  fallow) .  The 
Member  States  are  able  to  establish  for  those  base  areas  a  system  of 
individual references by  producer or of regional references. 
iii)  Non-compulsory partic~~ation in this system of aids. The payment of the 
aids is dependent on the withdrawal  (set-aside based on rotation)  of the area 
on which cereals and protein-rich oil plants have been cultivated (base area), 
that  rate  being subject  to  annual  review in  the light of  the conditions of 
production on the market.  The Member  States are able to opt for an individual 
or regional base area. 
iv)  Definition of small  producers who  are not  required to take land out  of 
cultivation.  A  small  producer  is  deemed  to  be  one  producing  less  than  92 
tonnes of cereals a  year,  corresponding to an area of less than 20  ha  on the 
basis of average Community yield  (4.6 T/ha). 
- 97  -v)  Maintaining  the  Community  preference  by  fixing  a  threshold price.  But 
modification of  the  range  between  the  threshold price  and  the  target  price 
which  is  fixed  at  a  lower  level.  The  threshold  pr~ce  is  gradually  to  be 
reduced until, in 1995-196, it reaches the current average market level in the 
EC. 
vi)  In addition to these arrangements,  which apply to all cereal crops,  it 
is  worth  mentioning  the  case  of  dururn  wheat.  In  past  years,  the  Council's 
approach to this product has  been gradually to reduce its price to the level 
of  that  of  other  cereals  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  increase  the  aid given 
which  is  accorded only  for  crops  grown  in  what  are  called the  traditional 
zones.  As  of 1993/94,  dururn  wheat  is to be brought  into line with the other 
cereals,  w~th the same  price and the same level of compensation per hectare. 
The special situation of the  trad~tional zones will continue to be taken into 
account,  since  a  supplement  to  the  aid,  also  payable  by  the  hectare  and 
amounting  to ECU  297,  will be  able  to  be  accorded in those  zones. 
vii)  The  Member  States are  able to  treat maize  differently from  the  other 
cereals. If they do  so,  they have to establish separate base areas and apply 
different average yields in terms  of the categories of crop thus identified. 
In addition,  the Member States are able to separate out zones under irrigation 
and  to  determine  for  that  category  also  base  areas  and  regionalization 
programmes.  Overall,  however,  the  total  compensat~on  may  not  exceed  the 
compensation obtained on the bas~s of the average land area and yield recorded 
nationally. 
b)  Protein-rich oil plants 
i)  Integration of  the  common  organizations  of  the  market  into  the  system 
generally applied to major  crops,  but abolition of the institutional prices 
which no longer apply. There will simply be aid per hectare fixed at Community 
level and then regionalized on the basis of average past yield. Those payments 
are to act as  no more  of an  incent~ve than those paid in respect of cereals. 
ii)  The reform is to be applied at  a  stroke and in full  (following the expiry 
of certain transitional arrangements  in 1992/93)  from  the  1993/94 marketing 
year  for  wh~ch the  Council  has  decided upon  aid of  359  ECU/ha.  Paid in  two 
instalments,  the  first  at  the  beginn~ng and  the  second at  the  end  of  the 
marketing year,  the aid is able  to be  adjusted in terms  of the price trends 
recorded on  the world market. 
In practice, if average world prices recorded for the three main protein-rich 
oil plants  (colza,  sunflower and soya)  depart  from the provisional reference 
price  (163 ECU/t)  by ±8%,  no adjustment will be made.  If,  however, prices rise 
or  fall  in excess  of  that  percentage  marg~n,  the  compensation accorded per 
hectare will be  cut or increased accordingly. 
As  regards  regionalization,  which is determined on  the basis of  the average 
aid of  359  ECU/ha,  the  Member  States  have  the  option of  putting this  into 
effect  in  the  light  of  average  regional  cereal  yields  or  average  oilseed 
yields. 
Since the base areas are determined for all the major  crop plants,  land may 
be left fallow on  the basis of either the cereal or the oilseed fallow. 
- 98  -iii)  Compulsory set-aside and definition of  "small producers"  (see section 
on  "cereals") . 
C)  Milk and milk products 
i)  Price of butter reduced by  2.5%  in  1993-94  and  1994-95.  No  reduction in 
the price of milk powder. 
ii)  No  reduction in the quotas for  1992-93,  but  the possibility of reducing 
them at the beginning of the 1993-94 and 1994-95  market~ng years in the  l~ght 
of the market situation. 
D)  Beef and veal 
i)  Intervention price reduced by  15%  over the three marketing years 1993-94, 
1994-95  and  1995-96 as  follows: 
July 1993:  325.85  ECU/100kg carcase  we~ght 
July 1994:  308.70  ECU/100kg  carcase  we~ght 
July 1995:  291.55  ECU/100kg carcase  we~ght 
ii)  Changes to the premium arrangements.  Four premium systems are retained: 
the premiums for male bovines,  the premiums for suckler cows,  the premiums for 
processing  calves  and  the  premiums  for  extensive  live-stock  farm~ng.  In 
general  terms,  the  reform establishes  a  dens~ty factor  (equal  to  3.5  adult 
bovine  animal  units  (UGB)  in  1993,  3  UGB  in  1994,  2.5  in  1995  and  2 
thereafter)  representing a  premium capping level.  In addition,  the premiums 
are limited to  a  maximum  number  of animals  per farmer.  A regional reference 
herd,  the maximum number giving entitlement to premiums, is defined. Seasonal 
adjustment of  the premiums  for male cattle. In the case of suckler cows,  the 
setting-up of  a  national  reserve  and  possibilities of  transferring premium 
entitlement as  in the case of  sheep. 
iii)  Acceptance for intervention of animals with a  carcase weight of between 
150 and  200kg;  limiting intervention to 750,000 tonnes in 1993  and gradually 
reducing that level to 350,000  tonnes  in 1997;  keeping in place the "safety-
net",  that is intervention where  there is an excessive fall in prices. 
E)  Sheepmeat 
i)  Changes to the premium arrangements:  limiting the number of ewes eligible 
for  the premium  to the  1989,  1990  or  1991  reference level  (the choice being 
a  matter  for  the  Member  States),  with  a  ceiling of  1,000  head  in  the  less-
favoured  regions  and  500  elsewhere  (outside  those limits,  the  premium is to 
be cut by  50%);  the setting-up of  an additional reserve in the less-favoured 
zones  and  definition  of  the  rules  governing  the  transfer  of  premium 
entitlements between producers. 
ii)  The  premium for  lightweight animals and goats will amount  to 80%  of  the 
normal  premium. 
F)  Tobacco 
The varieties  (and there are more  than 45  at present)  are to be divided into 
5  main groups,  plus  3  groups  cover~ng certain Greek varieties. 
- 99  -Maximum  tonnage  eligible  for  support 
tonnes  as of  1994. 
370,000  tonnes  in  1993  and  350,000 
i~)  Processing quotas  for crops  in the period 1993  to  1997. 
G)  Accompanying measures 
The  reform defines  the  accompanying measures,  in  the  form  of  supplementary 
aids,  in three programmes: 
i)  An  agri-environmental programme  designed to enhance  the part  played by 
farmers  in protecting the rural environment  and managing  the countryside. 
ii)  A programme for the afforestation of agricultural land,  designed to help 
investment and better compensate for loss of income during the non-productive 
stages when  the trees are growing. 
iii)  Early retirement programme 
The  details  of  these  accompany~ng  measures  are  as  yet  rather  unclear. 
Significant budgetary costs are to be anticipated if the measures are actually 
put into effect by all the Member  States. 
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METHOD 
THE  MAIN  ANALYSES  CARRIED  OUT  SO  FAR  AND  THE  CONCLUSIONS  REACHED  IN 
THEM:  A  COMPARATIVE  STUDY 
The  tables  which  follow  have  been  drawn  up  on  the  basis  of  statistics 
contained in the following documents  each of which is identified by  a  letter 
(the documents most often referred to are the B and  L  (COPA),  F  (Commission) 
and  8  (SCA  report) .  Those  letters  are  used  in  the  tables  to  indicate  the 
different documents. 
A:  INRA- Sciences sociales-Rennes,  11/92: Reforme de la PAC,  simulations et 
analyses  [Reform of the CAP,  simulations and analyses]  (summary analysis); 
B:  COPA,  16.11.92: Valet agricole des negociations  GATT  et panel oleagineux 
[The chapter on agriculture of the GATT  negotiations and the oilseeds panel] 
(11  pages  including tables); 
C:  Proceedings  of  the  31st  seminar  of  the  European  Association  of 
Agricultural  Economists,  Frankfurt  am  Main  (G),  7-9  December  1992  (first 
draft):  The  EC  and  US  agricultural trade conflict and  the  GATT  Round:  petty 
multilateralism?  (available from  INRA-Rennes  (F)); 
D:  Economie et statistiques, No  254-255,  May-June  1992:  La reforrne de la PAC 
et les negociations du GATT:  un pas necessaire pour un compromis minimal?  [The 
reform  of  the  CAP  and  the  GATT  negotiations:  a  necessary  step  towards  a 
minimum  compromise?]  (pages  41-61); 
E:  11/92:  DG  I  internal working  document:  "The  European  Community  and the 
Uruguay Round"; 
F:  25.11.92:  SEC(92)2267 final:  Commission commiunication on the chapter on 
agriculture of the  GATT  negotiations and the  reform of  the  CAP; 
G:  ONILAIT,  OFFICE  NATIONAL  INTERPROFESSIONNELDU  LAIT  (F),  25.12.92: Conseil 
de  d~rection: negociations commerciales multilaterales,  impact  du  compromis 
de Washington dans  le secteur  lait~er  [multilateral trade negotiations,  the 
effect of the Washington compromise on  the milk sector] ; 
H:  FEDERATION  NATIONALE  BOVINE  (F),  26.11. 92:  Communique:  GATT,  consequences 
dramatiques  pour  les  producteurs  de  viande  bovine  [GATT,  disastrous 
consequences  for beef and veal  producers]; 
I:  AGPB,  25.11.92:  pourquoi  les cerealiers fran9ais  rejettent un  accord au 
GATT  dans  les conditions actuelles  [why  French cereal producers are opposed 
to a  GATT  agreement  in the current circumstances]  (communicat~on) ; 
J:  AGPM/AGPB,  10.12.92:  GATT:  une  epreuve de  verite pour  l'Europe  [GATT:  a 
litmus test for  Europe]  (joint communication  w~th the AGPM); 
K:  FEDERATION  NATIONALE  PORCINE  (F),  30.12.  92:  Bilan  de  1' accord  de 
Washington pour le secteur pore  [an assessment of the Washington agreement for 
the pork sector]; 
- 101  -L:  COPA,  28. 1 . 93:  Prel~m~nary results  of  a  study  to  access  the  possible 
impact  of  the  GATT  on  the  EC  agr~cultural sector as  a  whole  (17  pages  +  18 
pages of separate tables); 
The  following  documents  have  also  been  used  but  contain  data  that  is 
superfluous in relation to the above documents or have used their results or 
economic  arguments,  or  do  not  provide  precise  figures.  No  reference  is 
therefore made  to them  in  the tables: 
1:  AGPB,  4. 2. 91:  Premieres reflexions sur 1'  ~rnpact de la nouvelle PAC  sur les 
PSC  [an  initial  assessment  of  the  impact  of  the  new  CAP  on  the  cereal 
substitutes]. 
2:  AGPB:  31 .3.93:  Ut~lisation  des 
consequences  de  la  reforme  de  la  PAC. 
consequences of the CAP  reform] . 
cereales  en  alimentation  animale: 
[The  use  of  cereals  in animal  feed: 
3:  25.11.92:  The  un~ted States  Trade  Representative,  letter  to  Mr  Frans 
Andriessen  (this document  ~n fact constitutes the written transcription, left 
to the Americans to draw up,  of the commitments entered into in the Washington 
draft  accord  which  the  two  delegations  (EC  and  US)  did  not  have  time  to 
formalize  in writing at  the  end of  the~r last meeting. 
4:  18.12.  92: Paper prepared for the 1992 International Symposium on "GATT  and 
Trade Liberalization in Agriculture", Otaru University of  Commerce,  December 
18-19  1992,  Otaru,  Hokkaido,  Japan:  The  common  agricultural  policy  of  the 
European  Community in the context  of  the  GATT  (Stefan Tangermann,  Institute 
of Agricultural Economics,  University of Gottingen,  G). 
5:  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  Directorate  General  for 
agriculture  (DG  VI-H-1),  15.2.93:  191NOT02.93SAC:  for  the  attention  of  the 
Special  Committee  on  Agr~culture.  Subject:  agriculture  in  the  GATT 
negotiations and the reform of the CAP  (~nformation sheet, internal document). 
6:  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  Directorate  General  for 
agriculture  (DG  VI-H-1),  22.2.93:  196NOT02.93SAC:  for  the attention of  the 
Special  Committee  on  Agriculture.  Subject:  agriculture  in  the  GATT 
negotiations  (information sheet,  internal document). 
7:  COPA,  8.3.93:  Rapport  des 
( 4 . 2 • 9 3 ,  11  . 2 . 9 3  and  4 . 3 . 9 3) 
l'agriculture de  la Cornmunaute 
services on the possible impact 
(21  pages) . 
reunions  avec  les  services  de  la  Commission 
concernant  l'  impact  eventuel  du  GATT  sur 
[report  of  the  meetings  with  the  Commission 
of the  GATT  on agriculture in the Community] 
8:  Council of  the  European Communities,  10.3.93:  5030/93-RESTREINT:  Report 
of the Special Committee on Agriculture to the Council  (16 and 17 March 1993). 
Subject: Uruguay Round- chapter on agriculture- compatibility of the Blair 
House  accord with the common  agricultural policy  (35  pages). 
- 102  -4.2.1- IMPACT  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS  CONTAINED  IN  THE  WASHINGTON  DRAFT  AGREEMENT  FOR  COMMUNITY  EXPORTS,  IMPORTS  AND 
INTERNAL  SUPPORT 
--·-····  - ------------
COMMITMENTS  DOC.  APPLICATION 
REDUCTION  A.M.S  F  A.M.S  (MECUs)  AMS  1999/COMMITMENTS  AMS  1999/  REFORMED  CAP 
(AGGREGATE  WASH 
MEASUREMENT  OF 
SUPPORT)  A.M.S.  cereals  25526  111 01 
A.M.S.  livestock  23076  19698 
("INTERNAL  SUPPORT" 
CHAPTER)  other A.M.S  16490  20422 
A.M.S.  ALL  PRODUCTS  65091  51 221 
- 1 03  -COMMITMENTS  DOC  APPLICATION 
TARIFFICATION  OF  IMPORTS  F  Tar~ffication compatible with  reformed  CAP  :Ln  all sectors except  white sugar  and  sk~mmed mLlk,  but  the  EC 
AND  REDUCT.  IN  CUSTOMS  w~ll be able  to reduce  by  20%  only  in  those sectors  (commitment  to a  36\  ar:LthmetLc  mean  reduction on all 
DUTIES  products)  to maintain a  Community_Q_reference  (ECU/T): 
("IMPORT  ACCESS"  CHAPTER)  PRODUCTS  CUSTOMS  DUTIES  1999  (A)  (B)  EC  PREFERENCE 
(-36%/86-88)  LOWEST  IMPORT  EC  PRICE(2)  (A) -(B) 
PRICES 
(1) 
comm.  wheat  95.0  197.9  126.5  +71.4 
ma:cze  94.0  175.5  126.5  +49.0 
barley  92.6  162.7  126.5  +36.2 
white sugar  335.4  629.7  678.5  -48,8 
s~immed m:clk  powder 
butter  950.4  1701.7  1974.5  -272.8 
beef/veal  (fresh)  1895.6  3460.3  2930.2  +530. 1 
sheepmeat 
(fresh)  1768.3  3171.7  2670.9  +500.9 
1713.5  3741.1  3035.9  +705.2 
(1)  assum:cng  :  appl:ccat:ton of  the safeguard clause  :Ln  l:tne  WLth  the  Dunkel  comprom:Lse;  world prices  env:tsaged 
=  lowest  monthly  prLces  recorded  between  1986  and  1991. 
(2)  Pr:tce after introduct:ton of  the  reform,  :tncluding possible monthly  increases  (cereals  and sugar),1e 
intervention  pr:Lce  for  sugar,  skimmed  milk  powder  and  butter  and  the representat1ve market  pr:tce  for 
sheepmeat. 
H  Wash:tngton draft  =>  42%  reduct:ton  Ln  customs  duties  (1999/91)  for  beef/veal,  compounded  by  the  comm1tments  to 
:tmport  "HLlton  Beef"  at  very  low  rates. 
K  Tarifficat:ton  =>  d:tmLnLshed  protect:ton  :tn  relat:ton to :tmports,  hence  the fall  in  Lnternal  support  prLces,  1n 
part offset  by  the  fall :tn  product:ton  costs  resulting from  the fall in cereal prices  (ca  8  to  12%). 
- 104  -COMMITMENTS  DOC.  APPLICATION 
TARIFFICATION  OF  L  Tariffication =>  reduction in customs duties  =  20%  for  sugar  (assuming:  ACP 
IMPORTS  AND  sugar excluded from  GATT  commitments) 
REDUCTION  IN  =  20%  for fruit and 
CUSTOMS  DUTIES 
("IMPORT  ACCESS"  vegetables 
CHAPTER  (cant)  =  20%  for  wine 
= 
20%  for  skimmed milk  powder 
=  36%  for  other milk products 
- 105  -COMMITMENTS  DOC.  APPLICATION 
MINIMUM  MARKET  c  Impact  of the measures contained in the Dunkel  compromise on  the increase in 
ACCESS  - INCREASE  Community  imports,  comparison  1999/90  (1,000 Tonnes): 
IN  IMPORTS 
("IMPORT  ACCESS"  Products  import.  1990  import.  1999  Difference 1999/90 
CHAPTER  cereals  5675  7652  +34.8% 
wheat  1351  2964  +119.0% 
other cereals  4324  4689  +8.0% 
sugar  1860  1846  -0.7% 
olive oil  76  72  -5.0% 
butter  & b.  oil  60  90  +50.0% 
cheeses  113  205  +81  . 0% 
skim'd milk pdr.  14  71  +407.0% 
whole milk pwdr.  3.4  13  +282.0% 
concentr'd milk  2.4  12  +400.0% 
beef  501  492  -2.0% 
pork  78  625  +701.0% 
sheepmeat  287  252  -12.0% 
poultry  135  273  +102.0% 
eggs  42  241  +474.0% 
D  Increase in imports of CGF,  manioc  and other cereal substitutes between  1990  and 
1996,  following  the commitments  contained in the Wash.  draft and in line with  trends 
in world price differentials between the different products  {MT): 
Products  1990  1996  difference  {%) 
CGF  8. 1  10.6  +24% 
manioc  5.8  5.9  +  2% 
other substitutes  25.8  31.0  17% 
- 106  -COMMITMENTS  DOC.  APPLICATION 
MINIMUM  MARKET  F  minimum  market  access  =>  increase in cheese imports  =  +100000  T  (a year?) ,  that is  1 
ACCESS  - INCREASE  MT  milk equivalent 
IN IMPORTS  ' 
G  minimum  market  access  =>  100%  increase in imports of  milk  products between  1991  (  1 . 45 
("MARKET  ACCESS"  MT)  et  1999  ( 2. 90  MT)  . 
CHAPTER)  H  In  the Wash.  draft,  and in line with  the opinion of  the oilseeds panel,  the  EC 
(cont)  undertakes  to open  import quotas  for  "Hilton Beef"  (superior quality beefmeat),  which 
will add  to Community  beef/veal surpluses. 
J  commitments in  the Wash.  draft  =>  increase in cereal imports  =  +100% 
=>  increase in poultry imports  =  +86% 
=>  increase in pork  imports  =  +1000% 
Fall in substitute imports  following reductions in cereal prices exaggerated by  the 
commission  (in doc.  SEC (92)  2267  final) .  Similarly,  increase in imports  in all 
sectors minimized by  the Commission. 
K  Market  access  commitments for  pigmeat  :  3%(86-88)  =  374000  T 
in  1994 
5%(86-88)  =  624000  T 
in  1999 
Vol.  import.  1990  =  99000  T 
Vol.  import.  1991  =  56000  T  (DG  VI,  ex-GDR  included) 
=  115000  T  (Institut technique du pore,  F) 
Vol.  import.  1992  =  75000  T  (DG  VI  estimate) 
=  100000  T  (ITP) 
Between  1992  et  1999,  pork  imports would  therefore increase 6- or  8-fold depending  on 
the  source. 
- 1 07  -COMMITMENTS  DOC.  APPLICATION 
MINIMUM  MARKET  L  Impact  of the  commitments  in the Wash.  draft on  imports et  EC  internal consumption, 
ACCESS  - INCREASE  comparison  1999/91  (%)  : 
IN  IMPORTS 
Products  imports  ( *)  internal consumption 
("IMPORT  ACCESS"  cereals  +79  -4.8 
CHAPTER)  potatoes  ±0  +1. 6 
(cant)  sugar  +179  +1. 6 
oil  seeds  -4.6  -9.7 
fruit  & veg  ±0  +1. 6 
olive oil  -8.4  +1. 6 
wine  +231  +1. 6 
meat  +51  +1. 6 
-beef  -18.3  +1. 6 
-pork  +1014  +1. 6 
-poultry  +80  +1. 6 
milk products  +261  +1. 6 
eggs  +562  +1. 6 
( *)  assuming  :  the  imports satisfylng minimum  access are  included but  not  aggregated 
(by  individual tarlff heading) . 
Increase in wine  imports  on  the basis of  the minimum  access  commitments  ln  the wash. 
=  +100%  (because  1999  minimum  access equivalent  5%  internal consumption 86-88). 
- 108  -COMMITMENTS 
FALL  IN VOLUME 
SUBSIDIZED 
EXPORTS 
("EXPORT  SUPPORT" 
CHAPTER) II) 
DOC. 
B 
APPLICATION 
Fall in volume  of subsidized exports,  comparison 1999/91  : 
Cereals:  fall  21%  vol.  export.  sub.  (1999/86-90)  =fall 32%  (1999/91) 
Wheat:  fall  38%  vol.  export.  sub.  (1999/91) 
Fodder grain  :  fall  24% 
Sugar:  fall  19%  (quotas  A et  B) 
All  meats:  fall  39% 
Beef/veal:  fall  38% 
Pigmeat:  fall  41% 
Poultry:  fall  40% 
All  ~ilk products:  fall  24% 
Butter  +  butter oil:  incr.  +6% 
Cheese:  fall  35% 
Skimmed  milk pwdr:  unchanged 
Other milk products:  fall  31% 
Eggs:  fall  27% 
C  I Volume  of subsid1zed exports permitted under  the  Dunkel  Compromise  (attention:  24%  fall 
1n  volume as  compared with  the  reference period),  comparison  1999/90  (1  ,000  Ts): 
Products  1990  1999  % difference 
cereals  33627  22468  -33 
.wheat  22436  13524  -40 
.other cereals  111 91  8944  -20 
sugar  3310  2776  -16 
butter & b.  oil  262  315  +20 
cheese  456  316  -31 
skmd  milk pwdr.  207  233  +12 
whole milk pwdr.  522  416  -20 
concentr'd milk  343  295  -14 
beef  816  714  -12 
pork  580  353  -39 
poultry  425  300  -29 
eggs  139  100  -28 
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COMMITMENTS  DOC  EFFECT 
FALL  IN  VOLUME  D  1996  :  export vol milk prods  provided for  under  CAP  reform= 13,7  MT  (13,3  MT  in  1993) 
SUBSIDIZED  EXPORTS  (assuming:  no quota cut,  price cut of  1,25%  over  3  years); 
1996  :  reduction in surpluses in 1996  as  compared with  1993  according to new  CAP 
(assuming fall in price= 15%); 
("EXPORT  SUPPORT  1996  :  increase in volume  of exports of pork,  poultry and eggs  as  compared with  1993 
CHAPTER")  (assuming fall  in costs of animal  feed) 
E  Impact of draft Washington accord on  the volume  of subsidized exports permitted in  1999 
(cont)  for  the  EC,  compared with  1986-90  (-21%)  (MT): 
Products  1986-90  1999 
wheat  17.0  1 3. 4 
ALL  CEREALS  29.8  23.5 
white sugar  1.60  1. 30 
butter  0.46  0.37 
skmd  milk  pwdr  0. 31  0.24 
cheese  0.39  0.30 
beef  1. 00  0.82 
pork  0.49  0.39 
poultry  0.37  0.29 
- 110  -COMMITMENTS 
FALL  IN  VOLUME 
SUBSIDIZED  EXPORTS 
("EXPORT  SUPPORT" 
CHAPTER) 
(cont) 
DOC. 
F 
APPLICATION 
- cereals:  in 1999,  EC  exportable surplus  =  19  MT  (assuming:  yields static at  4.66 
T/ha,  production= 164  MT,  int.  conseq.  increase of  12  MT,  imports stable at  3  MT)  or 
25.4  MT  (assuming:  increase in yield =  1%  annually),  whereas  volume permitted under  ' 
Wash.  draft =  23,4  MT. 
-milk products:  21%  fall in volume of subsidized exports will  not  be  binding on 
butter and skimmed milk  powder;  for  cheese and other milk products,  surplus over 
commitments  (1999)  =  3-3.5  MT  milk equiv.,  but  buying-up of Italian and Spanish 
quotas  (2  MT)  and conseq.  increase  EC  cheeses  (600-900000 T),  means  no  real overrun 
in  1999. 
- meat:  in  1999  surplus  in excess of quantities provided for  under  the  commitments of 
200,000  T  for  pork and  150000  T  for  poultry,  and  300,000- 400,000  T  for  beef/veal. 
Volume  of exports subsidized in 1986-90 and volume authorized in  1999  according to 
the commitments  under  the Washington draft  (21%  reduction in volume  in  1999  as 
compared with  1986-90)  (MT): 
Products  1986-90  1999 
wheat  and flour  17.0  13.4 
other cereals  12.6  10.0 
ALL  CEREALS  29.6  23.4 
butter and  b.  oil  0.46  0.37 
skmd milk pwdr.  0.31  0.24 
cheese  0.39  0.30 
other milk prods  1.19  0.94 
ALL  MILK  PRODS  2.35  1.  90 
beef  1 . 03  0.82 
pork  0.49  0.39 
poultry  0.37  0.29 
ALL  MEATS  1. 89  1. 50 
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COMMITMENTS  DOC  EFFECT 
FALL  IN VOLUME  G  Milk products:  21%  reduction in export volume  in  1999  (compared with  1986-90)  ~> fall in 
SUBSIDIZED  exports of milk  products~ 1.6 MT  milk equiv.  (or  13%)  compared with  1991,  or  1.6%  of 
EXPORTS  quotas. 
Overall cut  13%  (99/91)  =  30%  cut  for  non-fat-red.  pwdrs,  cheese,  skmd  milk; 
("EXPORT  ~permitted increase of  12%  for butter and b.  oil. 
SUPPORT"  =  permitted increase of  18%  for  skmd  milk pwdrs  ' 
CHAPTER)  If impossible to increase exports of butter and  skmd  milk pwdrs,  quotas  cut  by  2.3%  and not 
1. 6%. 
Additional constraint resulting from  the  cut  in budgets  for  refunds  (-36%  in  1999  compared 
(cent)  with  1986-90)  =>  fall  in volume of subsidized exports  1999/91  = 27%,  that is 2.4%  of  1991 
quotas  (and not  1.6%). 
Fall in volume of subsidized exports of milk products  in  1999  compared with  1986-90  and  1991 
( 1, 000  Ts): 
Products  1986-90  1991  1999  1999/91  (%) 
butter and b.  oil  417  294  (+60=GDR)  329  +12% 
skmd  milk  pwdr  308  205  243  +18% 
whole  milk pwdr  541  617  427  -31% 
concent'd milk  401  316  317  +-0% 
cheese  367  428  290  -32% 
liq. milk  +  yoghurt  214  274  169  -38% 
TOT  MILK  EQUIV.  13500  12300  10700  -13% 
H  Volume  of  subsidized exports of beef/veal in  1999  (according to the  Washington commitments) 
:  50  0000  T  reduction over  1991. 
Washington draft  includes an  EC  commitment  to refrain from all subsidized exports on  the 
markets of south-East Asia:  but  those markets are growing substantially  (and are  the only 
ones)  and are solvent:  the commitments,  which are unilateral and  therefore without 
consideration,  are an obstacle to the opportunities for  increasing EC  exports. 
I  Wash.  draft results in loss of export outlets for  12  to  19  MT  of  Community  cereals. 
J  Wash.  draft  =>  fall  in vol.  export  1999/92:  wheat  =  -40% 
poultry =  -40% 
beef/veal~ -30% 
- 112  -COMMITMENTS 
FALL  IN VOLUME  OF 
SUBSIDIZED 
EXPORTS 
("EXPORT  SUPPORT" 
CHAPTER) 
(cont) 
DOC. 
K 
APPICATION 
Volume  EC  subsidized exports pork  1986-90  =  497  000  T 
Vol  permitted by  commitments  for  1999  =volume  1986-90  - 21%  =  393  000  T 
Volume  EC  subs.  exports  pork  1990-91  =  633  000  T  (source:  Commission,  DG  VI) 
=  668  000  T  (source:  Eurostat) 
Volume  EC  subs.  exports pork  1992  =  550  000  T 
=>  reduction  1999/90-91  =  -38 a -41% 
Surplus  in 1999  over commitments  in draft= 200  000  T,  accepted by  Commission 
which  however considers problem  to be  "apparent only". 
L  I  Impact of  the commitments  contained in  the Wash.  draft on  the volume  of  EC 
subsidized exports and  total exports:  comparison  1999/91  (%differences): 
PRODUCTS  TOTAL  EXPORTS  SUBSIDIZED  EXPORTS 
cereals  -25.9  -26.9 
potatoes  0  0 
sugar  -10.3  -32.9 
fruit  &  veg  -2.6  -17.5 
olive oil  -21.8  -21.8 
wine  -0.5  -1.7 
ALL  MEATS  -38.8  -38.8 
-beef  -39.8  -39.8 
-pork  -42.1  -42.1 
-poultry  -34.3  -34.3 
milk  products  -17.6  -18.4 
eggs  -29.8  -29.8 
Reduction in vol.  subsidized sugar exports  1999/86-90  =  26%  and not  21%,  if 
account is taken of  the additional constraint caused by  the  36%  cut  in the  budget 
for  refunds 
- 11 3  -COMMITMENTS  DOC.  APPLICATION 
FALL  IN  BUDGET  FOR  E  Impact  of  the commitments entered into in the Wash.  draft on  the resources allocated 
REFUNDS  for  refunds:  comparison 1999/1986-90,  in MECUs: 
' 
("EXPORT  SUPPORT"  Products  1 986  - 1 990  1999 
CHAPTER)  wheat  1783  11 41 
cereals  3224  2063 
beef  1967  1 259 
refined sugar  776  497 
butter  1325  848 
skmd  milk  pwdr  370  237 
ch~ese  439  281 
pork  176  11 3 
poultry  143  92 
G  Cut  in budget  for  refunds  1999/91,  to meet  the  36%  cut  1999/86-90 and  in the light of 
cuts already made  since then:  -8% 
K  budget  refunds  pork exports: 
1986-90  :  151  M ECU 
1999  =  1986-90  - 36%  ~  97  M ECU 
1991  :  304  M ECU  =>  reduction  1999/91  =  -70% 
1992  :  200  M ECU  =>  reduction  1999/92  =  -50% 
=>  further fall in volume of exports and/or fall in internal support prices 
...  . 
- 114  -4.2.2.CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS  CONTAINED  IN  THE  WASHINGTON  DRAFT  FOR  THE  VITAL  ASPECTS  OF  COMMUNITY  AGRICULTURE 
COMPONENTS  OF 
AGRICULTURE 
INTERNAL  SUPPORT 
COSTS 
I~ 
HYP 
see 
c  4.2.4 
lA 
2 
16 
17  -
~  1 
2 
4 
5 
CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS  IN  THE  WASH.  DRAFT  FOR  COMPONENTS  OF  AGRICULTURE 
Fall in milk price between  1996  and  1999:  -8% 
Fall in white-sugar price between  1996  and  1999:  -8% 
Fall  in the prices of  EC  milk of between  3  and  4%  in  1999/91,  as  a  result of 
export  and  import  commitments 
Prices paid to producers  (covering all products)  fall  by  12.5%  between  1991  and 
1999  (causes:  reduced frontier protection and fall in price of animal  feed): 
.cereals:  -33.6%  .potatoes:  +10.0% 
.o~lseeds:  -48.6%  .fruit and veg.:  -5.1% 
.wine:  -1.9%  .meat:  -10.7% 
.sugar:  -9.3%  (poultry:  -15.0%) 
9.8%  (beef:  -27.0%) 
(pork:  -13.5%) 
(sheepmeat:  -17,0%). 
.olive oil:  -6.1% 
.milk prods:  -19.7% 
(milk:  -2. 3%) 
.others:  -5.1%  .eggs 
Fall in the CSP  prices will follow fall in cereal prices:  -33.5%  (1999/91) 
Protein feed prices static  (if world demand  increases and world  raw materials' 
prices  remain static) 
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COMPONENTS  OF  D  HYP  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS  UNDER  THE  WASH.  DRAFT  ON  THE  COMPONENTS  OF 
AGRICULTURE  0  see  AGRICULTURE 
c  (4-2.4) 
SET-ASIDE  (CEREALS  A  9  Between  1996  and  1999,  10%  increase in area of set-aside  (compared with the  ' 
OILSEEDS  AND  PROTEIN  10  15%  provided for  under  the  CAP) 
CROPS) 
In  1997-98,  set-aside =  4.4  M ha,  under  the  reformed CAP  and  the Dunkel  B  10 
compromise;  hence arable land sown  to crops  in  the  EC  =  47.5  M ha  (1991-92: 
48.2 M ha). 
I  10  In  1999,  set-aside will increase from  15%  (CAP  year  1992-93)  to  25  or  30% 
J  1 0  Set-aside will  increase from  15%  in 1992-93  to  25  or  30%  in  1999-2000,  as  a 
result of  the  commitments contained in the Wash.  draft 
L  10  Set-aside in 1999  : 
7  1st  hypothesis:  yields of  cereals and protein-rich oil plants remain static 
8  from  1993  to  1999,  and  imports  of  CSPs  and protein feeds decrease. 
14  -set-aside existing in  1992:  1. 2  M ha  (ex-GDR  excluded) 
-GATT  constraints  +  fall in demand  for  animal  feed:  8. 7  M ha 
-effect of  increase in cereals stocks  (19  MT):  1. 5  M ha 
' .  or  11.5 M ha  in total  . 
2nd hypothesis:  increase in yields of cereals and protein-rich oil plants:  +1% 
per annum,  fall in imports of  CSPs  and protein feeds,  and increase in rate of 
food conversion,  the  fall in prices ieads to extensification. 
in this situation,  set-aside =  20  M ha. 
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COMPONENTS  OF  D  HYP  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS  UNDER  THE  WASH.  DRAFT  ON  THE  COMPONENTS  OF 
AGRICULTURE  0  see  AGRICULTURE 
c  (4.2.4) 
' 
VOLUME  OF  D  8  Equilibrium of  the  EC  cereals market  following the  CAP  reform:  comparison 1996 
AGRICULTURAL  (reformed CAP)/1990  : 
PRODUCTION  AND 
SURPLUSES  elements  1990  1996  (CAP  reform) 
supply  155. 5  MT  156.6  MT 
demand  128.7  MT  141.8  MT 
balance  +26.8  MT  +14.8  MT 
rate of self-supply  110% 
1  21% 
G  18  Commitments  under  the Wash.  draft result  ~n a  fall  ~n exports of milk  products  for  1999  estimated at  1.6  MT 
l~tres  m~lk equ~valent,  hence  a  reduction of  1.6  MT  m~lk  equ~valent  ~n  product~on quotas,  that  ~s 1.6\  (compared 
w~th 1991). 
Moreover,  were  1t  not  poss1ble  to increase exports of  butter  and  skimmed  milk  powder,  the cut  1n  quotas  would 
rise to  2.3%. 
Effect  on  milk  quotas,  from  1994  to  1999,  of  the fall  in subs1dized exports  and  increases  in  imports  provided 
for  under  the washington draft  (MT  m1lk  equ1valent): 
Impact  of  the increase 1n  Impact  of  the fall  Overall  impact  on  quotas 
1mports  in exports_ 
1994  -0.64  +0.74  (-1 0  18)  +0.10  (-1 0  80) 
1995  -0.81  +0.26  (-1 0  39)  -0.55  (-2 0  18) 
1996  -0.97  -0 0  21  (-1.61)  -1 018  (-2.56) 
1997  -1.12  -0.68  (-1 .82)  -1 .80  (-2.92) 
1998  -1 0  29  -1. 15  (-2.04)  -2.44  (-3 0  31) 
1999  -1 .44  -1 0  63  (-2.26)  -3.07  (-3.70) 
Figs.  hypothesized 1n  table:  poss1b1l~t1es of  1ncreas1ng exports of butter,  buttero~land sk1mmed  m1lk 
powder  - Hyp.  f1gs  in brackets:  little or  no  opportunity of  1ncreas1ng exports of  these products 
because  the  market  is saturated. 
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I~ 
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AGRICULTURE  see 
c  (4.2.4) 
VOLUME  OF  AGRICULTURAL  L  4 
PRODUCTION  AND  SURPLUS  5 
7 
(cont) 
CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS  UNDER  THE  WASH.  DRAFT  ON  THE  COMPONENTS  OF 
AGRICULTURE 
Consequences of  the commitments  under  the Wash.  draft on  the volume of 
production of the different agricultural products in the EC,  and on  the value 
of  that production,  comparison 
1999/1991  (%)  : 
Products  Production volume  Production value 
cereals  -13.4  -42.5 
potatoes  +2. 1  +12.4 
white-sugar  -2. 1  -11.2 
oil  seeds  -1 6. 1  -56.9 
fruit  & veg  +1. 5  -3.7 
olive oil  +0. 1  -6.0 
wine  -1.2  -3.1 
meat  -5.4  -15.5 
-beef  -9.8  n.d. 
-pork  -4.5  n.d. 
-poultrymeat  -3.2  n.d. 
milk  products  -4.5  -23.3 
eggs  -3.5  -12.9 
others  +1. 5  -3.7 
TOTAL  -4.0  -16.0 
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CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS  UNDER  THE  WASH.  DRAFT  ON  THE  COMPONENTS  OF 
AGRICULTURE 
Although  the total value of agricultural production is going  to fall by  16%  between 
1991  and  1999,  the value of the  inputs used will increase by  7%  (9%  fall in the 
quantities used,  animal  feed costs static,  3%  increase annually in the costs of 
chemical products and services) . 
-cereal production:  increased imports  (imports  =  7.5  MT  in 1999,  if minimum  access= 
5%  of internal consumption 1986-88)  + fall in volume  of  subsidized exports  (approx.  -
27%)  + fall in budgets  for  refunds  + fall in intra-EC demand  for  cereals  for  animal 
feed  (fall of  11.5%  between  1991  and  1999)  =>fall in cereal production between  1991 
and  1999  =  13.5%  (in  terms  of  volume)  or  42.5%  (in terms of value). 
- sugar production:  9%  fall in internal support  prices  +  26%  fall  in export  volume 
(to meet  the  36%  cut  in the  budget  for  refunds)  +  reduction of  20%  only  ~n customs 
duties  (36%  as  the arithmetic mean  for all products)  + assumption ACP  sugar excluded 
from  GATT  commitments=>  2%  fall in production  (in  terms of  volume)  between  1991  et 
1999. 
- production de fruit and vegetables:  if customs duties are cut  by  20%  only,  costs of 
internal supports will fall by  13%  between  1991  and  1999,  but  production volume will 
be  affected little or not  at all as  the  bulk of production is not  subsidized. 
-olive oil production:  21%  fall in volume of exports +cut in customs duties of  20% 
only  =>  fall in costs of internal support. 
- wine production:  100%  increase in volume of  imports  and  20%  cut  in customs duties 
=>  fall in internal support  costs and production volume. 
- beef/veal production:  reduction in customs  dut~es +  reduct~on in intervention 
prices  (-27%  between  1991  and  1999,  but  the prices paid to producers are already much 
lower  than the intervention prices)  =>  10%  fall in production volume. 
-pork production:  between  1991  and  1999,  the  EC  is going to move  from being a  net 
exporter to being a  net  importer:  although prices paid to producers will fall by 
13,5%,  production volume will fall  by  4,5%. 
- poultrymeat production:  prices will fall by  15%  between  1991  and  1999  (because of 
the  lower  customs  duties)  and  production volume  by  3%. 
- sheepmeat production:  prices will fall  by  17%  between  1991  and  1999.  Even  now,  this 
sector exports very little and is a  major  importer.  That  trend is going to become 
more  marked. 
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c  (4.2.4) 
VOLUME  OF  AGRICULTURAL  1 8  - milk products:  20%  reduction in customs duties  (skimmed milk  powder)  or  36% 
PRODUCTION  AND  1  9  (other  products)  +  9.5%  fall in intervention prices  (but  20%  reduction in 
SURPLUSES  prices  to producers)  =>  4.5%  fall  in production volume  (milk equivalents)  de 
4,5%  between  1991  and  1999. 
(cont)  20  - egg production:  10%  fall in prices to producers  and  3.5%  fall in production 
volume. 
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COMPONENTS  OF  D  HYP  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS  UNDER  THE  WASH- DRAFT  ON  THE  COMPONENTS  OF 
AGRICULTURE  0  see  AGRICULTURE  ' 
c  (4.2. 
4) 
EC  MARKET  IN ANIMAL  D  8  Development of  EC  markets in animal  feed  between  1990  and  1996,  following  the 
FEED  4  measures  to reform  the  CAP  (MT): 
5 
Products  1990  1996  (reformed  Difference  (%) 
CAP) 
cereals  79.3  87.2  +9.1% 
cake  40.6  38.3  -6.0% 
CGF  8. 1  10.6  +23.6% 
manioc  5.8  5.9  +1. 7% 
other substit.  25.8  31.0  +16.8% 
F  8  Increased use of  cereals in animal  feed  in the  EC  =  12  MT  :  5  MT  deriving from 
11  the increase in the  production volume of white  meats  and  7  MT  from  the use of 
.  cereals instead of substitutes as  a  result of the fall  in beef/veal production 
and  increased rates of livestock food conversion. 
L  8  Overall fall in  the  demand  for  livestock feed  between  1991  and  1999  .  -8,5%  (in  . 
11  terms of  volume) ,  as  a  result of  the fall in beef/veal production and  the 
increased rates of livestock food  conversion.  i  -----
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PRODUCER  INCOMES  AND  IL  I  ~  CAP  BUDGET 
6 
CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS  UNDER  THE  WASH.  DRAFT  ON  COMPONENTS  OF 
AGRICULTURE 
Trends  in prices paid to producers  between  1991  and  1999,  following  the  CAP 
reform and  n  the basis of  the  commitments contained in the Wash.  draft  (the 
direct compensatory payments provided for  in the  CAP  reform are not  taken  into 
account  in this table;  in theory,  they will be  designed to offset  these  income 
trends: 
Products  Trends  1999/1991  (%) 
cereals  -33.6 
potatoes  +10.0 
sugar  -9.3 
oil  seeds  -48.6 
fruit  and veg  -5.1 
olive oil  -6.1 
wine  -1.9 
meat  -10.7 
milk products  -19.7 
eggs  -9.8 
other  -5.1 
TOTAL  -12.5 
The  agricultural working  population will fall by  33%  between  1991  and  1999, 
declining from  8.1  million to  5.5 million. 
If the  compensatory payments were  not  introduced,  farmers'  purchasing power 
would fall  by  50%  between  1991  and  1999. 
In fact,  the compensation needed solely to maintain  1991  spending power  would 
amount  to  ECU  32.5  bn,  that  is more  than  twice  the  budget  provided for  the 
reformed CAP,  or  the whole of  the  EC  agricultural budget  in 1993-94. 
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CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS  UNDER  THE  WASH.  DRAFT  ON  THE  COMPONENTS  OF 
AGRICULTURE 
Compatibility of  the  Dunkel  compromise with  the  reformed CAP,  for  the volume  of 
subsidized exports  [NB:  Dunkel  Compromise  provides for  a  24%  reduction in the 
volume  of subsidized exports,  whereas  Wash.  provides for  only  21%),  in 1999 
(assuming constant  institutional prices between  1996  and  1999)  · 
CAP  volume  - Dunkel  volume: 
cereals  :  +  10.8  MT  (overrun) 
beef  +  0.5  MT 
white meats  +eggs  :  +  3.8  MT 
sugar  +  0.5  MT 
butter & butteroil  :  -103.0  MT 
cheese  .  +220.0  MT 
skmd milk  pwdr.  :  +  9.7  MT 
whole milk pwdr.  :  +115.2  MT 
concentr'd milk  .  +  57.6  MT  . 
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CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS  UNDER  THE  WASH.  DRAFT  ON  THE  COMPONENTS  OF  AGRICULTURE 
compatibility of the washington draft and the reformed CAP: 
.tariffication and fall in customs duties:  no  problem for  any except  the sugar and skimmed 
milk sectors.  But  possibility of cutting customs duties by  only  20%  for  those  sectors  => 
Community  preference maintained. 
.  internal support: 
A.M.S.  permitted in 1999  under  Wash.  =  ECU  65  bn, 
A.M.S.  envisaged in 1999  under  the  reformed CAP=  ECU  51  bn: 
there is therefore no  problem of compatibility in relation to the A.M.S . 
.  volume of subsidized exports: 
-cereals:  imports stable =  3MT/per  annum 
internal outlets increase by  12  MT 
production=  164  MT 
=>  if yield remains static,  exportable surplus =  19  MT 
=>  1f yield increases  by  1%/per  annum,  exportable surplus  = 
25.4  MT,  but  increased yield not  very likely. 
compatibility therefore ensured for  cereals 
-milk products:  overrun for  cheese only  (=  3-3.5  MT  milk equiv.) 
but  buying-up of  Spanish and Italian quotas  (2MT)  and anticipated increase in EC  cheese 
consumption  (600-900000  T),  compatibility therefore assured. 
-white meats:  exportable surpluses in 1999 will exceed the  permitted quantities of  200,000 
T  for  pork and  150,000 T  for  poultrymeat,  but  the fall in cereal prices will certainly 
make  it possible to export all those surpluses w1thout  refunds. 
-red meats:  in 1999,  there will be  an excess of exportable surplus of  between  300,000  and 
400,000  T,  that is  5%  of  EC  production.  But  supply control measures are needed with or 
without  GATT  constraints. 
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CONSEQUENCES,  ON  AN  INDIVIDUAL  PRODUCT  BASIS 
Note:  for  each product,  two  tables are  prov~ded: 
table A  concerning the effects of the  comm~tments, 
- table B  concerning the consequences of the  comm~tments. 
1.  CEREALS 
A.  HOW  THE  COMMITMENTS  WILL  APPLY 
DOC.  DETAIL  APPLICATION 
F  AMS  1999  =  25,526  MECU  under  WASH 
AMS  1999  =  11,101  MECU  under  the  CAP 
B  Fall in vol.  export.  subs.  all cereals 99/86-90  =  21% 
99/91  =  32% 
wheat  99/91  =  38% 
fodd.  grain 99/91  =  24% 
c  Fall in vol.  export.  subs.  99/90  ( 1 , 000  Ts): 
Products  1990  1999  Variation  (%) 
wheat  22436  1 3524  -40 
other cereals  1 1  1  91  8944  -20 
ALL  CEREALS  33627  22468  -33 
E,F  Fall vol.  export.  subs.  99/86-90  ( 1 , 000 Ts): 
Products  1986-90  1999 
wheat  1 7. 0  13.4 
ALL  CEREALS  29.8  23.5 
F  EC  exportable surplus  (1999)  =  1 9  MT  (assumed  y~eld: 4.66 T/ha, 
production=  164  MT,  cons.  internal incr.  =  +12  MT,  imports static at  3 
MT) 
or exportable surplus =  25.4  MT  (same  hypotheses except yield increase 
+1%/per  annum) 
I  WASH  =>  loss of outlets for  12  to  19  MT  cereals produced in the EC 
J  WASH  =>  fall in wheat exports  99/92  =  40% 
L  Impact  of WASH  on  volume  of  EC  exports,  comparison  1999/91  .  . 
- subsidized exports:  -26.9% 
- total exports:  -25.9% 
E  Fall in budgets for  refunds,  comparison  1999/86-90  (MECU): 
1986-90  1999 
Wheat  1783  1  1  41 
ALL  CEREALS  3224  2063 
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F  36%  cut in customs  duties and  Community preference  (ECU/T) : 
Products  customs  lowest  EC  pr~ce  Community 
dut~es  import  preference 
1999  price  (%) 
common  wheat  95.0  197.9  126.5  +71 .4% 
maize  94.0  175.5  126.5  +49.0% 
barley  92.6  162.7  126.5  +36.2% 
c  Consequences of the  DUNKEL  compromise  on  Community  imports,  comparison 
1999/90  (1 ,000 Ts): 
Products  import  90  import  99  variation  (%) 
wheat  1 351  2964  +119.0% 
other cereals.  4324  4689  +  8.0% 
ALL  CEREALS  5675  7652  +  34.8% 
J  WASH  =>  increase in volume  of cereal  imports  between  1991  and  1999  .  . 
+100% 
L  Consequence of WASH  on  the  imports and domestic consumption of the  EC, 
comparison 1999/91  .  . 
-volume of imports:  +79% 
-volume domestic consumption:  -4.8% 
(imports  to meet  minimum access calculated WITHOUT  aggregation,  that is 
on an  individual product  basis} 
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B  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS  . 
ooc.  CONSEQUENCES  IN  DETAIL 
L  WASH  =>  reduction in prices paid to producers,  comparison  1999/91: 
-33.6%  for cereals  (all products:  -12.5%) 
A  WASH=>  between  1996  and  1999,  set-aside will  ~ncrease from  15%  a 
25%  (cereals +  oilseeds) 
B  In 1997-98,  set-aside under  CAP  and  DUNKEL  compromise  =  4.4  M ha 
I  1999:  set-aside will increase from  15%  (1992-93)  to  25  or  30% 
J  1999-2000:  set-as~de will  be of  the order of  25  to  30%,  under the 
WASH  accords 
L  Set-aside in  1999: 
-1st hypothesis: 
.cereal yields static between  1993  and  1999 
.fall in imports of substitutes and protein crops 
=>  set-aside 1999  =  set-aside 1992  (1.2  Mha)  +  GATT  constraints + 
fall in demand for  animal  feed  (+  8.7  Mha)  + consequences increase 
cereal stocks  (+  1 . 5  Mha)  :  that is 11.5Mha. 
-2nd hypothesis: 
. increased yield cereals and protein-rich oil plants  +  1%/p.a  . 
.fall in imports of substitutes and proteins 
.increase in food  conversion rates 
=>set-aside 1999  =  20  Mha 
D  Balance on  EC  cereals markets  following  reform of  the CAP, 
comparison 1996/90  .  . 
elements  1990  1996 
supply  155.5  156.6 
demand  1 28.7  141 . 8 
surplus  +26.8  +14.8 
rate of self-supply  121%  11 0% 
L  Consequence of  WASH  on  the volume  and value of agricultural 
production,  comparison 1999/91  for cereals: 
-volume  .  -13.4%  . 
-value:  -42.5% 
Cereal  imports  in  1999  = 7.5 MT  compared with  3  MT  in  1 991 
(increase in imports  to sa·tisfy minimum  access) 
Volume  of cereals exports in 1999,  compared with  1991  :  -27%  (to 
meet  the  36%  cut  in the  budgets for  refunds). 
Fall  ~n intra-EC demand  for  cereals for animal  feed,  between 1991 
and  1999  .  -11.5%  .  . 
- 1 27  -DOC.  CONSEQUENCES  IN  DETAIL 
D  Trends  in the use of cereals in Community animal  feed between  1990 
and  1996,  following  the  CAP  reform:  +9.1%  (87.2  MT  in  1996  as 
against  79.3  MT  in  1990) 
F  Increase in the use of cereals in animal  feed in the EC  =  +12  MT 
between now  and  1999: 
.5  MT  der~v~ng from  the  increased production of white meats 
.7  MT  deriving  from  the use of cereals instead of substitutes in 
animal feed  (as  a  result of  the fall in cereal prices) 
L  Trends  in prices paid to producers following the CAP  reform and 
WASH:  comparison  1999/91:  -33.6%  for cereals 
c  Vol.  subs~dized exports,  1999  .  difference between  the  volumes  . 
permitted under  the  DUNKEL  compromise and  the volumes  provided 
under  the reformed  CAP  (assuming:  constant institutional prices 
between  1996  and  1 99 9) :  the  ant~cipated overrun is 10.8  MT  (NB:  the 
DUNKEL  Compromise  provides  for  a  24%  fall in the volume of 
subsidized exports) 
F  Compatibility of  WASH  with  the reformed  CAP: 
assuming:  volume  cereal  ~mports  stat~c at  3  MT  between now and  1999 
internal outlets  ~ncrease by  12  MT/per  annum 
production 1999  =  164  MT 
=>  if yields  remain static,  1999  surplus=  19  MT 
=>  if yields increase by  1%/per annum,  1999  surplus  =  25.4  MT 
But  assumed increase in yields of  1%/p.a.  not  very likely: 
therefore compatibility assured  ~n the case of cereals 
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A.  HOW  THE  COMMITMENTS  WILL  APPLY 
I  DOC.  I  DETAILED  APPLICATION  I 
L  Consequence of  WASH  on the imports and  domest~c consumption of the 
EC  of oilseeds,  comparison  1999/91: 
-imports  (commitments considered without aggregation):  -4.6% 
-domestic consumption:  -9.7% 
2.  OILSEEDS 
B.  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS 
DOC.  CONSEQUENCES  IN  DETAIL 
L  Consequences  of the commitments  under  WASH  on  the volume  and value 
of oilseed production in the EC,  comparison 1999/91: 
-production volume:  -16.1%  (all products comb.:  -4.0%) 
-production value:  -56.9%  (all products comb.:  -16.0%) 
Trends  in prices paid to oilseed producers between  1991  and  1999, 
following the reform of the  CAP  and  WASH  commitments,  CAP 
compensatory payments  excluded:  -48.6%  (average all agricultural 
products:  -12.5%) 
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A.  HOW  THE  COMMITMENTS  WILL  TAKE  APPLY 
II  DOC.  DETAILED  APPLICATION 
B  Fall in vol.  subs.  exports: 
milk products: fall of  21%  1999/1986-90 
but fall of  24%  1999/91 
butter and butteroil: possible  6%  increase 1999/91 
cheese:  35%  fall  1999/91 
skimmed milk powder:  remain1ng static:  +-0% 
other milk products:  31%  fall 
c  Vol.  subs.  exports,  comparison 1999/90  (1,000  Ts): 
Products  1990  1999  variation  (%) 
butter and b.  oil  262  315  +20% 
cheese  456  316  -31% 
skmd  milk pwdr  207  233  +12% 
whole milk pwdr  522  416  -20% 
concentr'd milk  343  295  -14% 
D  1996  .  vol.  subs.  exports  provided for  under  CAP=  13.7  MT  ( 1 993:  . 
1 3. 3  MT)  I  if no  cut in quotas and  1 .25%  fall in prices over  3  years 
E  Vol.  subs.  exports prov1ded  for  under  WASH  in  1999,  comparison/ 
1986-90  (MT)  : 
Products  1986-90  1999 
butter  0.46  0.37 
skmdmilk pwdr  0.31  0.24 
cheese  0.39  0.30 
F  21%  fall in vol.  subs.  exports will not  restr1ct exports of butter 
or skmd milk pwdr;  1n  case of cheese and other milk products, 
surplus envisaged compared with WASH  for  1999  =  3-3.5  MT  milk 
equivalent; 
but  buying-up of Spanish and Italian quotas  (2  MT)  and  increase in 
cheese consumption in EC  (600  to 900000  T)  =>  no overrun to be 
feared for  1999. 
Vol.  subs.  exports  1 999,  comparison  I  86-90  (MT): 
Products  1986-90  1999 
butter and b.  oil  0.46  0.37 
skmd milk pwdr  0.31  0.24 
cheese  0.39  0.30 
other milk prods  1 . 1 9  0.94 
ALL  MILK  PRODS  2.35  1 • 90 
- 1 30  -DOC.  DETAILED  APPLICATION 
G  21%  fall in vol.  subs.  exports  1999/1986-90 
=>  fall of  1.6 MT  in vol.  of milk equiv.  exports between  1991  and 
1999,  that is  13% 
=>  cut of  1.6 MT  milk equiv.  in production quotas,  that is  1.6% 
-non-fat reduced pwdrs,  cheese,  liquid milk:  30%  cut 
-butter and butteroil:  12%  increase permitted 
-skimmed milk powder:  18%  increase permitted 
If it proves  impossible to export  more butter and skimmed milk 
powder,  cut  in  quotas  =  -2.3% 
If the further constraints resulting from  the  36%  cut  in the budget 
for  refunds are taken into account,  cut  in quotas:  -2.4%  (1999/91) 
and cut in vol.  subs.  exports  =  -27%. 
Fall in vol.  of exports  between  1986-90 and  1999  and between  1991 
and  1999  ( 1 , 000  Ts): 
Products  1986-90  1991  1999  1999/91 
butter and b.  oil  417  294+60  GDR  329  +12% 
skmd rnlk pwdr.  308  205  243.  +18% 
whole milk pwdr.  541  617  427  -31% 
concentr'd milk  401  316  317  +-0% 
cheese  367  428  290  -32% 
liq. milk  +  214  274  169  -38% 
yoghurt 
TOT  MILK  EQUIV.  13500  12300  10700  -13% 
L  Impact  of  WASH  on  the vol.  exports in milk products,  comparison 
1999/91: 
-vol.  total exports:  -17.6% 
-vol.  subs.  exports:  -18.4% 
E  Cut  in budget  for refunds,  comparison 99/86-90  (MECU)  : 
Products  1986-90  1999 
butter  1325  848 
skmdmilk pwdr.  370  237 
cheese  439  281 
F  Tariffication poses problems of  GATT-CAP  compatibility for  ski~ed 
milk,  but  the  EC  cut customs duties by  20%  only for  the sensitive 
sectors  (WASH  commitment  to cut  by  36%  as an arithmetical and not 
weighted average) 
Reduction in customs  dut~es and Community preference  (ECU/T) : 
Products  at  1999  lowest  EC  price  Community 
import  (interven  preference 
prices  tion) 
skmdmilk  pwdr  950.4  1701.7  1 974.5  -272.8 
butter  1895.6  3460.3  2930.2  +530. 1 
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L  Fall in customs  duties following  tar~ffication, comparison 
1999/1986-88  .  . 
-skimmed milk powder:  -20% 
-other milk products:  -36% 
c  Consequences of  DUNKEL  compromise  on  volume of  Community  ~mports, 
comparison  1999/90  ( 1, 000  Ts): 
Products  1990  1999  difference  (%) 
butter and b. oil  60  90  +  50% 
cheese  113  205  +  81% 
skmd milk pwdr.  14  71  +407% 
whole milk  3.4  13  +282% 
concentr'd milk  2.4  1 2  +400% 
F  5%  minimum access  in  1999  will result in a  100,000 T  ~ncrease in 
cheese  imports for  the EC,  that is  1  MT  milk equiv. 
G  5%  minimum access  1n  1999  will result in a  100%  increase in imports 
of milk products between  1991  (1 .45  MT)  and 1999  (2.90  MT) 
L  Consequence of  WASH  on  EC  imports  and domestic consumption of milk 
products,  comparison 1999/91: 
-imports  (commitments considered without aggregation):  +261% 
-domestic consumption:  +1  .6% 
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B  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS  -
DOC.  CONSEQUENCES  IN DETAIL 
-
A  Fall  ~n milk  pr~ce between  1996  and  1999  =  8% 
G  Fall in milk price between  1 991  and  1999  =  3  to  4%,  because of the 
export and  import  commitments  under  WASH 
L  Prices paid to producers,  comparison 1999/91: 
-all milk products:  -19.7% 
-milk:  -2.3% 
G  Commitments under  WASH  =>  fall in exports  1999/91  =  1 .6  MT  milk 
equiv,  hence the 1.6  MT  cut in production quotas,  that is  1 16% •  If 
it is impossible to increase exports of butter and  skimmed milk 
powder,  cut in quotas  =  2.3%. 
Effect on milk quotas,  between  1994  and  1999,  of the fall in vol. 
of  subsidized exports et and the increase in imports provided for 
under  WASH  (MT  milk equiv.): 
Years  consequence  consequence fall  total effect on 
incr.  imports  exports  quotas 
1994  -0.64  +0.74  (-1.18)  +0.10  (-1.80) 
1995  -0.81  +0.26  (-1.39)  -0.55  (-2.18) 
1996  -0.97  -0.21  (-1.61)  -1 . 1 8  (-2.56) 
1997  -1 . 1 2  -0.68  (-1.82)  -1.80  (-2.92) 
1998  -1 . 29  -1 . 1 5  (-2.04)  -2.44  (-3.31) 
1999  -1 . 44  -1 . 63  (-2.26)  -3.07  (-3.70) 
N  .B.:  The  figures in brackets reflect the least  favourable 
scenario,  in which exports of butter butteroil and  skimmed milk 
powder could not  be  increased because of market saturation. 
L  Consequences of  WASH  on  the  volume  and value of milk product 
production,  comparison  1999/91: 
- volume:  -4.5% 
- value:  -23.3% 
Fall in production between  1 991  and  1999  because of: 
- cut  in customs duties of  20%  (skimmed milk powder)  or 
36%  (other milk products) 
- 9.5%  fall  in intervention prices 
- 20%  fall in prices to producers 
Trend in prices to producers between  1991  and  1999,  following the 
reform of  the  CAP  and  the commitments  under  WASH  (excluding 
compensatory payments under  the  CAP)  :  for milk producers,  fall of 
19.7% 
c  Compatibility between vol.  subs.  exports  subv.  "provided for"  under 
the CAP  in 1999  and  those permitted by  the  DUNKEL  compromise 
(assuming:  constant  EC  institut~onal prices between  1996  and  1999) : 
-butter and butteroil:  CAP  less than  DUNKEL  by  103  MT 
-cheese:  CAP  exceeds  DUNKEL  by  220  MT 
-skimmed milk pwdr:  CAP  exceeds  DUNKEL  by  9.7  MT 
-whole milk powder:  CAP  exceeds  DUNKEL  by  115.2  MT 
-concentr'd milk:  CAP  exceeds  DUNKEL  by  57.6 MT 
F  Compatibility of  WASH  and reformed  CAP  for milk products:  overrun 
of  between  3  and  3.5  MT  milk equiv.  for  cheese alone,  but  buying-up 
of Spanish and Italian quotas  (2MT)  and increase in intra-EC cheese 
consumption  (6ooooo  a  9ooooo  Tl  =>  compatibility assured for milk 
products. 
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A.  HOW  THE  COMMITMENTS  WILL  APPLY 
I  DOC  I  DETAILED  APPLICATION  I 
F  Comparison of overall livestock support measured by A.M.S.  in 
1999,  in line with  the  WASH  cornrn~tments and  the  reformed CAP: 
-AMS  livestock 1999  acc.WASH  commitments=  23076  MECU 
-AMS  l~vestock 1999  acc.CAP  =  19698  MECU 
=>  WASH  therefore compatible with reformed  CAP. 
B  Fall in volume  subs.  exports comparison 1999/91: 
-ALL  MEATS:  -39% 
-beef/veal:  -38% 
-pigmeat:  -41% 
-poutrymeat:  -40% 
c  Fall in vol.  subs.  exports,  comparison  1999  (ACCORDING  TO  DUNKEL 
COMPROMISE)  /91  (1,000  Ts): 
Products  1990  1999  difference  (%) 
beef  816  714  -12% 
pork  580  353  -39% 
poultryrneat  425  300  -29% 
D  The  reform of the  CAP  will result between now  and  1996  in an 
increase in exports of pork and poultry as compared with  1993, 
because of  the fall in costs of  an~mal feed. 
E  Fall in volume of subsidized exports according to WASH 
commitments,  cornpar~son 1999/1986-90  (MT): 
Products  1986-90  1999 
beef  1 . 0  0.82 
pork  0.49  0.39 
poultry  0.37  0.29 
F  Meats:  surplus in 1999 over  WASH  commitments  =  200000  T  for  pork, 
150000  T  for  poultrymeat and  300000  to 400000  T  for beef/veal. 
21%  fall in val.  subs.  exports  between  1986-90  and  1999, 
according to the WASH  commitments  (MT): 
Products  1986-90  1999  ace.  WASH 
beef  1 • 03  0.82 
pork  0.49  0.39 
poultrymeat  0.37  0.29 
ALL  MEATS  1 . 89  1 . 50 
H  Fall in vol.  subs.  exports  between  1991  and  1999  according to the 
WASH  commitments:  500000  T. 
WASH  also includes an undertaking by  the EC  to refrain form  any 
form of  subs~dized exports  on  the markets of South-East Asia:  but 
these are  the only markets  which are solvent  and expanding 
markedly. 
: 
J  Fall in vol.  subs.  exports  between  1992  and  1999  acc.WASH: 
-beef/veal:  -30% 
-poultrymeat:  -40% 
- 1 34  -DOC  DETAILED  APPLICATION 
K  Pork:  vol.  subs.  exports  1986-90 =  497000  T 
1990-91  =  633000  T  (DG  VI) 
=  668000  T  (Eurostat) 
1992  =  550000  T 
1999  ace.  WASH  =  393000  T 
=>  fall in volume  between  1 991  and  1999  =  -38%  to  -41% 
Pork surpluses in  1999 as  compared with WASH  commitments  = 
200000  T,  accepted by the  Commission which considers this a 
problem "in appearance only" 
L  Impact  of WASH  on vol.  meat  exports,  comparison  1999/91  (%)  : 
Products  total exports  subs.  exports 
beef  -39.8  -39.8 
pork  -42. l  -42.1 
poultrymeat  -34.3  -34.3 
ALL  MEATS  -38.8  -38.8 
E  Impact  of  WASH  on  the budgets  for  refunds:  comparison  1999/1986-
90  (MECU)  : 
Products  1986-90  1999 
beef  1967  1259 
pork  176  11 3 
poultry  143  92 
K  Trend in refunds  budget  for  pork: 
1986-90:  1 51  MECU 
1 991 :  304  MECU 
1992:  200  MECU 
1999  ace.  WASH:  97  MECU 
=>  fall  1999/91  =  -70% 
fall  1999/92 =  -50% 
These  commitments will result in additional restrictions on the 
volume of subsidized exports and/or  internal support  prices. 
F  Cut  in customs  duties and  Community preference for  meat  (ECU/T): 
Products  d.d.  1999  lowest  import  EC  Comm. 
price  price  pref. 
fresh  1768.3  3171.7  2670.9  +500.9 
beef/veal 
fresh  1713.5  3741.1  3035.9  +705.2 
sheepmeat 
=>  the  Community preference is secured for beef/veal 
H  WASH  =>  42%  cut  in customs  dut1es  between  1991  and  1999  for 
beef/veal,  compounded  by  the  commitments  to import  "HILTON  BEEF" 
at very  low rates of duty. 
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c  Consequences of  the DUNKEL  comprom~se on  the  import  volumes  of 
the  EC,  comparison  1999/90  ( 1 , 000  Ts) : 
Products  1990  1999  d~fference  (%) 
beef  501  492  - 2% 
pork  78  625  +701% 
poultry  135  273  +102% 
sheepmeat  287  252  - 12% 
H  Under  WASH,  the  EC  undertakes  to open  import  quotas  for  "Hilton 
Beef" at  very  low  rates of duty,  which w1ll add  to the  Community 
surpluses of beef/veal 
J  WASH  =>  86%  increase in imports  of poultrymeat 
=>1,000%  increase in pork  ~mports between  now  and  1999 
K  Market  access  commitments  for  pigmeat: 
.3%  of internal consumption 1986-88  =  374000  T  in 1994 
.5%  of  internal consumption  1986-88  =  624000  T  in 1999 
The  volume  of imports  amounted to 99000  T  in  1990 
56000  T  in 1991  (DG  VI) 
11 5000  T  in  1 991  (ITP) 
75000  T  in  1992  (DG  VI) 
100000  T  in 1992  (ITP) 
=>  between  1991  et  1 999,  pork  imports will  ~ncrease 6- or 8-fold 
depending  on  the source 
N.B.  :  ITP  =  Institut technique du pore  (F) 
L  Consequences  of  WASH  on  EC  imports and domestic consumption of 
meat,  comparison  1999/91  (%)  : 
Products  variation  ~n  variat1on in domestic 
imports  consumption 
(commitments 
not  aggregated) 
beef  -18  + 1 . 6 
pork  +1014  +1  . 6 
poultry  +80  +1  . 6 
ALL  MEATS  +51  +1. 6 
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B.  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  COMMITMENTS 
I  DOC 
L 
I  CONSEQUENCES  IN DETAIL  I 
Var~ation in prices paid to producers between  1991  and  1999 
(compensatory  payments under  the  CAP  not  included) : 
.  poultrymeat:  -15.0% 
.  beef:  -27.0% 
.  pork:  -13.5% 
.  sheepmeat:  -17.0% 
.  ALL  MEATS:  -10.7% 
(.  ALL  PRODUCTS:  -12.  5%) 
Consequences of  WASH  on  the volume  and value of meat  production, 
comparison  1999/91  (%): 
Products  variation in volume  variation in value 
beef  -9.8%  n.d 
pork  -4.5%  n.d 
poultrymeat  -3.2%  n.d 
ALL  MEATS  -5.4%  -15.5% 
- beef/veal:  cut in customs duties and fall in intervention prices 
(-27%  between  1991  and  1999,  but  prices to producers are already 
very much  lower  than the  ~ntervention prices)  mean  a  fall  ~n 
production of  10%  in volume; 
-pork:  between  1991  and  1999,  the EC  will move  from being a  net 
exporter to  be~ng a  net  importer.  Prices to producers will fall by 
13.5%  and output  by  4.5%; 
- poultry:  between  1991  and  1999,  reduced external protection is 
going to result in a  fall in prices of  15%  and  a  fall  in output of 
3%; 
- sheepmeat:  between  1991  and  1999,  prices will fall by  17%  and the 
EC's rate of self-supply will  decl~ne further. 
C  Compatibility of  the  DUNKEL  compromise with  the  CAP  in  terms of the 
volume  of subsidized exports,  in  1999  : 
- beef  :  expected DUNKEL  overrun =  470000  T 
-white meats  +  eggs:  DUNKEL  overrun= 3.85  MT 
F  Compatibility of the  WASH  draft and the  CAP  in the meat  sector: 
- white meats  (pork,  poultry):  exportable surplus in 1999  will 
be in excess of  the  volume permitted under  WASH  of  200000  T  for 
pork and  150000  T  for  poultry,  but  the  "fall in cereal prices will 
certainly make it possible  [sic]  to export all those surpluses 
without  refunds" 
- red meat:  surpluses  ~n 1999 over  the volume permitted under 
WASH  =  300 a 400000  T,  that is  5%  of  Community  production.  But 
"supply control measures are needed,  regardless of  the  GATT". 
- 137  -4. 2.  4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE HYPOTHESES OF THE  COMMISSION AND  THE COPA  ON  THE ECONOMIC 
PARAMETERS  DETERMINING ASSESSMENT OF  THE  COMPATIBILITY OF  THE  WASHINGTON  DRAFT WITH  THE 
REFORMED  CAP. 
N' 
2 
3 
4 
5 
HYPOTHESES 
Exchanges  rates 
(of  $  in 
particular) 
affects all  WASH 
commitments 
rate of 
inflation in the 
EC 
affects producer 
marg~ns and 
income 
"world" 
agricultural 
prices 
affects all  WASH 
commitments 
price trend in 
CSPs  (cereal 
substitutes) 
affects the 
minimum access 
commitments,  the 
outlets for 
common  wheat  and 
market 
equilibrium 
price trend in 
protein feed 
affects the 
minimum access 
commitments 
POSITIONS 
COPA 
~mpossible to forecast,  the 
$  may  fall,  if the  US  so 
decides:  this factor will 
have  a  major  influence on 
trade,  agricultural 
budgetary  equil~brium and 
farmers'  incomes. 
hyp.  =  3%:  optim~stic for 
the years to  come  and very 
much  lower  than years  gone 
by. 
stagnation as world supply 
structurally >  world demand 
and markets lost by  EC  as  a 
result  WASH  accords  w~ll 
immediately be  taken over 
by competitors 
fall parallel  I  fall EC 
cereal prices: price may 
fall as  much  as  -40%  as 
comp.  EC  cereal price 
without  affecting US  loan 
rate;  Latin American 
countr~es have  huge  scope 
for  reduct~on 
stagnat_ion 
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stable  ~n the years  to come 
3%:  reasonable hyp. 
increase as fall in volume 
of subsidized exports 
arriving on world markets  => 
stab~lization 
no fall in prices;  use of  EC 
cereals in place CSPs  = 7 
MT;  Thailand will not cut 
its manioc  prices but will 
sell to Asia. 
stagnation; 
fall in excessive use of 
soya in the  EC  as  replaced 
by less expensive cereals. 6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
HYPOTHESES 
increase in 
overall food 
consumption in 
the  EC 
affects the 
consequences of 
the commitments 
agricultural 
input prices in 
the EC 
affects farmers' 
margins and 
income 
trend in cereal 
yields 
affects the 
export 
comm~tments 
use of  Community 
cereals in EC 
animal  feed 
affects import 
and export 
commitments 
-• 
exportable 
cereal surpluses 
in 1999/those 
permitted under 
WASH  (23.4 Mt) 
(23,4 Mt) 
affects export 
commitments 
POSITIONS 
COPA 
at best in line pop.  growth 
(1 .6%/p.a.). 
increase in line inflation: 
+3%/p.a.  at least, 
determine the margins 
=>  EC  inflation =  decisive 
factor for  farmers'  incomes 
with  $. 
*constant?  (not  very 
likely) 
*increase 1%p.a.  as  a 
result of genetic progress 
alone:  far more  likely 
*at best constant as  % => 
fall in volume as overall 
volume animal  feed falls; 
*probably % fall as  CSP 
prices will also fall and 
WASH  =>  increase CSP 
imports =  3Mt 
33.7  MT  at best:  10  MT 
surplus  I  WASH. 
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w~ll certainly >  1 .6%/p.a. 
for certain products 
(cheese) . 
incr.  <  inflation,  as in 
recent years  (1986-90); 
fall in demand and fall in 
agricultural wages  =>  fall 
in input  prices. 
constant or increase<  1% 
/p.a.as decoupling aids does 
not  encourage increased 
yields. 
increase of  12  Mt  between 
1999  and  1992,  as  a  result 
of fall in cereals prices: 
*CSPs  replaced by  7  MT 
cereals; 
*increased use for  white 
meat  production:  5  MT; 
*over-use soya cake 
eliminated. 
*if yield static:  14.7  MT 
*if yield incr.1%/p.a.: 
24.9  MT 
=>  no  problem as  2.5 
MT/p.a.in food aid and incr. 
yield not very likely. 1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
HYPOTHESES 
set-aside 
(cereals, 
protein -rich 
oil plants) 
affects the 
export, 
production and 
income 
comm~tments 
trend in white 
meat  consumption 
and consequences 
affects the 
export 
commitments 
surplus 
beef/veal in 
1999  I  WASH. 
affects the 
export 
comm~tments 
export of large 
quantities of 
white  meat 
without  refunds 
affects the 
export 
commitments 
marketing of 
existing stocks: 
-cereals:  19  MT 
-beef/veal:  1  MT 
affects the 
export 
commitments 
!I  POSITIONS 
COPA 
*if yield constant:  11.5 
Mha  l.n  1999; 
*if yield incr.  1%/p.a.:  20 
Mha  in  1999. 
probable increase in 
consumption white  meats  but 
consequence = fall 
consumption beef/veal  => 
fall consumption cereals by 
beef cattle and reduction 
in land used grazing and 
fodder  =>  used instead for 
cereals =>  problem. 
very  large =>  severe drop 
in prices 1nev1table. 
exports without  refunds not 
possible,  as production 
costs will not  fall 
adequately;  very fl.erce 
competition on  world 
markets. 
very difficult,  not  to say 
impossible before the entry 
into force of WASH:  solvent 
world markets saturated, 
former  USSR  no  longer  buys, 
bitter trade war  and us 
pressure. 
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15%  set-aside rate  (=4.5  M 
ha)  sufficient during  1993-
2000  to comply with 
commitments. 
marked increase  l.n 
consumption whl.te  meats  and 
incr.  overall meat 
consumption =>  incr.  use of 
cereals in EC  animal  feed = 
5  MT. 
N.B.:  problem of what  to do 
with pasture and fodder  area 
not studied by  Commission. 
very large,  will pose 
problems  but  problems would 
have arisen without  WASH: 
need for drastic reform of 
sector. 
no  problem as white meat 
production costs will fall 
as  EC  cereal price falls. 
able to be disposed of 
without difficulty before 
entry into force of  WASH 
(incr.  world prices,  food 
aid) . 16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
HYPOTHESES 
application 
sugar protective 
clause: 
automatic and 
permanent 
affects the 
~mport 
comm~tments 
price of sugar 
intra-EC between 
now  and  1999 
affects the 
import 
comm~  tmen  t s  and 
producer incomes 
milk quotas 
affects export 
comm~tments,prod 
uction and 
income 
disposal cheese 
surpluses in 
1999 
affects export 
commitments 
peace clause and 
new  sectors 
affected by  the 
CAP  reform 
between  1993  and 
1999 
affects all the 
commitments 
under  WASH  for 
those sectors 
POSITIONS 
COPA 
impossible,  it is not 
realistic to accept  that 
the other parties will 
agree  (that  would  amount  to 
increasing import  barriers 
as  compared with the 
current situation) 
sharp fall,  as  world prices 
static,  supply in 
structural surplus and 
indefinite application 
protective clause 
impossible. 
anticipated cut  in quotas = 
4.5%  between  1991  and  1999; 
2%  cut in quotas 
anticipated by  Commiss~on 
will not suffice and  ~s not 
yet  approved by Council. 
problems will arise,  inter 
alia because of: 
- incr.  imports  (minimum 
access)  of  10400  T,  that is 
+81%  between  1991  and  1999. 
-possible new  members  from 
Eastern Europe  =  major 
producers of cheese  and 
limited purchasing power 
for  quality cheeses. 
new  sector reforms  and 
compensatory aids 
compat~ble with  the peace 
clause?  =>  new  reforms 
possible? 
Q  :  what  about  the clause 
after 1999? 
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no  problem,  nothing to 
prevent  this in WASH. 
slight fall in prices,  as 
incr.  world prices and 
permanent  appl~cation 
protective clause will not 
pose  any problem. 
commitments met  if 2%  cut in 
quotas in 1994  (proposed by 
Commission) . 
no  problem: 
-minimum access  import 
quotas unlikely to be met  in 
full,  as cheese concerned 
not  to European tastes. 
-99  surpluses calculated on 
a  very generous basis; 
-quality cheeses will be 
exported without  refunds; 
-incr.intra-EC demand as  a 
result  access~on Eastern 
Eur.  countries; 
-opening of US  market  post-
WASH.  [!] 
no  problem if new  aids 
remain  <  overall AMS 
provided for  1992  ; 
A:  duration of clause =  6 
years. POSITIONS 
N•  HYPOTHESES  COPA  COMMISSION  DES  CE 
21  product  *not written into WASH.  *aggregation= position 
aggregation for  =>  major  problem for  the  defended by  EC,  will be 
minimum  market  beef/veal sector if no  respected  ~n GATT; 
access  aggregation; 
affects the  *prob.  for  EC  exports  ~f  *"~t is for  the  EC  [to 
market access  other countries also apply  ensure]  that  this method 
commitments  this. 
22  former  GDR  no  =>  EC  production of 
included in  cereals and  fodder  and 
statistics  pasture underestimated. 
Allocation of milk quotas 
affects the  to former  GDR? 
calculations 
concern~ng 
corrunitments  and 
thus compliance 
with  them 
WASH.:  draft Washington agricultural accord. 
Hyp. :  hypothesis 
cannot  be applied by other 
countries" 
in part only =>  problem as 
for  the  COPA  estimates. 
A.M.S.:  aggregate measurement of support,  adopted by  the GATT  at the suggestion of the 
EC  to take into account all forms of support,  direct or indirect, internal or external, 
influencing agricultural production policy. 
=>  :  means  (consequence) . 
I  :  compared with  (comparison) . 
- 142  -4.3. CONCLUSIONS AS  TO  THE  COMPATIBILITY OF THE  WASHINGTN  DRAFT AGREEMENT  AND  THE  CAP 
REFORM;  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DRAFT  AGREEMENT  FOR  AGRICULTURE  IN THE  EC. 
4.3.1.  CRITICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  ECONOMC  AND  AGRONOMIC  ANALYSES 
General criticism of the COPA  study: it compares a  situation in 1991  (former CAP  with 
stabilizers- but  without  GATT)  with a  new  situat~on in 1999  (new  CAP+  GATT),  but 
fails to separate out the' effects of the CAP  reform and any GATT  agreement:  combining 
the two in this way  means that it is not possible to identify the true effects of the 
Washington  draft  agreement  alone,  even  though  the  principal  points  of  and  main 
sectors affected by  the  CAP  reform are largely accepted. 
General  criticism  of  the  Commission  study:  ~t  is  based  more  on  imprecation  and 
wishful-thinking than on real economic models; moreover,  on its own  admission, it has 
failed to establish a  general model  of  the effects of  the draft but has  referred in 
part  to simulative models  produced elsewhere  (the  "SPELL"  model  of  Bonn  University 
and the INRA  "MISS"  model) ,  and therefore  us~ng an approach to problems and methods 
of which it was not the originator. Moreover,  the Commission automatically considers 
its views and demands  in the context of the negotiations to be agreed  (its position 
on the level of import  aggregation,  for  example);  this m~ght be a  sensible approach 
in  the  context  of  the  negotiations  but  it  is  less  appropriate  when  it  comes  to 
assessing the consequences of the draft that  has actually been drawn up and accepted 
by  the  Commission itself,  in Washington,  on  25  November  1992;  the  fact  is that  in 
most  instances,  the wording of the draft is not in line with the "wishes" or "views" 
of  the Commission. 
N• 
2 
3 
HYPOTHESES 
exchange rate  (of  $ 
in particular} 
rate of  inflation 
in EC 
"world" 
agricultural prices 
OUR  VIEW 
rates of  exchange  generally and that of  the dollar 
in particular are unlikely to stabilize in the next 
few years:  there will continue to be  a  great deal 
of uncertainty concerning the competitiveness of 
European products on the international markets and 
the conditions of  compet~tion. The models 
established have  therefore to treated w~th a  great 
deal of caution. 
COPA's  assumption of  3%,  although below the figures 
of past years,  seems  fairly realistic given the 
general deflationary trends. It remains  to  be seen 
how  far  the fall  in rates will continue  (US, 
Europe). 
there is nothing to indicate that,  as  the 
Commission believes,  the fall in the  volume of 
subsidized exports entering the markets after a 
GATT  accord would  s~gnificantly boost world prices. 
For  the  main  products in fact,  supply by far 
exceeds  demand  and  the market  shares lost by  the  EC 
as a  result of possible concessions to GATT  would 
immediately be  taken over  by  ~ts competitors,  the 
downward pressure on  markets being unable  to be 
checked in those conditions. 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
HYPOTHESES 
trend in cereal 
substitute prices 
trend in protein 
feed prices 
increase in overall 
food consumption in 
EC 
costs of 
agricultural inputs 
(operating costs in 
EC) 
trend in cereal 
yields 
use of Community 
cereals in EC 
animal feed 
OUR  VIEW 
it is not very likely that Thailand would prefer to 
sell on  the Asian market  than to cut its prices on 
the  European market  (where it obtains hard 
currency);  in contrast,  the  US  could cut its prices 
substantially before jeopardizing its margins 
(cereal substitute=by-products),  and it will have 
no  problem in following  the fall in European cereal 
prices:  the latter will therefore have  a  great deal 
of difficulty in being competitive on  the animal 
feed markets. 
soya prices will probably remain static or fall in 
the  com~ng years,  the margin avilable to the 
countries of Latin America and the  US  to cut  pr1ces 
being very large. 
logically, will more or  less keep pace with  the 
growth  in population,  that is  +1.6%  per annum;  will 
be little affected by the general increase in 
consumption in the  former  GDR  (food staturation 
point has already been  reached and exceeded for  the 
EC). 
there 1s  no  reason why  the costs of agricultural 
inputs should increase less rapidly than inflation; 
the main  trend reveals an increase often swifter 
than 1nflation,  except  for  recent years.  Moreover, 
the structural costs  (amortization or rent)  are 
heavy  and unable to be  reduced) . 
the  trend towards  a  slowdown in the rate of 
increase is likely to continue because of  the 
"disincentive" resulting from link between support 
and yield being broken  (particularly in the 
peripheral regions),  but it is almost  impossible 
that  the  increase in yield will be less  than  1% 
p.a.  simply because of genetic progress,  not  to 
ment~on technical advances  (in the dynamic  regions 
above all). 
the  12  MT  increase forecast  by the Commission is 
based on very optimistic,  not  to say unrealistic, 
forecasts;  in fact  the fall in cereal prices will 
make  then more competitive vis-a-vis the 
subst~tutes only  ~f substitute prices do not fall 
in parallel;  however,  the  US  and  the countries of 
Asia  (preferential agreements)  and  Lat~n America 
can substant1ally cut  their prices without 
difficulty. It is therefore very likely that  the 
proportion of cereals in feed will,  at best,  remain 
at  the same  level or fall.  As  a  result of the 
overall fall  in the volume of  animal production, 
the volume of cereals used will therefore decline. 
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HYPOTHESES 
-
exportable 
surpluses of 
cereals in  1999  I 
those permitted 
under  WASH 
set-aside  (cereals 
protein-rich oil 
plants) 
trend in 
consumption white 
meats  and 
consequences 
surplus beef/veal 
1999  I  WASH 
export of large 
quantities of white 
meat  without 
refunds 
OUR  VIEW 
as  there  ~s no  chance of  cereal yields  rema~n~ng 
static,  we  can forecast,  on  the basis of an 
increase of  1%  p.a.,  an exportable surplus of  33.7 
MT,  that is a  10  MT  excess over  the  WASH 
commitments. 
g~ven the  antic~pated increase in yield  (at  least 
1%  p.a.),  the anticipated overrun in relation to 
the WASH  commitments  and the current state of 
Community  stocks  (some  27  MT  in May  1993),  and 
given  that  there is little likelihood of  a 
significant expansion in internal outlets,  very 
strict measures will be  needed to keep production 
within  the limits provided for  under WASH:  25-30% 
set-aside is  to be feared,  that is 20  Mha  in the 
EC. 
the  trend towards increaased consumption of white 
meat  will continue in the corning  years,  but  the 
~ncrease in internal production does  not  mean  an 
increase in outlets for  Community  cereals  (5  MT  in 
the  Comrniss~on view)  but  instead for  the 
substitutes;  moreover,  we  should not overlook  the 
increasing competition from  low-cost  imports  from 
the countries of Eastern Europe,  which  enJOY 
preferential agreements.  At  any rate,  beef/veal 
will decline because of  the  WASH  commitments and 
the fall in internal consumption:  land used for 
pasture and  fodder will be  diverted to cereals and 
thus  the surpluses will be  compounded.  The  premium 
for extensification will therefore not  produce the 
hoped-for result.  The  Commission has  clearly failed 
to tackle this issue. 
the surpluses,  antic~pated by  COPA  and  accepted by 
the Commission,  will be  very large,  and draconian 
measures will  be required to control production, 
severely affecting this sector.  The  import  and 
export  commitments add significantly to the gravity 
of  the situation. 
production costs will certainly fall as  a  result of 
tpe fall  in cereal prices,  but it does  not appear 
very  l~kely that it will  be possible to export  the 
large  quant~t~es of surplus  w~thout refunds.  World 
prices are  ~n decl~ne and are unlikely to increase. 
The  fall  in EC  white meat  prices will not  be 
sufficient to make  ~t competitive.  There is thus 
the  threat of  be~ng left with stocks of white meat 
that it is difficult to sell. 
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HYPOTHESES 
disposal of 
existing stocks 
(05/93): 
-cereals:  27  MT 
-beef/veal:  1  MT 
application 
protective clause 
on  sugar:  automatic 
and permanent 
intra-EC sugar 
price between now 
and 1999 
milk quotas 
disposal of cheese 
surpluses in 1999 
OUR  VIEW 
these stocks must  be disposed of before the entry 
into force  of any  GATT  agreement  (1994?),  but  this 
would appear more  or less  ~mpossible given the 
level of  stocks  and  the world market situation:  a 
low level of purchasing by  the  former  USSR, 
exaggerated competition with  the  US  wh~ch has 
adopted zero set-aside for  1993-94  and a  reinforced 
EEP  (~n breach of  GATT  rules),  durnp~ng by Eastern 
European countries on  the meat  market.  Here  again, 
the commission underestimates the problems .. 
here again,  the Commission considers that its 
wishes  have been met,  although the draft does not 
take account of  them and  the other parties 
categorically refuse to accept  any possibility of 
automatic application of  protective clauses which 
establish greater protection than already exists! 
it will not  therefore be possible to apply the 
protective clause indefinitiely,  and world prices 
are unlikely to increase,  given the current trend 
towards market  blocking.  We  have  therefore to 
expect substantial falls  in prices in the corning 
years  and difficulties in applying the Community 
preference,  becuase of tariffication.  The  imports 
under  the  Lome  agreements  (guaranteed quantities, 
1.3 MT,  at high prices)  will add to market 
saturation. 
the  2%  cut  in quotas  for  1994  envisaged by  the 
Commission will not  be  enough to adjust production 
in line w2th  the  WASH  commitments on  import  and 
export.  A cut  of between  3.5 and  4%  will probably 
be  needed,  and this will have  a  severe effect on 
the sector. 
major  problems are  ~nevitable, as the WASH 
commitments  mean  that  imports will more  or less 
double.  It is not  responsible to claim that the 
cheeses likely to be  imported are not  to  European 
taste and that  the countries of Eastern Europe 
represent  a  large potential market,  given their 
poor  level of purchasing power.  As  far as  the 
propspects of an  opening of the American  market  are 
concerned,  the Commission  seems  excess2vely 
optimistic. 
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HYPOTHESES 
peace clause and 
new  sectors 
affected by  CAP 
reform between  1993 
and  1999 
aggregation of 
products for 
minimum  market 
access 
inclusion of  former 
GDR  in  statist~cs 
OUR  VIEW 
there is going  to be  practically no  marg~n 
available for  the reforms  to come  for  fruit and 
vegetables,  wine,  sugar and  the other sectors if 
the  EC  wishes  to  remain within the limits of  the 
supports adopted in  1992  (see  4.3.2)  - those limits 
were  largely reached in 1993  and will  certa~nly be 
exceeded in 1994.  What  instruments of support will 
be able to be  introduced without increasing 
expenditure? 
there is nothing in the WASH  draft to confirm the 
Commission position.  The  DUNKEL  compromise 
specifies four-figure positions for  the tariff 
headings,  which rules out  aggregation.  The  other 
parties seem in no  way  prepared to accept  the 
Commiss~on viewpoint,  which it alone considers 
agreed.  The  latest  (20  June  1993),  however,  is that 
the us  might possibly be  prepared to show  some 
flexibility on  this,  if the  EC  gives  way  on all the 
other points of disagreement. 
the  failure to include the  former  GDR  in all the 
studies means  that  a  number  of areas of production 
are underestimated,  including pork,  colza,  barley 
and beef/veal,  and  therefore distorts  the 
quant~ties on  which calculation of cuts  in support 
has  to be based.  This will  be  a  source of more 
acute problems of compatibility,  given that 
production is tending to grow very rapidly  (ie 
colza)  (i.e.  colza)  in the  new  Lander  as  a  result 
of  the opportunities offered by  the market  and 
Community supports. 
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The following table illustrates, for the main sectors subject to reform,  the main changes effected by the reform  (under 4.1.), 
the  most  likely consequences of  the commitments  under  the Washington draft accord  (under  4.2.2. et 4.3.1.),  and concludes 
as  to  GATT-CAP  compatibility.  The  principal effects of  GATT  and  the  CAP  reform are also listed as  well  as  the cumulative 
effect of  GATT  +  CAP. 
SECT:  sectors;  CER:  cereals;  OIL:  oilseeds;  MILK:  milk products;  MEAT:  meats. 
SECT  I  WASH 
commitment 
CER  1 20%  reduction 
AMS; 
21%  fall vol. 
subs.  exports 
21%  fall in 
vol.  subs. 
exports  between 
1986-90  and 
1999 
HYP 
(see 
4.2. 
4) 
1 
3 
7 
8 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
9 
GATT 
impact 
fall in prices  1999/91:  -
33.6%  for  cereals 
A.M.S.  1999  <  25526  MECU 
fall in volume  subs~dized 
exports  1999/91:  -32% 
CAP 
impact 
29%  fall in prices 
between  1992-93  and 
1995-96,  offset  in 
part  by direct aids 
A.M.S.  1999  = 11101 
MECU 
fall in volume of 
exports hoped for 
(not  quantified) 
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GATT-CAP 
COMPATIBLE 
NO 
YES 
NO 
cumulative impact  of 
GATT  + CAP 
-the CAP  changes  are 
restricted to price 
cuts offset  by direct 
aids per hectare to 
deter crop 
intensification. 
-the GATT  imposes 
draconian export  and 
production limits 
which will devastate 
this production 
sector. SECT 
CER 
cant 
WASH 
commitment 
minimum 
access  (5%  in 
1999)  and  36% 
cut  in 
customs 
duties 
export  and 
import 
commitments 
HYP 
(see 
4.2. 
4) 
21 
4 
5 
6 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
1 2 
15 
GATT 
impact 
increase in volume  of 
imports  1999/91:  +150% 
(volume  imported in  1999 
=  7.5  MT) 
set-aside needed in 1999 
to comply  with  GATT 
commitments:  25  a 30%, 
ie 11.5- 20M ha 
supply - demand  balance 
1999  =  +  25  MT  (GATT 
commitment:  13.4  MT) 
CAP 
impact 
no  increase in 
volume of  imports 
(stable at  3  MT) 
set-aside:  15%,  ie 
4M  ha 
market 
equilibrium: 
supply  - demand 
balance  1996  = + 
14.8 MT 
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GATT-CAP 
COMPATIBLE 
NO 
NO 
NO 
cumulative impact of 
GATT  +  CAP SECT  I WASH  I  HYP 
commitment  (see 
4.2. 
4) 
OIL  I  - fixing of  a  1 
maximum  area  3 
able  to be  sown  22 
to oilseeds: 
5.128  M ha;  any 
overrun of this 
SBA  will give 
rise to a 
penalty 
- minimum 
compulsory set-
aside every 
year:10% 
- area of  fallow 
sown  to 
"industrial" 
oilseeds limited 
to the  level of 
1  MT  {eg  meal) 
of production 
GATT 
impact 
- limit  imposed on  the 
development of  these 
crops  in EC,  despite 
very  low  level of self-
supply; 
- limit  imposed on  the 
development  of  these 
industrial crops  and 
biofuels,  though  they 
are a  promising source 
of markets 
CAP 
impact 
- no limit on area 
or  volume of 
production  {though 
the system is 
restricted to 
areas reflecting 
the current 
situation 
established on  the 
basis of a 
reference period; 
unrestricted use 
of oilseeds grown 
on  fallow for 
industrial 
purposes; 
- internal prices 
brought  down  to 
the level of world 
prices  from  1992-
93,  at  a  stroke; 
- direct aids paid 
to producers 
according to land 
area  {359  ECU/ha) 
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GATT-CAP 
COMPATIBLE 
YES,  BUT ••• 
compatibili 
ty is not 
totally 
guaranteed; 
the 
development 
of  the 
sector is 
greatly 
hindered. 
cumulative impact of 
GATT+  CAP 
-the effects of the 
CAP  amount  to 
checking production 
and putting  the 
prices of  EC  oilseeds 
at  the world market 
level,  producer 
income  being 
supported by  d1rect 
aids per hectare. 
-the further  limits 
on  the  area  sown  to 
oilseeds and  the 
production for 
industrial fallow 
derive solely from 
the  GATT,  and the  CAP 
reform is going to 
have  to be modify  to 
incorporate them. SECT  I WASH 
commit-
ment 
MILK  1 -21%  fall 
in vol, 
subs. 
exports 
-36%  fall 
in refund 
budgets 
-minimum 
access  (5% 
in  1999) 
-20%  or 
36%  (ace. 
product) 
cut  in 
customs 
duties 
HYP 
(see 
4.2. 
4) 
3 
18 
19 
21 
22 
GATT 
impact 
- fall in milk prices 
between  1996  and 
1999:-8%,  because of 
WASH  import  and 
export commitments 
- producer price 
1999/91:- 20%  (all 
milk products) 
- milk price, 
1999/91:  -2.3% 
- cut  in quotas 
1999/91:-4.5% 
CAP 
impact 
- 2. 5%  fall in 
price of butter in 
1993-94 and  2.5% 
fall  in  1994-95; 
- 1%  reduction in 
milk quotas  in 
1993-94  and  1% 
reduction in  1994-
95. 
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GATT-CAP 
COMPATIBLE 
NO 
cumulative impact of GATT  + 
CAP 
compatibility between the 
surpluses to be exported 
under  the  CAP  in  1999 
(assuming constant  EC 
institutional prices  between 
1996  and  1999)  and  the 
quantities permitted under 
the Dunkel  compromise: 
- cheese:  220  MT  overrun 
-whole milk  powder:  115  MT 
overrun 
-concentrated milk:  57.6  MT 
overrun 
- skimmed milk  powder:  10  MT 
overrun SECT  I WASH  I  HYP 
commitment  (see 
4.24) 
MEAT  I  -21%  fall in  1 
vol.  subs.  3 
exports  12 
-36%  fall in  13 
refund  14 
budgets  15 
-non- 21 
aggregated  22 
minimum 
access  (5% 
in  1999) 
-36%  cut  in 
customs 
duties 
-Andries  sen 
compromise 
GATT 
impact 
Variation prices  to 
producer,  1999/  91 
(compens.  aids  under  CAP 
not  included) : 
-all meats:  -10.7% 
-beef:  -27% 
-sheepmeat:  -17% 
-poultry:  -15% 
-pork:  -13.5% 
Cut  in customs  duties for 
beef  1999/91:  42%. 
Variation imports, 
1999/91: 
- pork:  +700  to  +1000% 
- poultry:  +102% 
- beef:  - 2  to  -18% 
- sheepmeat:  -12% 
Moreover,  the  "Andriessen 
compromise"  prevents  the 
EC  expanding on  the 
lucrative Asian markets. 
Fall in meat  production 
199/91:  -5.4%  (-15.5%  in 
value),  but  10%  for 
beef/veal. 
CAP 
impact 
Intervention price 
for  beef/veal cut 
by  15%  between 
1993-94  and  1995-
96,  premiums 
capped at  3.5  and 
then  2  UGB/ha, 
ceiling on  herd 
size  (regional 
reference herd), 
compensation for 
extensive rearing, 
"male bovine"  and 
"suckler cow" 
premiums 
increased. 
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GATT-CAP 
COMPATIBLE 
NO 
cumulative impact of  GATT 
+CAP 
- exportable surplus 
beef/veal  1999  = 
1  074  000  T,  as  compared 
with  817  000  T  authorized 
under  WASH  (exports  1992: 
1  200  000  T).  Moreover, 
the stocks in  the  EC,  1 
MT  in mid-93,  will be 
impossible  to export 
before  1994; 
exportable surplus of 
pork =  600  000  T  in 
1999,  compared with  393 
000  T  authorized under 
WASH; 
- exportable surplus of 
poultry =  490  000  T,  as 
compared with  290  000  T 
authorized under  WASH OTHER  SECTORS 
The compatibility of the GATT  and CAP  ~s unable to be assessed for the many sectors 
that have not been subject to reform: fruit and vegetables,  wine,  sugar etc. These 
sectors have been tackled to a  limited extent only,  if at all,  and the Commission 
has  proved extraordinarily reticent about  them during meetings of the SCA  and with 
the experts  from  the  COPA. 
It has,  however,  to be borne in m~nd that the Wash~ngton draft provides that future 
common  organizations of  the market  should not  exceed,  for  each sector,  the level 
of the package decided in 1992,  and  that the instruments of support should remain 
unchanged. 
We  have  therefore to  query  the margin of manoeuvre  that will be  available to the 
Commission when it tackles these sectors, which will have, moreover, to incorporate 
in full the rules and disciplines arising out of any  GATT  agreement  and will,  in 
particular,  bear the  full  brunt  of  the  minimum import access concessions - (wine 
imports would increase from  2  mio  hl  to  7  or  8  mio  hl;  in Geneva,  the Commission 
did  not  propose  m~nimum access  for  fruit  and  vegetables  in  relation  to  which 
customs  duties  would  be  reduced  by  20%)  - and  the  limits  on  exports  (fruit  and 
vegetables and table wines) ,  as well as  the cut  in internal supports  (20%)  . 
- 153-4.3.3.  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS:  THE  CONSEQUENCES  FOR  THE  AGRICULTURAL  SECTOR  OF  THE 
COMMUNITY  IF THE  DRAFT  AGREEMENT  IS APPLIED  AS  IT STANDS 
It is clear that the  pr~ce reductions  imposed through the  reform of  the  CAP  will 
not be fully offset by direct a~ds to income  ~n the cereals, oilseeds and beef /veal 
sectors.  The  commitments  conta~ned in the Washington draft would clearly involve 
limits on production and on land area and  pr~ce reductions - for which there would 
be  no  compensation  - over  and  above  those  inherent  in  the  CAP  reform.  It  is, 
however,  extremely difficult  (see the studies  of  COPA  and  the  proceed~ngs of  the 
SCA)  to  separate out  the  actual  effect of  the  GATT  from  the  effects  of  the  CAP 
reform- the  deadl~nes are not even the same.  The issue is all the more complicated 
because  the way  in which  the CAP  will apply to the sectors subject  to  reform has 
not  yet  been  fully  decided.  Unfortunately,  the  position is altogether uncertain 
when  it comes  to  the  sectors  which  have  yet  been  reformed  and  are  significant 
sectors: fruit and vegetables,  wine etc. In point of fact,  those sectors will have 
to incorporate all the disciplines,  cuts  in support  and  income  result~ng from  a 
GATT  agreement  BEFORE  they are reformed.  Such reform will have in fact  inevitably 
to incorporate the GATT  discipl~nes,  and those sectors will be  doubly sacrificed. 
In  the  case  of  the  reformed  sectors  - cereals,  oil  seeds,  beef  /veal  and  milk 
products  - the economic consequences  (none  of  them  compensated for,  as  they have 
not been anticipated by the Commission) ,  will vary from one product to another and 
will depend on a  number  of macroeconomic parameters defining the world markets  in 
agricultural  products,  and  it is  precisely  these  parameters  which  underlie  the 
assessment of  GATT-CAP  compat~bility. 
The  fact remains that  ~t would require a  miracle for all the extremely  optimist~c 
prognoses  on  which  the  Commission  is  bas~ng  its  approach  to  take  effect 
simultaneously, the GATT  commitments are certainly not compatible with the reformed 
CAP  and would result,  for European farmers,  in forced cuts in exports and increased 
imports  - and thus  a  fall in production  - accompanied by  a  reduction in the area 
cultivated: at the end of  the day,  that would inevitably bring a  fall in income. 
Some  sectors,  like cereals or milk products will be more particularly affected by 
the  reduction in exports;  others,  like wine,  fruit  and  vegetables,  beef/veal and 
white meats, will also be seriously thrown out of kilter by the import concessions, 
particularly if the level of aggregation defended by the Commission to and aga~nst 
all parties in the  GATT  continues not  to  be  accepted. 
All  those sectors will see their opportunities for  future development  limited in 
authoritarian fashion,  in terms  of exports but  also production,  including sectors 
in deficit  (eg oilseeds,  fruit  and vegetables). 
The  main  consequences  for  each  sector were  listed in detail in  chapter 4.2.  The 
main consequences on the major balances  affect~ng the most  important products can 
be  summarized as  follows: 
CEREALS 
fall in prices to the producer:  -34%  (not  including compensatory aids under  the 
CAP): 
.  32%  fall in exports between 1991  and 1999  (40%  in the case of wheat) ,  the effects 
of  the  reformed  CAP  combining  here  with  those  of  the  GATT  (hence  the  loss  of 
export  markets  which  will  immediately  be  ta~n over  by  the  US  and  the  other 
exporters); 
- 1 54  -.  decline in Community production:  -13.4% in volume and -42.5% in value  (1999/91); 
.  exportable surpluses as anticipated under the CAP= at least 25  MT,  ie an overrun 
of  10  MT  in relation to  GATT  commitments; 
.  supplementary imports:  some  3-4  MT  (+79%); 
.  set-aside:  25  to 30%  (compared with  15%  in  1992-93)  at least; 
fall  in  Community  demand  for  cereals  for  animal  feed:  between  0%  and  -11.5%, 
depending on  the level of  "world" cereal  and cereal substitutes prices  (as  the 
latter are by-products  and have  no cost  price,  their prices  may  be  cut at will 
by  the  producers,  principal among  them  the US). 
OILSEEDS 
- fall in prices to the producer,  1999/91: -48.6%  (not including compensatory aids 
under  the CAP)  ; 
fall in production:  -16.1%  ~n volume,  -56.9%  in value. 
MILK  PRODUCTS 
increases  of  400%  in  imports  of  concentrated milk,  of  407%  for  skimmed  milk 
powder,  282%  for whole  milk powder,  81%  for  cheese  and  50%  for  butter; 
fall  in prices  paid  to  the  producer,  1999/91:  -19.7%  for  milk products as  a 
whole,  -2.3%  for milk; 
fall in volume  of exports:  -1.6  MT; 
cut in production quotas:  -4%,  ie a  fall  ~n value of  -23.3%; 
overrun of the volume of exportable surplus in 1999,  reformed CAP  compared with 
the  GATT:  +220  MT  for  cheese,  +115.2  MT  for  whole  milk  powder,  +  57.6  MT  for 
concentrated milk and+  10  MT  for  skimmed milk powder. 
BEEF/VEAL 
intervention prices reduced by  15%  according to the reformed CAP,  in fact  -27% 
under  the  GATT  commitments; 
fall in the  volume of subsidized exports:  -38%,  ie  820  000  T; 
variation in volume  of  imports,  1999/91:  -18%; 
42%  reduction in customs duties between 1991  and 1999,  compounded by the opening 
of  import  quotas  for  "Hilton Beef" at a  very  low rate of duty; 
decline in production between  1991  and  199:  -10%  in volume; 
overrun of the volume of exportable surplus in 1999,  reformed CAP  compared with 
the GATT:  +400  000  T,  ie  5%  of  Commun~ty production; 
stocks  of  beef/veal  currently  in  cold  storage  in  the  Commun~ty:  ca.  1  MT, 
needing to be disposed of as  a  matter of urgency  (but how?)  before the entry into 
force of the  GATT  commitments. · 
WHITE MEATS 
- fall in intervention prices between 1991  and 1999:  -15%  for poultrymeat,  -13.5% 
for pork,  -17%  for  sheepmeat; 
reduction in the  volume of subsidized exports:  -40%  for poultrymeat,  -41%  for 
pork; 
- 155  -variation in volume of imports:  +102%  for  poultrymeat,  +700  to  +1000%  for pork 
in respect  of which  the  EC  will become  a  net  ~mporter; 
overrun of the volume of exportable surplus in 1999:  +150  000  T  for  poultrl~eat 
and +200  000  T  for pork.  Contrary to the Commission's  (unrealistic)  assumption, it 
will not  be  possible to export  these large quantities of  surplus without  refunds 
as  a  result  of  the  fall  in  cereal  prices  - something  which  the  Commission 
departments have  now,  inc~dentally, accepted. 
SECTORS IN WHICH  THE  COMMON  ORGANIZATION OF THE  MARKET  HAS  NOT  YET  BEEN  SUBJECT TO 
REFORM 
Unfortunately,  there  is  no  information  on  the  economic  consequences  of  a  GATT 
agreement  on all the sectors still to be  reformed in 1992,  as  no study has as yet 
covered them in detail.  But,  like all the  other sectors,  these  sectors will have 
fully  to  incorporate  the  disciplines  arising  out  of  GATT  agreement,  including 
tariffication and minimum access,  reducing the volume of subsidized exports and the 
refund  budgets  and  cutting  internal  supports.  The  common  organizations  of  the 
market  in  those  products,  which  are  even  now  little  developed  and  little 
"cherished"  by  the  EAGGF,  would  ~n all probability be  completely  "wrecked"  by  a 
GATT  agreement  (abolition  of  import  schedules,  var~able  reference  prices  and 
countervailing charges),  and  it would  subsequently  become  almost  ~mpossible to 
reform  them,  had  such  reform  to  incorporate  the  disciplines arising out  of  the 
GATT.  The  Mediterranean  countries  of  the  EC,  producing  fruit  and  vegetables  -
notably Spain  - and table wine  (it is table  w~nes which attract all the internal 
aids  and  export  supports,  and  here  again  Spain  accounts  for  a  substantial 
proportion of wine exports benefiting from refunds)  would be particularly affected 
by such agreements. 
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US,  THE  ROLES  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  COMMUNITY  INSTITUTIONS,  THE  ROLE  OF  THE 
GATT 
It is clear that the text of the Dunkel compromise and that of the draft Washington 
accord were based on the arguments of the  US=  separation of commitments lnto three 
sectors:  lnternal aids  - export  subsidles and  market  access,  with  direct  income 
support  remaining  unaffected  as  well  as  waivers  and  unilateral  US  measures. 
Throughout  the negotiations,  the  US  has demonstrated a  united front,  consistently 
adopting an ultra-free-trade and maximalist  approach,  in daily contrast with its 
actual actions  (abolition of set-aside,  bolstering of export  subsidy  programmes, 
import barriers,  unilateral retaliatory trade measures etc)  but  which  has earned 
it the  support  of  the  liberal exporters  of  agricultural  products  in  the  Cairns 
Group.  The EC  has been skilfully made  by the Americans,  inevitably supported by the 
Australians and  the  Cairns  Group,  to  occupy  the position of  the eternal naughty 
schoolboy in the class of the  GATT  contracting parties,  throughout  the 7  years of 
negotiations. The American tactic is to shout out at the least opportunity that the 
European export subsidies are THE  factor disrupting the world agricultural markets, 
which would otherwise be  functionlng excellently,  that  EC  protectionism in regard 
to  its  agricultural  markets  lS  without  parallel  and  intolerable  for  all  the 
exporting countries,  including the developing countries and that the obstinacy of 
the  EC  in  protecting  its  agricultural  markets  has  seriously  jeopardized  the 
successful  outcome  of  GATT  Uruguay  Round  as  a  whole  (the  other  14  areas  of 
negotiation of which having been  making rapid and harmonious  progress,  accordlng 
to the US!  The true state of affairs was  apparent when  the other sectors concerned 
were discussed after  the publication of  the Washington draft agreement ...  ). 
Finding  itself constantly in  the  dock,  the  EC  adopted  an  exclusively defensive 
position,  and was  weakened further by  the lack of internal cohesion and the deep-
seated differences in interest and strategy dividing the Member  States which made 
any  firm and rapid decision practically lmpossible.  Not  to mention the different 
reception  the  Member  States  gave  to  American  commands  and  did  or  did  not  obey 
without question ...  the Community has unquestionably been in a  position of weakness 
as  compared with  the  US  since  the  start of  the  negotiations,  and  has  more  often 
than not been  the odd man  out. 
This  weakness  in  the  Communlty  posltion has  been  aggravated  by  the  differences 
existing  between  the  Member  States  within  the  Council  but  also  those  existing 
between the Council  and the Cornrnlssion,  the  European Parliament having generally 
confined itself to issuing opinions belatedly and with little determination. More 
particularly, during the negotia  tlons between the EC  and the US  in October-November 
1992,  which  resulted in  the  Washington  agreement,  the  Commission  was  accused  by 
several Member  States of having largely exceeded the mandate it had been set by  the 
Council  - the  mandate  itself  perhaps  lacking  in  precision.  It  lS  at  any  event 
desirable  that,  given  the  huge  importance of  the  economic,  social and  political 
issues  for  the  345  million citizens  of  Europe,  that  mandate  should  be  set  and 
strictly adhered to as negotiations are pursued.  A conclusion to the Uruguay Round 
- whatever its nature  - will in fact  effect  a  profound change in the living and 
working conditions of every European  in the  decades  to come. 
The  role  of  the  GATT  has  also  been  the  subJect  of  an  ever-increasing amount  of 
discussion during the past  7  years.  The need for far-reaching reform of the way  in 
which  it  operates  - whether  or  not  accompanied  by  the  creation,  a  concept 
withdrawn after Bretton Woods,  of  a  world trade organization with real powers  to 
carry out  surveillance and  impose  penalties  - has  become  increasingly apparent. 
However,  the  concept of  total  free  trade advocated by  the  GATT  which  has  proved 
- 157  -extremely  catastrophic  for  the  economy  and  social  conditions  of  many  countries 
(foremost among them the United K~ngdom) is being increas~ngly called into question 
in Europe and elsewhere,  particularly since the dramatic  ~ncrease in unemployment 
in the major industrialized countries, accompanied by a  tragic  (but with less media 
appeal)  decline  into  poverty  of  all  of  the  countries  of  Black  Africa.  Serious 
economists realize that the  econom~es of the industrialized democracies will never 
be able to withstand, in the context of absolute free trade, exports from countries 
where wages are  10  or  50  times  lower  than in the  EC  or social  protect~on does  not 
exist and the workforce  (particularly ch~ld labour)  is overexploited, not can they 
withstand  the  exports  of  countries  which  sell  off  their  products  on  the  world 
markets at low prices in order to dominate them and thereby perpetuate the collapse 
in world agricultural pr~ces  (and along with them that of several of the developing 
countries  whose  economies  are  undermined  by  the  staggering deterioration in  the 
terms  of  trade),  and  are  prepared  to  provide  their  farmers  with  (temporary  and 
degressive)  direct aid to guarantee them a  decent income.  Those aids,  which result 
in farmers  ceasing to  be  economic  agents  and  being  instead transformed into the 
takers  of  hand-outs,  are  not  only  unable  to  halt  but  are  in  fact  going  to 
accelerate  the  process  of  rural  exodus  and  desertification of  the  countryside, 
thereby  jeopardizing the  regional  balance  in the  Community.  It is  therefore  the 
basic  principles  underlying  the  GATT  - and  they  are  clearly  not  sui  ted  to 
agriculture - that are  be~ng questioned and  that  require adjustment of  ~ts rules 
and the way  in which it operates,  and  perhaps  indeed consideration of whether it 
should exist at all. 
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delegations  (EC  and US)did not  have  time to set down  offic~ally in writing at the 
end of their last meeting] ; 
-"USA  TEXT"  and "US  agricultural highlights",  information sheets published by  the 
US  mission to the European Communities,  Brussels  (occasional publication) 
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5.8.  AGRA-EUROPE  (AGENCE  EUROPE) 
Weekly information sheets recording the stage reached in the negotiations and  the 
positions of the various national and international parties involved (agricultural 
sector). 
Journal similar to "Agra-Europe". 
5.9.  DAILY  NEWSPAPERS  AND  NON-SPECIALIST  NATIONAL  MAGAZINES 
Dailies: 
-Le Monde  (F) 
-Les  Echos  (F) 
-Le  Figaro  (section on  the economy)  (F) 
-Herald Tribune  (US) 
-Financial Times  (UK) 
weeklies: 
-Le Point  (F) 
-L'Express  (F) 
-Time Magazine  (US) 
-Newsweek  (US) 
-The  Economist  (UK) 
Monthlies 
-Eurodiagnostic  (F) 
5.10.  AGRICULTURAL  AND  ECONOMIC  JOURNALS  OR  PUBLICATIONS 
FRANCE 
-Cultivar  (F,  agricultural,  monthly) 
-Tribune Verte  (F,  agr~cultural,  information circular,  twice-weekly) 
-BIMA  information bulletin of  the  French Agriculture Ministry  (F,  agricultural 
(bi-monthly) 
.23.1 .92:  l'Uruguay Round  (dossier)  (pages  20-24) 
-Agriculture et cooperation  (F,  agricultural,  quarterly) 
-Reussir-cereales-grandes cultures  (F,  agricultural,  monthly) 
-L'information agricole,  journal of the FNSEA,  (F,  agricultural-trade unionist, 
monthly) 
-Agriculture magazine  (F,  agricultural,  monthly) 
.N°  79,  special Europe,  December  1992 
-Revue  du marche  cornmun  et de  l'Union europeenne  (F,  agricultural and economic, 
monthly) 
.N°  356,  March  1992:  Le  GATT,  l'Europe et la France  (pages  201-202). 
-Economie et statistiques, revue de  l'INSEE  (Institut national de la statistique 
et des  etudes economiques)  (F,  economic,  monthly),  N°  254-255,  May-June  1992: 
.Des  excedents agricoles  diffic~les a maitriser  (pages  19-27) 
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.L'agriculture  americaine  est-elle  plus  productive  que  celle  de  l'Europe 
(pages  29-40) 
.La  reforme  de  la PAC  et les negociations du  GATT:  un  pas  necessaire  pour 
un  compromis  minimal?  (pages  41-61)  [econometr~c model] 
-Problemes  economiques,  N°  2302,  2  December  1992,  (F,  econom~c,  monthly): 
.Quelle agriculture deman?  (pages  18-22) 
.Les negociations du  GATT  et la PAC:  la logique des positions americaine et 
communautaire  (pages  14-17) 
-Chroniques 
l'agriculture, 
economiques  N° 
de  la  SEDEIS,  N°  10,  15.10.90  (F, 
by  Phippe  Chalmin  (pages  360-367) 
2201,  28.11.90,  pages  17-23) 
-Economie rurale  (F,  economic,  bi-monthly) 
economic) : 
(reprinted 
Le 
~n 
GATT  et 
Problemes 
.N°  210,  July-August  1992:  analyse  des  consequences  du  programme 
d'encouragement a !'exportation  (EEP)  des Etats-Unis sur le marche mondial du ble 
(pages  3-9) 
.N°  211,  Sept-Oct  1992: 
-le contexte historique et  polit~que de  la reforme  de la PAC  (pages  5-9) 
-le  projet  MacSharry:  facteurs  de  sensibilite  du  debouche  cerealier 
communautaire  (pages  20-29) 
-la politique agricole en question: quelle alternative au soutien des prix? 
(pages  34-39) 
-Economie  prospective  internat~onale,  N°  45,  first quarter  1991  (F,  economic, 
quarterly): L 'agriculture au GATT,  la position americaine d 'octobre 1989  (pages 27-
46) 
-Economie et finances agricoles,  N°  266,  Jan/Feb 1992  (F,  economic,  bi-monthly): 
Agriculture fran9aise:  l'ajustement force 
-Economie  et  sociologie  rurales,  INRA  (F),  Rennes,  January  1991:  Etude  de 
scenarios alternatifs d'evolution de la Pol~tique agricole commune  (available from 
INRA-Rennes  (F)) 
-Observations et diagnostics economiques  (mensuel,  economic,  F),  N°  42,  October 
1992: 
.Elements pour une nouvelle politique agricole,  pages  95-134 
-L'Europe en formation  (economic,  quarterly,  F),  N°  287,  winter  1992-93: 
.Le  GATT:  le veto et l'agriculture,  pages  13-14 
-INRA-Sciences sociales-Rennes  (Institut national de  la recherche agronomique, 
Departement  d'economie  et  de  sociologie  rurale,  Rennes,  F):  Reforme  de  la PAC, 
simulations et analyses  (summary analysis) 
-INRA-Economie-Rennes:  reforme de la Politique agricole commune:  la maldonne du 
nouveau soutien public a l'agriculture 
-MOCI  (Moni teur du commerce international)  (weekly,  trade-marketing, F),  N°  1069, 
22.3.93:  dossier special  GATT  93,  pages  34  to  73) 
-Proceedings  of  the  31st  seminar  of  the  Eur9pean  Association  of  Agricultural 
Economists,  Frankfurt am  Main  (D),  7-9  December  1992  (first draft):  The  EC  and US 
- 165  -agricultural trade conflict and the  GATT  Round:  petty multilateralism?  (available 
from  INRA-Rennes  (F)) 
-Cahiers fran9ais N°  257,  July-Sept 1992,  (F,  economic): Le differend commercial 
entre la Communaute  europeenne et  les Etats-Unis  (pages  90-92) 
-Le  monde  des  oleo-proteagineux:  politique des etats et strategies des  acteurs 
(BERTRAND,  CHALMIN,  GREEN,  JAZRA,  PINGUET-ROUSSEAU,  ROUX,  published by ECONOMICA, 
Paris  1988) 
"Les  problemes  de  compatibilite entre les  accords  du  GATT  et la reforme  de  la 
PAC":  Dissertation,  Institut  d I etudes  poli  tiques  (IEP)  de  Strasbourg,  Renaud 
KERSTERN  and Olivier VISSET  (IEP  publication,  June  1993) 
-Intereconomics,  review of  internatlonal  trade  and  development,  No  6,  vol  27, 
Nov-Dec  1992:  Final  curtain  for  the  Uruguay  Round?  (D,  Institut  fur 
Wirtschaftsforschung-Hamburg)  (pages  253-254) 
-Paper  prepared  for  the  1992  International  Symposium  on  "GATT  and  Trade 
Liberalization in Agriculture", Otaru University of Commerce, December 18-19, 1992, 
Otaru,  Hokkaido,  Japan:  The  common  agricultural policy of the European Community 
in the context of the GATT  (Stefan Tangermann, Institute of Agricultural Economics, 
University of Gottingen,  D) 
SPAIN 
-ICE  (lnforacion Comercial Espanola  (ES,  economic) 
.No  700  (special),  December  1991:  La  agricultura en  la  Ronda  Uruguay  del 
GATT: 
-La agricultura en la Ronda  Uruguay del  GATT  (pages  13-19) 
-Raciona~idad y  realldad en la Ronda  Uruguay del  GATT  (pages  105-115) 
-Impacto  de  la Ronda  Uruguay  sobre el sector de  cereales en  Espana  (pages 
115-130) 
.No  2335,  27  July-30  August  1992:  Situaci6n del  conflicto comercial entre 
la CEE  y  EE  UU  como  consecuencia del  "panel del soja"  (pages  2435-3436) 
-Revista de  estudios agro-sociales  (ES,  agricultural and economic,  quarterly) 
.No  155,  Jan-March 1991: 
-las  propuestas  de  liberallzacion  del  cornercio  mudial  agropecuario.  Una 
aproximacion cualitativa  (pages  11-40) 
-la agricultura de  Estados Unldos  frente  a  la europea en la liberalizaci6n 
del cornercio agrario  (pages  55-67) 
-politicas de ayuda y  protecci6n a  la agrlcultura: su tratarniento en el GATT 
(pages  105-129) 
-Ronda  Uruguay  y  agricultura  (pages  163-190} 
ITALY 
-Questione agraria  (IT,  agricultural,  monthly} 
-Revista di econornia agraria  (IT,  agricultural,  monthly) 
-L'informatore agrarlo  (IT,  agricultural,  weekly) 
- 166  -UNITED  KINGDOM 
-British Farmer  (UK,  agricultural) 
-Farmers Weekly  (UK,  agricultural) 
-Journal of agricultural economics  (UK,  agricultural and economic) 
. Vol 43,  No  3  (9/92): Confessions of a  double agent in the EC-US Agricultural 
Policy Argument  (pages  327-342) 
.Vol 44.  No  1  (1/93): Rebalancing EC  cereals protection and the GATT  Uruguay 
Round  (pages  14-24) 
-The changing role of  the  common  agricultural policy:  the future  of farming  in 
Europe  (MARSH,  GREEN,  KEAMEY,  MAHE,  TANGERMANN,  TARDITI,  published  by  Belhaven 
Press,  London/New York  1991): 
.Chapter  8:  Implications of  the  CAP  of  freer  trade 
.Chapter 15:  Assessment  of  the  EC  GATT  proposal 
BELGIUM 
-1992:  Universite libre de  Bruxelles  (ULB),  Institut d'etudes  europeennes:  La 
reforme de  la PAC,  consequences pour la production des oleagineux  (P  CASTILLO  DE 
LA  ROSA) 
UNITED  STATES 
US  Agricultural  Policy  Guide  (World  perspectives  policy  guides,  Washington  DC, 
1991 ) 
New  Zealand 
Farming without subsidies:  New  Zealand's recent experience,  edited by Ron  Sandrey 
& Russel Reynolds, Ministry for Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington, New  Zealand, 
1990. 
INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS 
-OECD:  Agricultural policies,  markets  and trade:  monitoring and outlook,  1991, 
1992  (published annually) 
-The  OECD  Observer,  No  176,  June-July  1992  (OECD,  bi-monthly):  Agricultural 
reform:  an  integrated approach  (pages  14-17) 
-FAO:  La situation mondiale de 1' alimentation et de 1' agriculture en 1991  (United 
Nations  Food and Agriculture Organization,  Rome  (IT),  1992,  228  pages 
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